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Scholars of American politics often assume World War II liberalized white racial attitudes and
prompted a liberal shift in the federal government’s position on civil rights. This conjecture is
generally premised on the existence of an ideological tension between a war against Nazism and
the maintenance of white supremacy at home, particularly the southern system of Jim Crow. A
possible relationship between the war and civil rights was also suggested by a range of contem-
poraneous voices, including academics like Gunnar Myrdal and civil rights activists like Walter
White and A. Philip Randolph. However, while intuitively plausible, this relationship is generally
not well-verified empirically.
Using both survey and archival evidence, I argue the war’s impact on white racial attitudes is
more limited than is often claimed, but that the war shaped and constrained the executive branch’s
civil rights agenda in ways institutional scholars have generally ignored. The evidence is pre-
sented in two parts: First, I demonstrate that for whites in the mass public, while there is some
evidence of slight liberalization on issues of racial prejudice, this does not extend to policies ad-
dressing racial inequities. White opposition to federal anti-lynching legislation actually increased
during the war, especially in the South. There is some evidence of racial moderation among white
veterans, relative to their counterparts who did not serve. However, the range of issues is limited
in scope. Second, the war had both compelling and constraining impacts on the Roosevelt and
Truman administrations’ actions on civil rights. The war increased the probability of any change
at all occurring, but in doing so it focused the civil rights agenda on issues of military segregation
and defense industry discrimination, rather than a more general anti-segregation and job discrim-
ination agenda. In summary, World War II had myriad impacts on America’s racial order. It did
not broadly liberalize white attitudes, but its effect on the White House was a precursor to the
form of “Cold War civil rights” that would emerge in the 1950s.
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Contradictory Narratives of Race and
War
Right in the middle of American participation in the Second World War, a race riot broke out
in Detroit. June 20, 1943, was a hot summer day, and many of Detroit’s residents, black and
white alike, went to Belle Isle, an island park in the Detroit River. Problems began with a few
unrelated scuffles, but as tensions increased, rumors of a race riot started to spread. By 11 pm,
thousands were brawling on the bridge between the city and the island. By early morning, the
police had arrested 47 people, and, temporarily at least, brought peace to the unrest. The riot,
however, was further propelled by rumors that quickly spread around the city. In Paradise Valley,
a predominantly black neighborhood, a rumor spread that a group of white people had killed a
black woman and her child by throwing them over the bridge. Many responded by attempting to
travel to Belle Isle, only to find access to the bridge barricaded. Angered but without the expected
outlet to vent their frustrations, they returned to Paradise Valley and began destroying many of
the white-owned businesses. As police began moving in to Paradise Valley, another rumor spread
among white crowds gathered along Woodward Avenue. This time the rumor was that black
men at Belle Isle had raped several white women. A white mob began attacking black residents;
police did little to stop it. It would take another twenty hours before the mayor of Detroit and
the governor of Michigan went on the radio to proclaim a state of emergency; it would take even
longer before federal troops were brought in to bring the riot to a close. In the end, 34 people
were killed and more than 700 were injured. Property damage reached two million dollars. War
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production in Detroit, the core of what President Franklin Roosevelt had called “the arsenal of
democracy,” came to a halt.1
Ten days after the riot, an editorial in The Nation linked the riot and the racial divisions it repre-
sented to the ideological logic of the Second World War. “The Axis is losing battles in Europe and
the Pacific,” the editorial began, “but it can console itself with victories recently won in the United
States.” The language only grew stronger from there. “It is time for us to clear our minds and
hearts of the contradictions that are rotting our moral position and undermining our purpose,” it
read. “We cannot fight fascism abroad while turning a blind eye to fascism at home. We cannot
inscribe our banners ‘For democracy and a caste system.’ We cannot liberate oppressed peoples
while maintaining the right to oppress our own minorities.” Remaining passive in the face of
such racial inequities, the article declared in conclusion, meant Americans “have no right to say
complacently: ‘We are not as these Herrenvolk. . . ’ ”2
Such sentiments were not unusual during World War II. A year later, in 1944, the Swedish
economist Gunnar Myrdal published his mammoth two-volume opus on American race relations,
An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. Over the course of nearly 1,500
pages, Myrdal made the contradiction between the aims of war and Jim Crow clear. “There is
bound to be a redefinition of the Negro’s status in America as a result of this War,” he proclaimed.3
A few pages later, he articulated his reasoning. This war, he wrote, “is an ideological war fought in
defense of democracy.” The nature of the totalitarian dictatorships the Allied forces were fighting
“made the ideological issue much sharper in this War than it was in the First World War.” Further,
since Nazism is “based on a racial superiority dogma,” American democratic principles “had to be
1Harvard Sitkoff, Toward Freedom Land: The Long Struggle for Racial Equality in America, (Lexington: The University
Press of Kentucky, 2010), 43-64.
2“Defeat at Detroit,” The Nation, July 3, 1943, 4. A typographical error in the print magazine excluded a quotation
mark, which is edited in here for clarity. Partially cited, among other places, in Maria Hohn, “ ‘We Will Never Go Back
to the Old Way Again’: Germany in the African-American Debate on Civil Rights,” Central European History 41, 2008,
616.
3Gunny Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, (New York: Harper & Brothers
Publishers: 1944), 997.
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applied more explicitly to race.” The implication of this, to Myrdal, was clear. “In fighting fascism
and nazism,” he wrote, “America had to stand before the whole world in favor of racial tolerance
and the inalienable human freedoms.”4 Myrdal’s book was, according to Alan Brinkley, a “major
factor in drawing white liberal attention to problems of race – precisely because Myrdal himself
discussed racial injustice as a rebuke to the nation’s increasingly vocal claim to be the defender of
democracy and personal freedom in a world menaced by totalitarianism.”5 Although it received
some scattered criticism, the nature of the book – its social scientific language, non-partisan spon-
sorship, massive length, Myrdal’s European-ness – led it to seem like a “definitive analysis” of the
American race problem in elite discourse.6 These arguments by white liberals complemented the
rhetorical efforts of civil rights organizations and black newspapers, who advocated what came
to be called the “Double-V campaign” for victory at home and abroad. The war, it seemed, had
finally given them the tools necessary to make a real dent in white supremacy.
Others, however, were not so sure. The southern journalist John Temple Graves was among
them. Black civil rights leaders, Graves wrote in 1942, had made “plain beyond question an intent
to use the war for settling overnight the whole, long, complicated, infinitely delicate racial prob-
lem.” He was no fan of the Double-V campaign. “So little are they concerned by the fact that their
all-embracive crusade means a domestic war while their country is making supreme war abroad
that they have invited their followers to think in terms of a Double V-for-Victory – victory in battle
with Hitler and victory in battle at home,” Graves wrote. “Victory, unhappily, doesn’t work that
way.” Later in the same article, while detailing improvements in the conditions of black south-
erners during the war, he noted the decline of lynchings, but warned, “Unhappily the number
may increase now as a result of the agitations of the white man against the black and the black
4Ibid., 1004.
5Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War, (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 168-
169.
6Ibid.: 169-70; for criticism, see, e.g., Leo P. Crespi, “Is Gunnar Myrdal on the Right Track?” Public Opinion Quarterly
9(2), 1945, 201-212. Ralph Ellison also penned a notable critique. Of course, Myrdal was not the only person writing
on this topic. Countless books and articles were published linking the war to racial equality. Another important
contribution was Carey McWilliams, Brothers Under the Skin, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943).
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against the white.” For Graves, war meant putting domestic debates aside and doubling down
on the war abroad. “This war must be won,” Graves wrote. “And the black man in the South,
where most black men live, must get on with the white man in the South, no matter what Wash-
ington orders or New York demands.”7 Other white southern voices were less constrained. On
the floor of the U.S. Senate, Mississippi’s James Eastland declared southern soldiers – presumably
he meant the white ones – wanted to return home “to see the integrity of the social institutions
of the South unimpaired” and “white supremacy maintained.” According to Eastland, that was
the real point of fighting the fascist menace. “Those boys are fighting to maintain the rights of the
States,” Eastland declared. “Those boys are fighting to maintain white supremacy.”8
These stories are not just interesting historical anecdotes, but rather reflective of the ambigu-
ities of academic scholarship on World War II’s effect on civil rights politics in America. Politi-
cal scientists Philip Klinkner and Rogers Smith argue “it is hard to escape the conclusion that it
was. . . the emergence of fascism and Nazism in the 1930s that most set the stage for real trans-
formations” on civil rights.9 Many historians, too, have been inclined to take a positive view of
the war. Pete Daniel argues World War II “unleashed new expectations and, among many whites,
taught tolerance.” Taking it a step further, Daniel goes so far as to argue “the war in many ways
made the civil rights movement possible.”10 John Modell and colleagues point to the role of black
7John Temple Graves, “The Southern Negro and the War Crisis,” Virginia Quarterly Review 18(4), 1942, 501, 514, 516.
8Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time, (New York: Liverwright Publishing Corpo-
ration, 2013), 206. Jason Morgan Ward describes the broader rhetoric of this sort that emerged in the white South.
In comparison to civil rights advocates’ Double-V campaign, Morgan Ward writes,“Yet defenders of segregation ar-
ticulated their own vision of Double Victory. Championing white supremacy and demanding freedom from outside
interference, Southern conservatives deemed civil rights agitation and federal encroachment to be as dangerous as an
Axis invasion. The white South, like African Americans, had entered the war fighting on two fronts.” He later describes
this effort as “[m]ore than an elite rhetorical strategy but less than an authentic grassroots rebellion.” Jason Morgan
Ward, “ ‘A War for States’ Rights’: The White Supremacist Vision of Double Victory,” in Fog of War: The Second World
War and the Civil Rights Movement ed. Kevin M. Kruse and Stephen Tuck, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012),
127, 140.
9Philip A. Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 137.
10Pete Daniel, “Going among Strangers: Southern Reactions to World War II,” The Journal of American History 77 (3),
1990, 910.
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military service, arguing, “To a democratic but inegalitarian nation, the cost of waging war may
include the transformation of second-class citizens who are called upon to serve.”11 Among his-
torians, this view was initially developed in the 1960s by scholars who saw the World War II era
as the “forgotten years of the Negro revolution.”12
However, historians have increasingly taken a more critical perspective on the war’s rela-
tionship with civil rights. “If historians search for the roots of the civil rights movement in the
wartime struggle, they will doubtlessly find something in the discordant record resembling the
evidence they seek,” Kevin Kruse and Stephen Tuck write. While acknowledging “the turmoil
and rhetoric and bloodshed of war did indeed provide a far-reaching challenge to Southern, na-
tional and global systems of race,” they argue it “did not push racial systems in a single direction,
and certainly not one moving inexorably toward greater equality.”13 More cynical perspectives
can also be found in the work of some political scientists. Daniel Kryder highlights the correlation
between war and instances of racial violence, especially during the Second World War. Ronald
Krebs demonstrates the limits of black civil rights gains after World War II by comparing them to
the greater success of the Druze in Israel.14
Both perspectives contain kernels of truth. The logic of a war against Nazi racism gave civil
rights groups a compelling rhetorical framework and made it intellectually more difficult to justify
domestic Jim Crow. Yet the war also coincided with significant incidents of racial violence, many
concentrated near military bases. Some black veterans returned home only to be beaten by white
11John Modell, Marc Goulden, and Sigurdur Magnusson, “World War II in the Lives of Black Americans: Some
Findings and Interpretations,” The Journal of American History 76(3), 1989, 838.
12Richard M. Dalfiume, “The ‘Forgotten Years’ of the Negro Revolution,” The Journal of American History 55(1), 1968,
90-106.
13Kevn M. Kruse and Stephen Tuck, “Introuction: The Second World War and the Civil Rights Movement,” in Fog of
War: The Second World War and the Civil Rights Movement, ed. Kevin M. Kruse and Stephen Tuck, (New York: Oxford
University Press: 2012), 11-12. They further note that Sitkoff has actually become somewhat more cynical about the
war and civil rights as well. Ibid., 5, 13f6.
14Daniel Kryder, Divided Arsenal: Race and the American State during World War II, (New York: Cambridge University
Press: 2002); Ronald R. Krebs, Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship, (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2006).
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mobs, sometimes including law enforcement. And as the writing of John Temple Graves suggests,
there were no shortage of whites who found the attempt by civil rights activists to use the war’s
antifascist logic to be troubling. Not everyone was so convinced that, to use a phrase from The
Nation’s editorial page, the war could not be fought against fascism abroad while also maintaining
elements of fascism at home. For many white Americans, the war was fought to defend the status
quo, white supremacy and all.
Given the discrepancies between these contradictory narratives, this dissertation asks the fol-
lowing question: Did World War II alter the racialized limits of American democracy? Stated in
its most extreme form, I am interested in the question of what a world with the New Deal but no
World War II looks like in terms of race, public opinion, and executive branch behavior. Perhaps
more realistically, I hope to at least provide a theoretically and empirically grounded assessment
of the specific ways in which the war influenced the politics of civil rights in its aftermath, as dis-
tinct from – although almost certainly interacting with – the New Deal and its resultant coalitional
and ideological pressures.
The broader inquiry is broken down into two constitutive parts. First, did the war lead white
Americans – civilians and veterans alike – to liberalized views on race relations and civil rights in
its aftermath? Or were white Americans able to maintain an acceptance of – and in some cases a
commitment to – white supremacy despite the experience of the war against Nazism? Second, did
the war lead the Roosevelt and Truman administrations to address civil rights in ways distinctive
from how they would have otherwise, and earlier than when they would have otherwise? The
first question necessitates the quantitative study of public opinion more common to behavioral
researchers, while the second question requires careful qualitative analysis of the sort associated
with the study of American political development.
Using multiple types of evidence and varied analytical perspectives, I argue the war’s effect on
white racial attitudes is more limited than many assume, but that the war both compelled and con-
strained the executive branch response to civil rights in ways not widely acknowledged. This has
a number of substantive implications for the study of race and American political development,
as well as the relationship between the historical study of political institutions and the study of
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public opinion. Before turning to this evidence, however, this chapter frames the larger project in
several ways. I first provide relevant background information about World War II and American
civil rights. I then situate this research more concretely into a set of scholarly agendas15 and ad-
dress several theoretical and methodological issues, including case selection, an executive branch
focus, and the relationship between mass attitudes on civil rights and the presidential response to
it. I conclude with a roadmap of the chapters to come.
Background
Certain aspects of the Second World War are relatively clear cut. Most historical accounts place
World War II’s beginning – at least in the European theatre – with the German invasion of Poland
on September 1, 1939, although fighting in Asia had been going on much longer. Japanese forces
attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the United States entered the war the follow-
ing day. Benito Mussolini was killed on April 28, 1945 and Adolf Hitler committed suicide two
days later. Fighting continued in Asia until Atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Na-
gasaki on August 6, 1945, and August 9, 1945, respectively. Japan surrendered on August 15,
with documents being signed on September 2, officially ending the war. The war was a landmark
event in many respects. Over fifty million people died in the war.16 The use of atomic energy
for weaponry brought research scientists into defense work in new ways, something that would
continue throughout the Cold War. The postwar international economic order was substantially
changed as well.17
The war’s impact on the American state was profound. In 1939, the national government spent
15This is articulated more fully in Chapters 3-5.
16John M. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 3. No
precise number is available and all estimates have some underlying uncertainty. Recent evidence suggests the number
is perhaps over sixty million.
17Anne-Marie Burley, “Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal
Regulatory State,” in Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, ed. John Gerard Ruggie,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 125-156.
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$1.1 billion on defense; just two years later, this number increased to over $6 billion. The next year,
in 1940, the American government instituted the first peacetime draft in the nation’s history.18 The
federal government expanded not just in size, but also in the scope of its authority – in no small
part due to the Second War Powers Act of 1942, a grant of executive discretion that declared a
state of emergency lasting until its formal termination a decade later.19 America’s relationship
with the rest of the world was also profoundly altered. The internationalist shift beginning with
Lend-Lease was a clear departure from a recent history of “international aloofness.”20
For President Roosevelt, whose tenure in the 1930s had been defined in large part by the eco-
nomic and social policies of the New Deal, the war meant “Dr. New Deal” had been replaced by
“Dr. Win the War.” However, there was at least one important shift on domestic policy. While
3,842 documented lynchings occurred between 1889 and 1941, the January 1942 federal investiga-
tion of the lynching of Cleo Wright in Sikeston, Missouri, marked the first time the Department of
Justice became directly involved in a state lynching case. Coming just a month after the attack on
Pearl Harbor, it is probably no coincidence that the details of the lynching – Wright was seized by
a mob of 600 whites, dragged through a black neighborhood tied to a car, and set on fire – were
spread around the world by Axis propagandists.21
The war’s effect on the public was no less substantial. In the interwar period, many Amer-
icans – “disillusioned with the failure of peace after the ‘war to end all wars,’ World War I” –
were “wary of foreign entanglements.” However, in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and America’s
formal entry into the war, national attitudes became more internationalist in nature.22 Beyond
18Klinkner and Smith, The Unsteady March, 147-148.
19James T. Sparrow, Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2011), 6.
20Ibid., 5.
21Klinkner and Smith, The Unsteady March, 173; Lee Finkle, “The Conservative Aims of Militant Rhetoric: Black
Protest during World War II,” The Journal of American History 60(3), 1973, 700.
22Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences,
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just public opinion towards interventionism, however, the war affected American society deeply.
About 16 million Americans served in the war, more than the combined total of all U.S. wars until
that time.23
The South was particularly influenced by the war. Eight of the nine army training centers
with capacities for 50,000 or more military personnel were located there. The war also coincided
with dramatic shifts to the demographic makeup and political economy of the region. In 1940, 77
percent of all African Americans lived in the South, with half of black southerners living in rural
areas. Employment in agriculture was 73 percent above the national average and per capita in-
come 40 percent below it. The region was “considerably poorer, blacker, and more rural than any
other part of the United States,” as Morton Sosna puts it. Over the course of the war, 1.6 million
civilians migrated out of the South. The rural population declined by nearly 3.5 million, bringing
it to about 7 million total – less than half what it had been before the Great Depression started the
trend. African Americans accounted for about two-thirds of migration out of the South, as well as
half of the intraregional movement from the rural South to its urban centers. African Americans
who left the South disproportionately went to states with strong city machine politics.24 By the
war’s end, the black rural population dropped by 30 percent and the share of the national black
population living in the region fell to 68 percent. Military service had a particularly strong influ-
ence on migration for young black veterans. Over half of black men in their twenties during their
service lived in a different region by 1950, compared to a third of nonveteran black men and a
quarter of white veterans in that age group. Economically, changes were similarly vast. As Dil-
lard Lasseter of the War Manpower Commission in Atlanta declared in 1944, “Due to conditions
arising out of the war, the South has undergone more economic changes in two years than in any
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 176.
23Morton Sosna, “Introduction,” in Remaking Dixie: The Impact of World War II on the American South, ed. Neil
McMillen, (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1997), xvi.
24John Frederick Martin, Civil Rights and the Crisis of Liberalism: The Democratic Party 1945-1976, (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1979), 50. On the same page, Martin suggests Tom Pendergrast, the boss of Kansas City who introduced Harry
Truman into Democratic political office, “was perhaps the first of the Democratic bosses to win over the new urban
blacks, and he did so in a state where the Klan was a power in politics.”
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previous fifty.”25
Yet World War II’s effects went far beyond this. An enemy more explicitly racist than Nazi
Germany is difficult to imagine, and in this sense the Second World War provided a unique set of
opportunities for the 1940s civil rights movement. “Unlike the aftermath of World War I,” Kimber-
ley Johnson writes, “nearly two decades of organizational activity and institution building prior
to World War II provided a means of translating the rhetoric, limited reforms, and slim political
openings created by a war for democracy into action.”26 “[T]he hysterical cries of the preachers of
democracy for Europe leave us cold,” an editorial in the NAACP’s Crisis proclaimed. “We want
democracy in Alabama, Arkansas, in Mississippi and Michigan, in the District of Columbia – in
the Senate of the United States.”27 For external factors to the civil rights movement – like inter-
national political pressures – “processes internal to the movement contributed to the favorable
effect they had on the structure of black political opportunities during the period in question,”
according to Doug McAdam.28 It was not just the exogenous shock of war, in other words, that
magically transformed the abilities of civil rights activists. Rather, it was processes endogenous to
these groups that directed the war’s impact. Black newspapers played a significant role in relating
25Sosna, “Introduction,” xiv-xvi; Pete Daniel, “Going among Strangers,” 886; Dillard B. Lasseter, “The Impact of
the War on the South and Implications for Postwar Developments,” Social Forces 23(1), 1944, 20; Modell et al., “World
War II in the Lives of Black Americans,” 839. As Pete Daniel describes it, “In the South then, the war planted seeds
that hastened the development of a new agricultural structure, intensified urbanization, and launched a civil rights
movement. The war, more than the New Deal, ended hard times for many southerners, and during the war the role of
the federal government, enlarged to fight depression, expanded and became ever more critical in reshaping southern
culture.” Daniel, “Going Home Among Strangers,” 887. Change was not restricted to the South, of course. There is a
large historical literature on the impact of the war on urban areas. See Nat Brandt, Harlem at War: The Black Experience
in WWII, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996); Roger W. Lotchin (Editor), The Way We Really Were: The Golden
State in the Second Great War, (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1999); Roger W. Lotchin, The Bad City in the Good
War: San Francisco, Los Angeles, Oakland, and San Diego, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003). Due to increases
in the black populations of northern cities as a result of southern out-migration, Democratic politicians in the North
were beginning to have a new set of incentives and strategic calculations to make.
26Kimberley Johnson, Reforming Jim Crow: Southern Politics and State in the Age before Brown, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 99.
27Klinkner and Smith, The Unsteady March, 148.
28Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970: Second Edition, Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1999 [1982], 271n.
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the international goals of war to the domestic goal of civil rights. The Pittsburgh Courier advocated
a Double V campaign – victory at home and abroad – while the Chicago Defender sought to com-
memorate the lynching of Cleo Wright in Sikeston, Missouri, by urging readers, “Remember Pearl
Harbor and Sikeston, too.”29 Wartime saw major increases in the strength of black political and
civic organizations. Membership in the NAACP, for example, increased ten-fold during the war,
while the readership of black newspapers went up by an estimated 40 percent.30 This coincided
with an international shift in the NAACP’s rhetoric. “Those attending the NAACP’s annual con-
ference in Philadelphia in June 1940 heard speaker after speaker link the global struggle against
tyranny to the historic battle against racial persecution,” according to Jonathan Rosenberg.31
Unfortunately, the war was far from a move into easy racial tolerance. Wartime violence on
the homefront was an unsettling reminder that in fighting a war against Nazism, America had a
ways to go. Many such cases were reported in A Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race
Relations. The August 1943 edition described how a black soldier stationed at Camp Van Dorn in
Mississippi was killed by a white civilian allegedly for saying “yes” instead of “yes, Sir.”32 The
September 1943 edition reported the following incident from Charleston, South Carolina:
A few weeks ago a Negro soldier was severely beaten by two civilian policemen. The
former was apparently sober when the officers accosted him and demanded that he
get into a patrol wagon. The beating ensued when the soldier refused. “Hell, shoot
me,” the Negro said, “It’s your country I’m supposed to die for anyway. Go ahead
and shoot.” The civilian policemen were obviously shamed by this statement, and put
29Neil A. Wynn, The Afro-American and the Second World War: Revised Edition, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1993
[1976]), 100.
30Harvard Sitkoff, “Racial Militancy and Interracial Violence in the Second World War,” The Journal of American His-
tory 58(3), 1971, 663; Thomas Sugrue, “Hillburn, Hattiesburg, and Hitler: Wartime Activists Think Globally and Act
Locally,” in The Fog of War: The Second World War and the Civil Rights Movement, ed. Kevin M. Kruse and Stephen Tuck,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 90.
31Jonathan Rosenberg, How Far the Promised Land?: World Affairs and the American Civil Rights Movement from the First
World War to Vietnam, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 133.
32A Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race Relations, 1943 1(1), 9.
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their guns away to await the arrival of M.P.’s.33
The January 1944 edition attempted a more systematic account, calculating 242 major incidents
involving black-white conflict in 47 U.S. cities between March 1 and December 31, 1943, which
“range in seriousness from hate strikes to race riots, from soldier and civilian clashes to racial
conflicts over housing sites.” Forty-six percent were in the South, 42 percent in the North, and 12
percent on the West Coast.34 Later that year, the editors noted, “One of the ironies of D-Day was
the fact that it was the beginning of one of the largest hate strikes witnessed in recent months.”35
Public discourse on race couldn’t help but be affected by this seeming discrepancy, as the rhetoric
by The Nation’s editorial board, Gunnar Myrdal, and others mentioned in the introductory section
suggests.
As this dissertation describes, the 1930s civil rights agenda of anti-lynching and anti-poll tax
legislation gave way to more war-specific claims about discrimination in the defense industry
and segregation in the armed forces. In contrast to the near absence of national policy accom-
plishments on civil rights in the 1920s and 1930s, the 1940s would see executive action related to
these new policy items. The goal of this dissertation is to ask what World War II meant for race
and American political development. The answer, I argue, can be found in assessing the ways
in which the war did – and did not – lead whites to rethink the racial status quo, and the ways
in which it led the executive branch to move earlier and differently on civil rights policies that it
would have otherwise. Yet before turning to my findings, this focus requires a few more words of
justification.
33A Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race Relations, 1943 1(2), 9.
34A Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race Relations, 1944 1(6), 2.
35A Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race Relations, 1944 1(11), 5. The incident took place in Cincinnati, Ohio.
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War and American Politics: Some Theoretical and Methodological Justi-
fications
In his 1957 book An Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony Downs set the framework for much
political science research about American politics. However, one statement by Downs has been
notably forgotten. “In essence, we are assuming that citizens’ political tastes are fixed,” he wrote.
“Even though these tastes often change radically in the long run, we believe our assumption is
plausible in the short run, barring wars or other social upheavals.”36 However, as David Mayhew
notes in an article written nearly a half-century later, scholars of American politics have long fo-
cused almost entirely on domestic factors like economic fundamentals to explain public policy
outcomes. This has led to a tendency to “underplay contingency,” of which wars are a prime
example.37 This is a striking contrast to research in international relations and comparative poli-
tics, where scholars have drawn on research agendas emphasizing “the second image reversed”
and how “war made the state,” respectively.38 As Elizabeth Kier and Ronald Krebs note, war
can have profound, complex effects on democratic politics. “Democracies often compromise their
principles during crises. Executive authority grows, rights of due process are set aside, and free
expression suffers,” they write. “But war’s effects on liberal-democratic institutions and processes
are diverse, often contradictory, and not always negative.”39 Considering this duality, it is strik-
ing that scholarship on race and American political development has, quite rightly, increasingly
turned to the mid-1940s as the beginning of a critical shift on civil rights, but without engaging
36Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (Boston: Addison-Wesley), 47. Emphasis added. The only
reference to this sentence I am familiar with is Andrew Sabl, Ruling Passions: Political Offices and Democratic Ethics,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
37David R. Mayhew, “Wars and American Politics,” Perspectives on Politics 3(3), 2005, 482.
38Peter Gouevtich, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Orga-
nization 32(4), 1978, 881-912; Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992, (Cambridge: Blackwell,
1995).
39Elizabeth Kier and Ronald Krebs, “Introduction: War and Democracy in Comparative Perspective,” in In War’s
Wake: International Conflict and the Fate of Liberal Democracy, ed. Elizabeth Kier and Ronald R. Krebs, (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2010), 1.
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with the international context of the Second World War.40 This dissertation highlights the war’s
central, albeit uneven, impact on race and American political development, offering insights for
this research agenda, as well as amendments to previously mentioned accounts of the war’s im-
pact on civil rights.41
The specific details of how this dissertation contributes to such theoretical accounts are de-
scribed in the relevant chapters.42 Several general aspects of this dissertation, however, merit
further justification before proceeding. The first concern is the issue of case selection generally,
and the use of a single case particularly.43 Research on war and domestic politics tends to look at
multiple wars or issue areas. Klinkner and Smith focus on the issue of civil rights, but since they
begin in 1619 and end in 1998, they cover all major wars in American history. Saldin examines
multiple wars (from the Spanish-American War to the Vietnam War), and while he considers the
incorporation of marginalized groups, he is also interested in broader shifts related to the state
and the party system. Krebs is focused on minority inclusion, but uses both multiple countries
(African American rights claims in the United State and rights claims by the Druze in Israel) and
multiple wars (World War I and the Cold War for the U.S. case).44 I argue that an in depth ex-
amination of civil rights during World War II is merited for several reasons. First, in aiming for
40Brian Feinstein and Eric Schickler, “Platforms and Partners: The Civil Rights Realignment Reconsidered,” Studies
in American Political Development 22, 2008, 1-31; Eric Schickler and Devin Caughey, “Public Opinion, Organized Labor,
and the Limits of New Deal Liberalism,” Studies in American Political Development 25(2), 2011, 162-189; Eric Schickler,
“New Deal Liberalism and Racial Liberalism in the Mass Public, 1937-1968,” Perspectives on Politics 11(1), 2013, 75-98.
41In particular, this dissertation systematically places its arguments in comparison to the arguments of Klinkner and
Smith, The Unsteady March; Krebs, Fighting for Rights; Kryder, Divided Arsenal; and Robert P. Saldin, War, the American
State, and Politics since 1898, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
42Chapter 3 situates an analysis of public opinion with reference to unverified assumptions about mass attitudes
common to studies of the era. Chapter 4 frames a consideration of the Roosevelt administration with reference to
scholarship on its neglect of civil rights, as well as Klinkner and Smith’s argument about the time period. Finally,
Chapter 5 moves to the Truman administration, and in doing so mediates between the more positive arguments of
Klinkner and Smith and the more negative take by Krebs.
43For a more methodological discussion of single case research, see John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and
Practices, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 187-210.
44Kryder, by contrast, does focus on the single case of race relations during World War II.
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generalizability – and, thus, exchanging depth for breadth – previous accounts of war’s impact on
American civil rights politics have missed important details of the the World War II case, which
has affected their general claims about war and minority incorporation. Second, if the dependent
variable is civil rights, I argue World War II – a total war, widely supported, against an obviously
racist enemy – is a critical case for an examination of war as an independent variable. Further,
the political development of civil rights in the context of the Second World War – compelled yet
also constrained by the wartime context – had profound implications for the twentieth century
politics of civil rights.45 As such, it is essential to make sure scholarly accounts of this juncture are
accurate.
Related to the selection of the specific war, there is also the question of dependent variable.
Why black civil rights? Certainly the war had profound implications for the rights of Japanese
Americans, as Japanese interment and the Korematsu v. United States Supreme Court case affirm-
ing its constitutionality demonstrate. In the war’s aftermath, national civil rights debates would
be understood by Democrats in the Pacific Northwest especially through the lens of their expe-
rience with Japanese American rights claims (as well as Native American rights claims).46 The
war also coincided with intriguing developments in the push for Mexican-American civil rights,
especially in Texas.47 Yet while these aspects of the war’s impact on race and American politics
are deeply important, I argue the focus on black civil rights is merited for several reasons. First,
there is the substantial difference in population size. In 1940, African Americans represented 10
percent of the population overall, and 21 percent of the population in the South. In some states,
they approached a majority. In Mississippi, to take the closest example, 49 percent of residents
45This argument is articulated more fully in the conclusion.
46Transcript, July 19, 1952, meeting of DNC subcommittee on platform and resolutions; Folder: “Proceedings of
Subcommittee on Platform and Resolutions, July 19, 1952”; Box 217; Records of the Democratic National Committee;
Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
47Thomas A. Guglielmo, “Fighting for Caucasian Rights: Mexicans, Mexican Americans, and the Transnational Strug-
gle for Civil Rights in World War II Texas,” The Journal of American History 92(4), 2006, 1212-1237. The 1943 “Zoot Suit
Riots” in Los Angeles also highlighted racial tensions between Mexican-Americans and whites in California. See Ed-
uardo Obregón Pagán, Murder at the Sleepy Lagoon: Zoot Suits, Race, and Riot in Wartime L.A., (Chapel Hill: The University
of North Carolina Press, 2003).
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were African Americans (this was a slight decrease from the 1930 Census, when Mississippi had
more black residents than white residents). Residents of “Hispanic origin (of any race),” by con-
trast, constituted only one percent of the national population, while residents who identified as
“Asian and Pacific Islander” represented just .002 percent. In 1940, even Texas had more African
American residents than Hispanic residents.48 Second, black civil rights drew far more national
political attention than the rights claims of other marginalized groups. If the object of study is
outcomes on civil rights, black civil rights makes sense as a focal point.
A second concern is the institutional focus on the executive branch, rather than Congress, the
Supreme Court, or the political parties. Scholars have increasingly – and rightly – called for greater
attention to Congress in studies of American political development.49 However, while Congress
is a useful site for preference expression, it is a less useful site if the object of inquiry is actual
public policy outcomes, at least for the study of civil rights in the 1940s. Recent scholarship by
Julian Zelizer supports this interpretation. “In certain respects, World War II had a transformative
effect on the United States,” he writes. “‘. . . The U.S. Congress, however was difficult to change.”50
The war “did not bring progress on the legislative front.”51 As Katznelson and colleagues have
described, the coalition between southern Democrats and northern Republicans, bolstered by in-
stitutional features of the Senate like the filibuster, effectively killed almost all civil right legisla-
48United States Census Bureau, “Table 1. United States – Race and Hispanic Origin: 1790 to 1990,” 2002, http:
//www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tab01.pdf; United States Census Bureau,
“Table 4. South Region – Race and Hispanic Origin: 1790 to 1990,” 2002, http://www.census.gov/population/
www/documentation/twps0056/tab04.pdf; United States Census Bureau, “Table 39. Mississippi – Race and His-
panic Origin: 1800 to 1990,” http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tab39.
pdf; United States Census Bureau, “Table 58. Texas – Race and Hispanic Origin: 1850 to 1990,” 2002, http:
//www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tab58.pdf.
49Ira Katznelson and John S. Lapinski, “At the Crossroads: Congress and American Political Development,” Perspec-
tives on Politics 4(2), 2006, 243-260.
50Julian E. Zelizer, “Confronting the Roadblock: Congress, Civil Rights, and World War II,” in Fog of War: The Second
World War and the Civil Rights Movement, ed. Kevin M. Kruse and Stephen Tuck, (New York: Oxford University Press,
2012), 32.
51Ibid., 39. The war, he suggests, “did help to produce a generational change in Congress that benefited civil rights.
To trace the contributions of the war, however, it is necessary to focus on long-term generational change rather than the
immediate political situation.” Ibid., 47.
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tion. The soldier voting bill is an exception, but its effects were far more limited than those of the
executive orders this dissertation analyzes.52
The Supreme Court might also seem a reasonable area of study, particularly since the war co-
incided with the 1944 Smith v. Allwright decision, which ruled against the white primary in the
South. Klinkner and Smith suggest as much. “The Court’s decision in Smith reflected its emerging
stress on the protection of civil and political rights, an emphasis influenced by the changing global
context,” they write. Although they acknowledge that Justice Stanley Reed, who wrote the Smith
majority opinion, “made no mention of the war,” they point to two sources: A New York Times cor-
respondent, who declared the “real reason” for the Court’s move against the white primary was
“that the common sacrifices of wartime have turned public opinion and the Court against previ-
ously sustained devices to exclude minorities”; and a 1979 book by the historian Darlene Clark
Hine, which argues, “The white primary was one of the casualties of World War II.”53 However,
the Smith case was somewhat more complicated than that. Intellectually, it was effectively de-
cided prior to U.S. entry into the war, by the decision in early 1941’s United States v. Classic, which
declared Congress had certain rights to regulate primaries. It is difficult to closely identify the
Court’s decision with the wartime context, per se. And, of course, in a case that was more directly
tied up in World War II – Korematsu v. United States, decided later in 1944 – the Court offered one of
the most profoundly illiberal, racially exclusionary decisions in its history, ruling that Japanese in-
ternment was constitutional.54 The courts were important, as the NAACP’s legal advocacy made
clear. Yet in the pre-Brown era, executive action produced more civil rights outcomes.
The Democratic and Republican National Committees offer a final potential area of study.
These party committees have increasingly become an objective of scholarly attention.55 The imme-
52I do, however, discuss public opinion related to giving ballots to black soldiers in Chapter 2.
53Klinkner and Smith, The Unsteady March, 193.
54For a contemporaneous discussion of this issue, see Eugene V. Rostow, “The Japanese American Cases–A Disaster,”
Yale Law Journal 54, July 1945, 489-535.
55This literature is still very much in development, but see Daniel Galvin, “The Transformation of Political Insti-
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diate postwar period was certainly an important moment of transition in how the national party
provided a space for state-level Democratic party elites to negotiate the party’s future on civil
rights, in a moment when black voters were claiming to be “the balance of power” in presidential
elections, rather than electorally captured.56 The party committee will play a small role in my
analysis of the Truman years. However, while the state parties and the national party committee
are excellent sites for preference expression, they, too, are less useful as sites of policy outcomes.
This does not mean they do not merit increased scholarly attention. They do. However, that is not
the object of this dissertation.
These negative arguments are helpful, but fortunately there are also positive arguments for
an executive branch focus. Perhaps most importantly, the actual concrete achievements on civil
rights in the 1940s were almost entirely executive orders issued by Roosevelt and Truman, since
the racially liberal coalition in the Senate was unable to override “the Southern veto.” Although
executive orders are often limited in comparison to congressional legislation, they represent the
primary accomplishments of the 1940s civil rights agenda.57 The executive branch is also inex-
tricably linked to war-making, holding the “sword” in the national government. This fits with
growing attention to the “wartime presidency.”58 Finally, social movements in the 1940s saw the
presidency as a place for pressure – probably in large part because they were all too familiar
with the filibuster’s ability to kill legislation in the Senate. Cornelius Bynum’s biography of A.
Philip Randolph, for example, suggests the executive branch focus “reflected [Randolph’s] basic
tutions: Investments in Institutional Resources and Gradual Change in the National Party Committees,” Studies in
American Political Development 26(1), 2012, 50-70; Christopher Baylor, “First to the Party: The Group Origins of the
Partisan Transformation on Civil Rights, 1940-1960,” Studies in American Political Development 27, 2013, 1-31.
56This is a topic I am exploring in a separate project. See Steven White, “Beyond ‘Northern’ Democrats: State Parties,
the Democratic National Committee, and Civil Rights, 1944-1952,” Unpublished Manuscript, Columbia University,
2014. For a discussion of “electoral capture,” see Paul Frymer, Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
57For a more general discussion of executive orders, see William Howell, “Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview,”
Presidential Studies Quarterly 35(3), 2005, 418-439;
58The “sword” rhetoric originates in Federalist 78. For an exploration of the wartime presidency, see William Howell
et al., The Wartime Presidency, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).
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understanding of interest group politics.” Congress “routinely ignored or overlooked the needs
of African Americans in drafting New Deal labor legislation,” in part because “African Americans
wielded insufficient political clout.” Randolph, he argues, “recognized that by targeting Roosevelt
and later Truman he could concentrate what political leverage African Americans did possess in
one branch of government instead of expending it on a disinterested Congress.”59
A third issue to address is the link between elite institutions and public opinion. The question
of what effect the war might have on racial attitudes was the subject of curiosity at the time. In
a 1942 special issue of The Annals of the American Academic of Political and Social Science dedicated
to the subject of “Minority Peoples in a Nation at War,” the social psychologist Otto Klineberg
attempted to set it up this way:
There remains the more general question as to what effect the war situation has had on
the attitudes toward minority groups in this country. In terms of what we know of so-
cial relationships, it is to be expected that a crisis situation would not leave unaffected
the interrelationships among the various subgroups that constitute the American peo-
ple.
To the question as to what effect a war situation in general, and this war in particular,
should have on these interrelationships, it is by no means easy to give a clear and un-
equivocal answer. In terms of logic and social science, there are factors in the situation
which would lead us to expect an improvement in the status of minority groups, and
other factors which would lead us to expect the opposite.60
A year later, the sociologist Charles S. Johnson described it this way:
In normal times there are numerous issues in the focus of discussion involving race,
and these issues are discussions are a part of the public opinion. A crisis situation such
as that created by the war penetrates to deeper levels. The issues are larger and more
ponderable. They involve not only the options that men discuss but the ideologies that
men fight about because they cannot discuss them. In this framework it is perhaps
easier to understand the present incidence of racial tension in the United States.
The war has raised new and deeper issues which are closer to the basic ideologies than
to the public opinions. It has had a disruptive effect upon the familiar institutions in
59Cornelius L. Bynum, A. Philip Randolph and the Struggle for Civil Rights, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010),
189-190.
60Otto Klineberg, “Race Prejudice and the War,” The Annals of the American Academic of Political and Social Science 223,
1942, 190.
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which racial adjustments of a sort have been worked out. It has made new demands
for manpower, in both the military and production fields, which transcend the virtues
of the traditional race system. Moreover, the over-all democratic philosophy of the war
brings a new hope of freedom to the minorities and, at the same time, brings a threat
of dissolution to the long entrenched traditions of social and racial dominance.61
While the Johnson quote ends on a positive note, Klineberg’s assessment that there are “factors
in the situation which would lead us to expect an improvement in the status of minority groups,
and other factors which would lead us to expect the opposite” is perhaps the better guideline for
this project. For the purposes of this dissertation, my concern with race and American democracy
leads me to consider public opinion a critical component. Yet “public opinion” at this time pe-
riod was not necessarily meant to be a representative cross-section of all the public. Pollsters like
George Gallup were often more interested in surveying the voting public – leading to severe under
sampling of African Americans generally, but black southerners in particular – which is somewhat
different than present-day practices. However, even this more limited public – whites, basically
– was useful if the concern is the link between people and politicians, as politicians were largely
concerned with the preferences of the white voting public in an era of legal white supremacy in
the South.62 There are more practical reasons as well. Given the tendency to simply assume World
War II liberalized white racial attitudes, an empirical examination of whether this is actually the
case is in order. This will provide a more nuanced and accurate understanding of race and Ameri-
can political development, particularly since state-centered analyses have often made underlying
claims about public attitudes, without reference to such survey evidence.63
61Charles S. Johnson and Associates, To Stem this Tide: A Survey of Racial Tension Areas in the United States, (New York:
AMS Press, 1943), ix.
62This theoretical justification will be addressed further in Chapter 2, which introduces the promises and perils of
using polls from the quota sampling era pre-1952. With reference to the behavioral tradition, this limited public mea-
sured by early pollsters is reminiscent of V. O. Key, Jr.’s definition of public opinion as “those opinions held by private
persons which governments find it prudent to heed.” V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy, (New York:
Alfred Knopf, 1961), 262.
63This argument is further developed in Chapter 3.
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Roadmap
This dissertation integrates analytical perspectives from the study of American political develop-
ment and the study of public opinion and political behavior, two aspects of the American politics
subfield that do not generally speak to each other. As Daniel Carpenter notes, research in the
American political development tradition has “consistently analyzed institutions at the expense
of emergent patterns of citizen behavior and organization.”64 Likewise, while scholars of pub-
lic opinion and political behavior have analyzed historical survey data, they generally have not
given significant attention to its relationship with the sort of institutional change that concerns
American political development scholars. Methodologically, then, I aim to bring together histor-
ical institutionalist and political behavioral approaches, considering both changes in institutions
like the executive branch and the content of public opinion. In framing my inquiries, I strive to
achieve a balance between reading history forward by relying on contemporaneous observations
about the war and civil rights on the one hand, and presenting my data analysis and historical
narratives with an eye toward present-day theoretical inquiries on the other.65
Chapter 2 provides a descriptive baseline of white racial attitudes in the midst of the Second
World War using two largely forgotten sources: the 1944 “Attitudes Toward Negroes” study con-
ducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), and a NORC mini-sample examining
attitudes toward soldier voting legislation then pending in Congress. Along with this substantive
overview of the state of white racial attitudes, I also discuss the nature of public opinion surveys
from this era, providing an overview of the weighting protocol recently developed that helps al-
leviate some of the sampling concerns related to them. This chapter concludes by considering the
broader theoretical goals that will complement this baseline overview in the third chapter.
Chapter 3 gathers the available survey evidence to assess two theoretical expectations. The
64Daniel P. Carpenter. “The Multiple and Material Legacies of Stephen Skowronek,” Social Science History 27(3), 2003,
467.
65For an articulation of what it means to “read history forward,” see Giovannia Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt, “The
Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond,” Comparative Political
Studies 43 (8/9), 2010, 931-968.
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first is that the Second World War led to increases in white support for black civil rights in general;
the second is that serving in the war led white veterans to be more racially liberal than their civil-
ian counterparts who did not serve. I demonstrate that white attitudes toward civil rights policies
– particularly federal intervention in state lynching cases and attitudes toward the abolishment
of the poll tax – did not liberalize over the course of the war. If anything, white opposition to
anti-lynching legislation actually increased, especially in the South. For veterans, the results are
somewhat more mixed. White veterans were indistinguishable from non-veteran whites on many
measures of racial prejudice. However, they were more supportive of federal anti-lynching leg-
islation in the war’s immediate aftermath, and southern white veterans were more supportive of
black voting rights in the early 1960s. The results have implications for scholarship assuming a
liberalization of white attitudes, as well as recent analyses of the link between economic and civil
rights liberalism in mass attitudes that have not focused on the wartime context.
Chapter 4 turns to the executive branch and considers the Roosevelt administration’s record
on civil rights in the context of the Second World War. Relying on internal executive branch doc-
uments, as well as attempts by black newspapers to get the administration to comment on the
Double-V campaign, I demonstrate the White House’s familiarity with the Double-V rhetoric of
civil rights activists, and frame this as part of a larger debate within the Roosevelt administra-
tion about whether to maintain a New Deal focus on social policy or focus almost entirely on the
military aspects of World War II. I then demonstrate how wartime activism compelled Roosevelt
to issue an executive order to combat defense industry discrimination, but how this constrained
the broader anti-job discrimination agenda. In demonstrating this dual effect of the war, these
findings offer a more accurate depiction of the Roosevelt administration’s civil rights record.
Chapter 5 examines the Truman administration’s record on civil rights in a similar light. In par-
ticular, I point to Truman’s belief in the republican virtues of military service as a variable that can
mediate between his personal racism and relatively more extensive civil rights program. I demon-
strate how violence against returning black veterans in the immediate postwar period led Truman
to issue an executive order establishing the President’s Committee on Civil Rights. I then discuss
his executive order calling for equality of opportunity and treatment in the armed forces, eventu-
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ally leading to the desegregation of the U.S. military. I also highlight one non-outcome: an effort
by some in the Truman administration to establish a Presidential Committee on the Right to Vote,
which was ultimately killed by party insiders. I finally consider how Truman’s post-presidency
analysis of the 1950s and 1960s civil rights movement can elucidate the constrained nature of his
civil rights “liberalism.” In demonstrating how the war both compelled and constrained the Tru-
man administration’s actions, I mediate between more positive accounts and more critical ones,
demonstrating how analyses of Truman’s relatively greater civil rights accomplishments must also
take into account how his civil rights agenda was largely focused on racism directed against black
veterans in particular, rather than African Americans more generally.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes by analytically summarizing the evidence from the public opin-
ion and executive branch chapters into a coherent narrative of the war’s effects on white racial
attitudes and the presidencies of Roosevelt and Truman. I discuss the scholarly implications of
this project for studies of race and American political development more generally, as well as the
long-term implications of the policy developments the wartime context produced. The overall
goal of this dissertation – what I hope to achieve by adding up these individual components –
is to offer the best possible empirical assessment of the ways in which World War II did – and,
in other ways, did not – alter the racialized limits of American democracy. In synthesizing the
evidence provided in previous chapters, the conclusion attempts to offer such an assessment.
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Chapter 2
White Racial Attitudess During World
War II: Methods and a Descriptive
Baseline
American entry into the Second World War coincided with an incomplete but nonetheless quite
real trend in survey research towards the study of racial attitudes. Political public opinion polling
was itself a new development, emerging only in the middle of the 1930s when Gallup first entered
the field. The questions about race and civil rights asked by commercial survey firms like Gallup
and academic ones like the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) offer intriguing and highly
informative pieces of evidence about the nature of civil rights in the context of World War II. Yet
historical research on race and civil rights during this time period has largely ignored these stud-
ies, except for occasional references to topline results found in secondary sources. This dissertation
seeks to more directly bring these surveys to bear on an assessment of the war’s effects on white
public opinion.
Before turning to a more analytical framework in the next chapter, this chapter provides some
relevant background information. I first discuss the historical development of public opinion
polling, including its uneven acceptance by the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Second,
I discuss the promises and potential problems of using these surveys as evidence in contempo-
rary academic scholarship. I describe how the “quota sampling” employed during the 1930s and
1940s differs from modern probability samples, as well as what methodological tools might al-
low for correcting some of the observable biases introduced by the quota sampling procedure.
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Third, I use two surveys from 1944 to provide a baseline of white racial attitudes in the middle
of World War II, as well as demonstrate how the methodological fix just described works in prac-
tice. Considering a range of questions related to the war’s effects on race relations – as well as
additional measures of general racial prejudice – I present weighted cross-tabulations depicting
the state of white attitudes. I also discuss distinctions between white southerners and whites else-
where, first using regional cross-tabulations, and then using multivariate regression analysis to
better hold other demographic factors constant. Finally, I discuss what theoretical implications
might be drawn from this more descriptive discussion, and conclude by foreshadowing the more
empirical quantitative chapter that follows, where these surveys are used to assess theoretical ex-
pectations about over-time change in the white mass public and cross-sectional variation between
white veterans and non-veterans in the war’s aftermath.
Historical Background on Survey Research
Historians often conjecture about what the public “thought” about some political issue for ev-
ery period of American history. However, Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency is a unique period in
American political development in that it coincides with the emergence of social scientific tools to
actually measure the political attitudes of ordinary citizens in a relatively generalizable way.1 On
September 10, 1935, interviewers with the Gallup Organization went into the field for six days to
ask around 1,500 Americans two questions: (1) “Do you think expenditures by the Government
for relief and recovery are too little, too great, or just about right?”; and (2) “AS a general principle,
would you favor limiting the power of the Supreme Court to declare acts of Congress unconstitu-
tional?” The organization reported back that majorities felt expenditures were too high and that
the Supreme Court’s power should not be limited.2 The next year, Gallup predicted Roosevelt
1For a discussion of how social and political historians have used other means of examining “opinion,” see Robert Y.
Shapiro, “Public Opinion,” in The Oxford Handbook of American Political Development, Forthcoming; Lawrence R. Jacobs
and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Public Opinion and the New Social History: Some Lessons for the Study of Public Opinion and
Democratic Policy Making,” Social Science History 13, 1989, 1-24.
2Gallup Poll, Sep, 1935. Retrieved Feb-2-2012 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion
Research, University of Connecticut. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/
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would win his 1936 reelection bid against Republican Alf Landon with around 56 percent of the
vote. This prediction contradicted that of The Literary Digest, a popular magazine that had correctly
predicted the winner of many earlier presidential contests. Polling literally millions of Americans
drawn from lists of its own subscribers, automobile registrations, and telephone users, The Literary
Digest predicted Landon would would win with around 57 percent of the vote. Roosevelt in fact
got almost 61 percent of the vote, beating Landon by over ten million votes and winning every
state except Maine and Vermont. The Literary Digest released its final issue in 1938, while George
Gallup and his brand of public opinion polling became an integral part of the modern American
political landscape.
Although the organization never made it a focal point, Gallup surveys did sporadically ad-
dress issues related to race and civil rights when they rose to national prominence. Gallup in-
quired about Justice Huge Black’s involvement with the Ku Klux Klan and federal intervention in
state lynching cases as early as 1936 and 1937, respectively. In 1939, it asked respondents about the
Daughters of the American Revolution’s decision to refuse “a well-known Negro singer” – Mar-
ian Anderson – to perform in one of their music halls.3 Other organizations followed in Gallup’s
footsteps. By the time of U.S. entry into the war, the National Opinion Research Council (NORC)
had taken the lead in asking probing questions about racial prejudice and civil rights, significantly
expanding the scope of questions being asked. NORC was founded in 1941 at the University of
Denver as the first academic survey institute.4 Although now based at the University of Chicago
and best known for their General Social Survey, much of their early work focused on aiding the
Office of War Information with fact-finding missions about public morale and attitudes toward
data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html.
3Also in 1939, Roper, in association with Fortune magazine, fielded a series of questions delving into specific issues
of racial prejudice, asking questions about residential segregation, black intelligence, and the “ultimate outcome of the
Negro problem in this country.”
4National Opinion Research Center, Social Science Research in Action, (Chicago, 2011), 4.
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wartime issues. They also completed “the first national measurement of racial attitudes."5
The first two presidents of the survey era had opposite approaches to these new political tools.
Franklin Roosevelt was enthusiastic about the new tools and became the first president to use
private polling, although he did not hire a private White House pollster. Rather, Hadley Cantril
“secretly worked as an unpaid, unofficial public opinion advisor for the FDR White House.”6
Cantril, in collaboration with Mildred Strunk, would later edit the largest published volume of
topline survey results from this period in 1951.7 Several government institutions were drawn to
survey research during the Roosevelt presidency. The Office of War Information was one of them.
In 1943, they surveyed black opinion in five cities, concluding, somewhat bluntly, that “Negroes
feel bad about many things.”8
Roosevelt’s successor, Harry Truman, is the only president in the modern era not to use private
public opinion polling.9 “I never paid any attention to the polls myself because in my judgment
they did not represent a true cross section of American opinion,” Truman wrote in his memoirs.
“I did not believe that the major components of our society, such as agriculture, management,
and labor, were adequately sampled. I also know that the polls did not represent facts but mere
speculation, and I have always placed my faith in the known facts.”10 In his description of the
situation he faced in the summer of 1948, he even goes so far as to place the pollsters alongside
the Republican Party, writing, “I knew that I had to do something about this concerted effort of
the pollsters and the Republican-controlled press to drug the populace with their statistics and
5Ibid., 42.
6Robert M. Eisinger, The Evolution of Presidential Polling, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3.
7Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, Public Opinion 1935-1946, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951).
8Report, Office of War Information; Folder: “Race Tension – Jonathan Daniels File – Minority Problems, 1942-1945”;
Philleo Nash Papers; Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
9Eisinger, The Evolution of Presidential Polling, 1.
10Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. 2, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday &
Company, 1956), 177.
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propaganda.”11 This distinction in how Roosevelt and Truman understood public opinion – par-
ticularly, whether it was quantifiable in the manner advocated by Gallup and others – might well
have had implications for their responsiveness to such opinion. I return to this prospect in the
concluding chapter.
A Methodological Discussion of Quota Sampling
Early public opinion surveys were unusual in many ways, too quantitative in approach and top-
down in implementation for the tastes of most historians, yet somewhat methodologically prob-
lematic from the perspective of modern social science as well.12 Most of the surveys used in this
dissertation are from the 1930s and 1940s. These datasets are not often used in contemporary
political science research, despite the plethora of theoretically interesting questions they are ap-
plicable to.13 This is largely because these datasets were difficult to come by until quite recently.
Fortunately, however, the iPoll Database from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at
the University of Connecticut now makes many of these datasets more easily obtainable. While
the datasets are often in rather messy form and require some significant cleaning before analysis
can be done, this offers many new potential research paths.
However, a second concern with these surveys relates to the quota sampling procedures em-
ployed at the time, “long since viewed as shoddy and unrepresentative,” according to Philip Con-
11Ibid., 178
12They are, in this sense, effectively located at the hinge space where the archive meets the dataset, not quite being
one or the other.
13Some exceptions include Robert S. Erikson, “The Relationship Between Public Opinion and State Policy: A New
Look Based on Some Forgotten Data,” American Journal of Political Science 20(1), 1976, 25-36; Gregory A. Caldeira, “Pub-
lic Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR’s Court-Packing Plan,” American Political Science Review 81(4), 1987,
139-153; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Prefer-
ences, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992); Stephen M. Weatherford and Boris Sergeyev, “Thinking About
Economic Interests: Class and Recession in the New Deal,” Political Behavior 22(4), 2000, 311-339; Matthew A. Baum
and Samuel Kernell, “Economic Class and Popular Support for Franklin Roosevelt in War and Peace,” Public Opinion
Quarterly 65, 2001, 198-229.
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verse.14 This methodological issue merits further discussion. Modern surveys use probability
sampling methods. There are two main versions of this. The American National Election Studies
and General Social Survey datasets are generated using a multi-stage area probability design that
results in a representative sample of national opinion. Other studies, like the National Annenberg
Election Survey, use random digit dialing telephone interviews, thereby generating a random sam-
ple of telephone owners. The quota sampling procedure employed by organizations like Gallup
and NORC prior to 1952 differed in several ways from both of these probability methods. For
quota samples, researchers determined in advance what proportions of the sample would come
from what segments of the population. These were divided into mutually exclusive “strata” along
politically relevant lines like region and gender. Each strata was given a certain size in the desired
sample by the researchers. Although there was some slight variation in how different survey or-
ganizations implemented quotas, quota sampling techniques were similar overall. This sampling
method led to two key differences from population characteristics as measured by the U.S. Cen-
sus. Strata were inherently non-representative due to the lack of random sampling. However,
even within the bounds of how the quota was allocated, interviewers were given sufficient dis-
cretion in the field, leading to “nonrandom selection within strata.”15 Put more concretely, within
a strata defined by region and gender, interviewers might have chosen to interview people who
seemed more approachable, often resulting in a class bias.
Fortunately, these problems are not prohibitive. Adam Berinsky advocates a weighting proce-
dure to correct for the known biases of these datasets. Several weighting protocols are available
depending on what information the surveys contain that can be matched to Census figures. Re-
gion, race, and gender are always used (and since I am focused on white racial attitudes, race is
held constant for my purposes here). However, class is a far more amorphous concept, and the
measurements surveys provide that can be matched to Census information was not consistent
over time. The best approximation available is educational attainment. With this information, one
14Philip E. Converse, “Second Comment,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 9(3), 1965, 331.
15Adam J. Berinsky, “American Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s: The Analysis of Quota-Controlled Sample
Survey Data,” Public Opinion Quarterly 70(4), 2006, 501-506
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can construct what Berinsky and Eric Schickler call an “eduWhites” weight, which is appropriate
“if one is seeking to investigate white opinion, either nationally or with respect to regional differ-
ences.” Consider the “Attitudes Toward Negroes” survey weights I create in this chapter as an
example. In this case, since women in the Northeast having attended at least some college repre-
sent 3.01 percent of the sample, but are in fact 1.34 percent of the adult population according to
the 1940 Census, they are weighted 1.343.01 = 0.4451827243 to correct for this oversample. Likewise,
since women women in the Northeast having attended only grammar school or less represent 4.64
percent of the sample, but are in fact 8.35 percent of the adult population according to the 1940
Census, they are weighted 8.354.64 = 1.7995689655 to correct for this undersample. However, edu-
cational attainment was often not asked in the prewar period. In these earlier surveys, the best
approximations are whether the respondent works in a “professional” industry or not and tele-
phone ownership. A“profWhites” weighting procedure is identical to “eduWhites,” but uses a
dummy variable for professional in place of educational attainment. A modified version of Berin-
sky and Schickler’s “phoneBlack” weight is likewise identical, except a dummy variable for phone
ownership is used rather than professional status or educational attainment. For cross-tabulations,
I use the best possible weight available given the nature of the dataset.16
In regression analysis, the solution is more straightforward. Since multivariate regression ef-
fectively estimates a coefficient for the variable of interest, averaging over the other variables in
the model, the weighting variables can simply be included as control variables in the regression
specification to account for undersampling of relevant demographic categories.17 So, if one were
to estimate an OLS regression of some racial attitude measure on veteran status, controlling for
region, gender, and education, the baseline model would be:
16The rank order of preference is (1) eduWhites, (2) profWhites, and (3) modified phoneBlack. While identical weight-
ing would be preferred if the data allowed for it, a comparison of the raw cross-tabulations suggests the weights do
not actually make a substantial difference when it comes to interpretation. The estimates of opinion are different, of
course, but not in major ways. For more details, see Berinsky, “American Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s”;
Adam Berinsky and Eric Schickler, “Gallup Data, 1936-1945: Guide to Coding & Weighting,” Unpublished Manuscript,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and University of California, Berkeley, 2011.
17Berinsky advocates using the weighting variables as controls in a regression framework. Berinsky, “American
Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s.”
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Yi = α + β1(Veteran)i + β2(Northeast)i + β3(South)i + β4(West)i + β5(Grammar)i +
β6(HighSchoolGraduate)i + β7(SomeCollege)i + β8(Female)i + εi
The Midwest and some high school categories are excluded as base categories. Since regional,
educational, and gender variation is averaged over in this regression framework, the β1 coefficient
associated with the veteran variable is taken as an estimate of the relationship between military
service and the attitude between analyzed.
Of course, anytime “the South” is measured, debates about what constitutes the region emerge.
This dissertation is ultimately agnostic about what states properly constitute the region, but for
the analysis of surveys from the quota sampling era, I follow the lead of Berinsky and Schick-
ler in defining the South as the eleven former Confederate states (Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia,
Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia),
plus Kentucky and Oklahoma. This is slightly broader than the eleven state definition advocated
by V. O. Key, and followed by a wide range of scholars in both public opinion and American
political development scholarship since then.18 It is, however, somewhat more limited than the
broader definition advocated by Sean Farhang and Ira Katznelson, which includes Kentucky and
Oklahoma, but also Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, and West Virginia.19
With these methodological matters taken care of, the remainder of this chapter turns to a de-
scriptive analysis of white racial attitudes in World War II, suing two 1944 surveys as examples.
This will provide a baseline from which to make sense of the more analytical chapter that follows.
18I do, however, examine distinctions between white veterans and non-veterans in the former Confederate states in
Chapter 3, as the 1961 dataset I use towards the end of the chapter only sampled these eleven states. For the classic
argument in favor of an eleven state definition, see V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation, (Knoxville: Univer-
sity of Tennessee Press, 2006 [1949]). See also Earl Black and Merle Black, Politics and Society in the South, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1987). For the usage of an eleven state definition in APD, see Robert W. Mickey, “The Begin-
ning of the End for Authoritarian Rule in America: Smith v. Allwright and the Abolition of the White Primary in the
Deep South, 1944-1948,” Studies in American Political Development 22, 2008, 143-182. I also use this definition in a paper
about contemporary Deep South vs. Peripheral South distinctions in public opinion. Steven White, “The Heterogeneity
of Southern White Distinctiveness,” American Politics Research 42(4), 2014, 551-578.
19Sean Farhang and Ira Katznelson, “The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal,”
Studies in American Political Development 19, 2005 1. For further discussion of the broader definition, see Melanie J.
Springer, “Defining ‘the South’ (Is Not a Straightforward Matter),” paper presented at the 2011 meeting of the State
Politics and Policy Conference, Hanover, NH.
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January 1944: Soldier Voting
Whether soldiers – including black soldiers – should be given ballots during the tenure of their
overseas service clearly drew together many of the key themes of this dissertation. The congres-
sional debate over soldier voting was controversial on numerous fronts, and it became a legislative
instance where “a peculiar combination or cumulation of circumstances,” as Key described it, led
southern Democrats and Republicans to vote together against northern Democrats. “The Repub-
licans did not want the soldiers to vote Democratic,” Key writes. “The southern Democrats did
not want colored soldiers to vote.”20
From December 31, 1943, to January 4, 1944, NORC conducted “Survey #1944-0222: Soldier’s
Vote,” a “spot-check” survey. As the notes provided by the Roper Center describe it, “The cross-
section of this spot-check survey consisted of a typical miniature of the population, with the
proper proportion in each geographic section, of rich and poor, young and old, men and women,
Democrats, Republicans, and non-voters.”21 Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 485 na-
tional adults, which is small but usable for certain types of analyses. Unfortunately the dataset has
other problems as well: the coding of the Census regions variable is missing one of the nine cat-
egories, which obviously presents certainly difficulties with sub-national analysis. Despite these
limitations, it does ask one question that clearly brings together civil rights and the wartime con-
text. Along with a short series of other questions about soldiers and voting, the issue of black
soldiers being given ballots is specifically addressed. Respondents were asked, “Do you think Ne-
groes over 21 in the armed forces should be allowed to vote or not?” This variable is dichotomized
so that 1 = no and 0 = yes.
American whites as a whole supported giving black soldiers ballots by an 85 percent to 15
percent margin. Overall, there was substantial support for allowing black soldiers to vote, with
opposition coming almost entirely from southern whites. Outside the South, 94 percent of whites
offered support for giving ballots to black soldiers. In the South, however, only 54 percent of
20V. O. Key, Jr. Southern Politics in State and Nation, (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2006 [1949]), 358-59.
21National Opinion Research Center, Should Soldiers Vote! A Special Report Based on a Spot-Check Survey, (Denver, 1944).
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whites did so, while 46 percent opposed such a measure. Despite this clear regional variation,
however, a slight majority of southern whites still offered support for the measure, which might
seem surprising.
This quantitative analysis can be complemented by archival materials NORC left behind. Al-
though transcriptions of comments by all respondents do not appear to be available, NORC did
release 13 responses, divided between northerners and southerners, in their report on the results.
I reproduce those here, with the statements in quotation marks and the descriptions of the anony-
mous respondents unchanged from how NORC referred to them.
“Some people are prejudiced,” a packing house clerk in Chicago said, “but if a man is good
enough to fight for his country, he should be allowed to vote.”
Others focused on intelligence and education as qualifications for voting. “They shouldn’t
be deprived of voting just because of their color,” said a California fire chief. “It all depends
upon their intelligence. That goes for white people, too. But there are more illiterate Negroes
than whites.” A Chicago machine operator distinguished between regions in this regard. “I don’t
know,” he said. “The northern Negroes that go to our schools got sense enough to vote. Those
from the South are such an ignorant class they don’t really know for what they are voting.”
Some responses were pithier. “Yes,” a female personnel worker in New York City said. “The
14th Amendment says ‘No discrimination.’ ” “They pay taxes,” said a clerk’s wife in Pennsylvania.
“[I]f they are allowed to vote in their own state,” said a contractor’s wife in Illinois. Not all the
short responses were positive, however. “No,” said a ship worker’s wife in Pennsylvania. “I don’t
like them.”
Southern responses reflect the greater opposition in the region overall.
The only clear positive response reflected that of the Chicago packing house clerk. “If they are
good enough to fight they are good enough to vote,” said a sales engineer’s wife in Louisiana. But
this response is clearly the odd one out.
A retired army officer in Houston said, “Only if they are allowed to vote at home” – which,
in the South, they were generally not. Others gave a range of reasons for their opposition to
giving black soldiers ballots. “The Negro in my opinion is not intelligent enough to vote,” said
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a chain store manager in Tennessee. “[T]hey are too easily influenced,” argued a farmer’s wife
in Mississippi. Others offered “just so” responses. “No – not down South,” said a female drug
store clerk in Alabama. A cabinet maker in Louisiana offered the most emphatic response. “No!
Absolutely not!!,” he said, apparently with sufficient feeling that the interviewer felt it necessary
to include an additional exclamation mark when transcribing his remarks.
What to make of the perhaps surprisingly positive white attitudes depends on one’s perspec-
tive on the soldier voting legislation itself. Alexander Keyssar’s history of voting rights in Amer-
ica considers the soldier voting legislation to be “an important step” in the advancement of civil
rights.22 In conjunction with other factors, this leads Keyssar to argue, “The equilibrium in voting
laws was decisively disrupted by World War II.”23 David Mayhew approvingly cites this account
in his argument about the centrality of wars to American politics.24 From this perspective, white
support might seem perplexing. Katznelson, by contrast, argues congressional acquiescence to
southern preferences in the details of the legislation exposed “tensions between symbolic and
sincere behavior with regard to civil rights.” Further, and “[c]ontrary to Keyssar’s canonical as-
sessment,” he argues the most notable aspects of the legislation were decisions not to standardize
the ballot and not to give the federal government significant power to deal with uncooperative
southern states.25 This perspective on soldier voting is much easier to reconcile with the lack of
staunch opposition by whites in the broader public.
Whatever one’s prior analytical perspective, care should be taken in interpreting the survey
results. The fact that this is the only survey evidence allowing researchers to assess public attitudes
on the soldier voting issue makes it integral to any contemporary academic assessments. Yet
22Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States, (New York: Basic Books,
2000), 247.
23Ibid., 244
24David R. Mayhew, “Wars and American Politics,” Perspectives on Politics 3, 2005, 479.
25Ira Katznelson, “Extremes Clash, Ambiguities Rule: Ballots for Soldiers” (paper presented at the 20th Century
American Politics & Society workshop, New York, NY, March 12, 2009).
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one survey, particularly one with a small sample, naturally carries risks of error and uncertainty.
However, any argument, even if only implied, about the nature of a broader public response
would benefit from engagement with survey evidence, limited though it might be.
May 1944: “Attitudes Toward Negroes”
In May 1944, NORC administered “Survey #1944-0225: Attitudes Toward Negroes,” a national
survey of white attitudes.26 The sample is 2,521 national white adults who were interviewed face
to face. While other surveys asked a question here and there about race relations in the midst
of other inquiries, this survey is entirely about race. The results provide a unique look at white
attitudes in the middle of World War II. Internally, NORC realized they were treading on difficult
territory. On July 11, researchers at NORC sent a memorandum to Julian Woodward, who would
later become President of the American Association for Public Opinion Research in 1950. “You
will note that lots of people appeared to be tolerant and it seems as if they were during the first
part of the questionnaire,” the memo read, “but it is sad to have to state that they were not half
so tolerant when we get down to brass tacks toward the end of the questionnaire.”27 Although
it had not been publicly released, the results made their way into the White House bureaucracy
by mid-summer. On July 21, the study found its way into the hands of Philleo Nash. Nash, who
would later become one of Truman’s presidential assistants, was then serving in the Office of
War Information as an assistant to the White House Liaison Director. Nash forwarded the report
to several people, including presidential assistant Jonathan Daniels. “Attached is an advance
tabulation on the Denver Opinion Research Center’s most recent Negro study,” he wrote Daniels.
The codebook with unweighted tabulations typed on was included.28 This particular survey made
26iPoll Databank, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html.
27Memorandum, NORC to Julian Woodward; Folder: “Minorities – Negro – Negro Opinion Studies – National Opin-
ion Research Center – Survey on Negroes, May 1944”; Box 22; Philleo Nash Papers; Harry S. Truman Library, Indepen-
dence, Missouri (hereafter cited as Nash Papers).
28Memorandum, Philleo Nash to Jonathan Daniels; Folder: “Race Tension – Jonathan Daniels File – Minority Prob-
lems, 1942-1945”; Box 27; Nash Papers.
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a number of people uncomfortable, and this inhibited a quick release to the wider public. In
December, for example, a confidential report summarizing the results was sent to seventy-five
people asking for comments on how it might be used in a constructive manner and whether it
would be advisable to release the numbers into general distribution. Later the results were in
the process of being prepared for publication by the American Council on Race Relations, but
the Council was concerned about a preliminary release. “The danger of publishing such figures,
without due caution and interpretation,” they argued, “lies in the fact that many persons reading
the results of the poll would mistake figures published for actual facts.”29
The weighted topline tabulations are an interesting look at white racial attitudes. The most
direction question the survey asked about the relationship between race and World War II dealt
with the effects of the war on race relations. “After the war,” one question asked, “do you expect
Negroes and white people to get along with each other better, or not as well as they did before
the war?” A plurality of whites – 37 percent – said they would not get along as well after the war.
However, attitudes were scattered. Another 22 percent expected better race relations, while 24
percent said the war would have no effect and 16 percent said they did not know. White attitudes
were split on whether there would be fewer jobs for white people if African Americans could get
more kinds of jobs after the war, with 43 percent saying there would be fewer and 41 percent
saying there would not be fewer. Another 14 percent said they did not know.
One survey question sounds especially peculiar to contemporary ears: “As far as you know,
is Negro blood the same as white blood, or is it different in some way?” However, this question
about the racial and biological characteristics of blood is actually a proper segue from questions
about the wartime context into personal prejudice, as the Red Cross at the time actually stored
black blood separately from white blood, even during total war.30 Overall, 31 percent of whites
said black blood was the same as white blood, while 35 percent said it was different and an ex-
29Jean Converse, Survey Research in the United States: Roots and Emergence 1890-1960, (Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1987), 312-313.
30Thomas A. Guglielmo, “ ‘Red Cross, Double Cross’: Race and America’s World War II-Era Blood Donor Service,”
Journal of American History 97, 2010, 63-90.
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tremely high 34 percent said they did not know. White assessments of black intelligence – “that
is, can they learn just as well if they are given the same education?” – were split, with 45 percent
saying yes and 46 percent saying no. Nine percent said they did not know. White attitudes were
likewise split on a question asking “[i]f you were sick in a hospital, would it be all right with you
if you had a Negro nurse, or wouldn’t you like it?” Fifty percent said yes, while 45 percent said
no. Only two percent said they did not know, while 3 percent volunteered that this would only be
okay if no white nurse were available.
White assessments of whether African Americans were being treated fairly varied interest-
ingly in terms of whether whites thought African Americans were being treated fairly versus
whether whites thought that African Americans thought African Americans were being treated
fairly. When asked if the respondent themselves “think most Negroes in the United States are be-
ing treated fairly or unfairly,” a strong majority of whites – 63 percent – said they were (compared
to 21 percent saying unfairly and 20 percent saying they did not know). However, answers were
somewhat different when respondents were asked, “From what you’ve heard, do most Negroes in
the United States think they are being treated fairly or unfairly?” 50 percent admitted black people
perceived themselves as being treated unfairly, with 28 percent saying fairly and 23 percent saying
they did not know.
This extended to a similar question about whether “Negroes have the same chance as white
people to make a good living in this country.” A majority of 54 percent said yes, while 36 percent
said no and only 3 percent said they did not know (another 4 percent actually volunteered the
response that black people were too lazy or simply would not work hard enough to make a good
living). Yet 67 percent of whites said “Negroes in the United States” did not “have just as good
a chance as white people to get any kind of job,” with only 24 percent claiming that they did.
Whites also expressed normative support for this, with 55 percent saying “white people should
have the first chance at any kind of job,” compared to only 39 percent saying black people should
have as good a chance. When asked whether they would be all right with “a Negro with the same
training had the same kind of job as you at the place where you worked,” 50 percent said they
would be all right with this and 43 percent said they would not like it. The survey also asked one
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oddly specific question: whether “a Negro. . . qualified to be a railroad engineer . . . should be given
a chance at this job.” Seventy percent of whites said yes, perhaps suggesting greater support for
higher skilled professions.
The education questions are an interesting comparison to the jobs questions. An overwhelm-
ing majority – 86 percent – said “Negroes in this town have the same chance as white people to get
a good education.” This dubious empirical assessment coincided with 88 percent support for the
normative proposition that “Negroes in this town should have the same chance as white people
to get a good education” (emphasis added). The survey does not inquire further, but this belief
likely coexisted with a belief that “separate but equal” was indeed sufficiently equal.
A number of questions about segregation were also asked. Fifty-two percent of whites said,
“[f]rom what [they] know,” “most Negroes in this town would rather go places where only Ne-
groes go,” while 35 percent said “they would rather go places where white people also go.” Four-
teen percent said they did not know.31 Similarly, 48 percent disagreed with the proposition that
“some restaurants in this town should serve both Negro and white people,” while 44 percent
said yes. Five percent said they did not know and three percent volunteered the response that
this would be okay only if everything about the restaurant were segregated. When asked if they
“would eat in a restaurant that served both Negro and white people,” 49 percent said yes and 43
percent said no. Two percent said they did not know, but 3 percent volunteered they would only
do this if there was no other places to eat and 2 percent volunteered they would do this only if the
restaurant itself were still segregated. This related, obviously, to housing policy. A majority – 66
percent – of whites said something should be done “making it possible for Negroes to have better
housing,” with only 24 percent saying no and 10 percent saying they did not know. However,
when asked whether “it would make any difference to you if a Negro family moved in next door
to you,” a slightly larger majority – 69 percent – said this would bother them, with only 23 percent
saying it would not. Six percent volunteered the response that it depended on the type of family.
31Sixty-five percent said black people would want to go more places white people also go if they could get more
kinds of jobs (21 percent said this would not be the case and 13 percent said they did not know). Following up on the
latter question, 61 percent of those who said black people would want to go more place said they would not be all right
with this, compared to 33 percent who said they would be. Three percent said they did not know and 2 percent said it
depended on qualities like the “type, quality, education, of negro.”
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These aggregate numbers are interesting in their own right. However, more can be learned
when the South is separated out from the rest of the country. I begin by comparing regional cross-
tabulations, which I then show are similar to the results from a multivariate regression model. To
use one obviously relevant example, region clearly confounds general assessments of how white
Americans perceived the relationship between the war and race. Fifty-three percent of south-
ern whites said race relations would be worse postwar, compared to only 32 percent of northern
whites. While 54 percent of southern whites said any postwar black employment gains would
come at the expense of whites, a plurality – 46 percent – of northern whites said this would not
be the case. Region is also an important variable for assessments of whether black blood was dif-
ferent than white blood. Whites in the North are split, with 34 percent saying it is the same, 30
percent saying it was different, and a slight plurality of 35 percent saying they did not know. In the
South, however, a strong plurality of 48 percent said it was different, with only 20 percent saying
it was the same and 32 percent saying they did not know. Uncertainty was constant with regard
to region, in other words, while the difference between acceptance and rejection of the scientific
racism position was quite large.
This is a common trend throughout. Consider jobs. Seventy-seven percent of whites in the
South said whites should have the first chance at a job, with only 14 percent saying black people
should have as good a chance. However, white opinion in the North was split, with 47 percent
saying white people should have the first chance and 46 percent saying black people should have
as good a chance. An even more dramatic version of this pattern is present for the question about
black workers with the same job training having the same job. Sixty-nine percent of southern
whites said they would not like it if a black worker with the same training had the same kind
of job as themselves in their workplace, with only 25 percent saying this would be all right with
them. In the North, however, the majority – 58 percent – said this would be all right, with only
35 percent saying it would not be. The biggest differences emerge in questions about segregation.
Sixty-one percent of white southerners said African Americans in their town would rather go to
places where only other black people could go; in the North, the number was 48 percent – lower,
but not wildly so. However, regional variation was stark on the question of whether some
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Figure 2.1: The Effect of Residence in the South on White Racial Attitudes, 1944
restaurants in their town should serve both white and black people. Eighty-six percent of white
southerners rejected this, with only 7 percent saying yes. In the North, 56 percent said yes and
only 36 percent rejected it. When asked if they would eat at such a restaurant, 79 percent of white
southerners said no, with only 14 percent saying yes. In the North, by contrast, 61 percent of
whites said that they would, with 32 percent saying they would not. There was no notable regional
variation in assessments of whether black people would want to go more places white people go
if they had more job opportunities. However, among those who answered yes and received the
follow up question of whether they would be all right with this, variation did emerge. In the
South, 87 percent said they would not like this, with only 11 percent saying it would be all right
with them. In the North, 53 percent said they would not like it, with 40 percent saying it would be
all right.
These results hold up in a multivariate regression framework as well. Figure 2.1 plots the lo-
gistic regression coefficients estimated for a dichotomous version of each of these attitudes on a
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southern dummy variable, controlling for 1940 vote choice, gender, religion, size of place, educa-
tion, and age. The black dot represents the coefficient, while the horizontal lines represent 95%
confidence intervals. If the black dot and horizontal line are entirely on the right side of the ver-
tical dotted line, then there is a statistically significant conservative difference between southern
whites and whites elsewhere in the country.32 These results are consistent with the weighted re-
gional cross-tabulations, so I focus on the latter because they are easier to interpret. See Figures
A1-A4 in the Appendix for a comparison of these regional coefficients to other variables.
This section provides a baseline of knowledge about the state of white racial attitudes in the
middle of World War II. One interesting observation is the level of sheer prejudice, putting aside
policy-related attitudes. Another interesting distinction seems to be attitudes toward educational
vs. occupational opportunity. Whites seemed convinced African Americans had equal educa-
tional opportunities and they claimed to think that they should, although it is likely most would
have insisted upon segregation if explicitly primed. Yet most whites admitted to occupational
discrimination and also supported it on normative grounds. Finally, relative to prior analysis of
such matters, this analysis demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between the southern
and non-southern white publics, as the differences are simply too large to average together in one
aggregate number. Indeed, the average difference between the southern and non-southern white
publics in the questions analyzed here is 21 percentage points, which rises to as high as 50-53
percentage points for two of the segregation questions.
Conclusion
This chapter provided a brief historical overview of political opinion polling’s emergence in the
1930s and 1940s, as well as a discussion of methodological tools available to correct some of the
known biases of these datasets for research today. I then offered a glimpse at at the state of white
racial attitudes in the 1940s. These descriptions have been suggestive in several respects. How-
32For some variables, “conservative” and “liberal” are not entirely intuitive, which accounts for what appear to be
two “liberal” dots on the left side of the vertical dotted line.
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ever, they raise several more theoretical, empirical questions beyond these cross-sectional descrip-
tives. Two issues in particular merit further examination. First, were there over-time trends with
reference to the war? While the state of attitudes at any one moment in time might have some his-
torical importance, the broader theoretical question this section of the dissertation is interested in
is whether World War II actually corresponded with increases in racially liberal attitudes. Second,
were those who served in the war distinguishable in their racial attitudes from non-veterans in
the war’s aftermath? While some accounts suggesting a relationship between the war and white
racial attitudes focus on the ideological logic of a war against Nazism, other accounts suggest that
it was actual military service – be it interaction with black soldiers despite segregated ranks, ex-
posure to relatively more racially egalitarian cultures in countries like France, or some other fact –
that might have led to such differences.33
The next chapter gathers the available survey evidence to assess these questions. It first as-
sesses shifts in racial prejudice using six questions from the “Attitudes Toward Negroes” survey
that were repeated at an additional time point. It then considers civil rights policy issues – partic-
ularly attitudes toward federal anti-lynching legislation and the abolishment of poll taxes – before
and after the war. Finally, it shifts focus to cross-sectional variation between white veterans and
non-veterans at two moments in time: the war’s immediate aftermath and the early 1960s. In
doing so, it provides a more rigorous empirical assessment of the assumption many make that the
war indeed liberalized white racial attitudes. It also provides a broader social context for the chap-
ters following it that focus on the executive branch response to civil rights during the Roosevelt
and Truman years.
33 This is consistent with Shapiro’s argument that American political development analyses of public opinion can
look at collective change in mass opinion over time, as well as how “individual surveys can provide insights for study-
ing historical and political developments and the state of politics at key points in time.” Robert Y. Shapiro, “Public
Opinion,” in The Oxford Handbook of American Political Development, Forthcoming.
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Chapter 3
Civil Rights, World War II, and U.S.
Public Opinion
Notions that World War II – particularly the logic of fighting a war against Nazi racism – led to
increases in white support for black civil rights are widespread. Civil rights activists, journalists,
academics, and others at the time regularly claimed that when shown “the gross discrepancy be-
tween our ideals and our practices,” as one contemporaneous observer described it, white Ameri-
cans would be forced to confront their own racial prejudices and legacies of discrimination, result-
ing in a major step forward for racial progress.1 Indeed, claims about World War II’s impact on
white racial attitudes can be found in sources including contemporaneous accounts, present-day
historical institutionalist scholarship, and scattered other sources like constitutional law books.2
Sometimes the claim is direct and central (e.g., Myrdal’s An American Dilemma); at other times, it
is taken for granted in the background (e.g., Klinkner and Smith’s The Unsteady March). However,
in making varied assumptions about the war’s impact on white attitudes, such accounts have sys-
1Margaret C. McCulloch, “What Should the American Negro Reasonably Expect as the Outcome of a Real Peace?,”
The Journal of Negro Education 12(3), 1943, 565.
2For contemporaneous accounts, see: Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democ-
racy, (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1944); Charles Wallace Collins, Whither Solid South? A Study in Politics
and Race Relations, (New Orleans, Pelican Pub. Co., 1947); Howard W. Odum, “Social Change in the South”, Journal of
Politics 10(2), 1948, 242-258. For contemporary historical institutionalist scholarship, see: Philip A. Klinkner and Rogers
M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1999); Daniel Kryder, Divided Arsenal: Race and the American State during World War II, (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2000); Robert P. Saldin, War, the American State, and Politics since 1898, (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2010). For other sources, see, e.g., Alfred H. Kelly, “The School Desegregation Case” in Ed. John A. Garraty Quarrels
that Have Shaped the Constitution, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1987 [1962]).
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tematically ignored public opinion surveys from the 1940s that might allow for a better empirical
assessment of such claims.
This chapter provides such an assessment. Based on an analysis of the available survey ev-
idence, I argue the war’s impact on white racial attitudes is far more limited than is widely as-
sumed.3 While there is some evidence white racial prejudice decreased during the war, this is not
true for attitudes toward civil rights policies. White opposition to federal anti-lynching legislation
actually increased, especially in the South, while attitudes toward the poll tax remained almost
constant. For these tougher issues of policy, then, the war had no liberalizing effect. I also assess
whether serving in the war liberalized white veterans, relative to their non-veteran counterparts.
I find a much more complex story among veterans. They are not distinguishable on a wide range
of racial prejudice measures, nor were they less supportive of segregation. However, they are dis-
tinctive on two issues: In the late 1940s, they were more likely to support federal anti-lynching
legislation; and in the early 1960s, white veterans in the South were more likely to support black
voting rights.
Along with being useful as a corrective to common assumptions, these results also have im-
plications for political science in several ways. First, a careful analysis of the uneven impact of
the war on white attitudes (as distinct from, although overlapping with, the war’s impact on in-
stitutions) helps demonstrate the importance of World War II for theoretical accounts of race and
American political development. Scholarship on civil rights and party politics in the 1940s has
focused almost entirely on domestic mechanisms, leaving the war untouched.4 The few political
science analyses of how the war did affect civil rights have focused entirely on social movements
and elite institutions. As such, their background claims about mass attitudes have been unsub-
3Of course, “the war” itself did not directly have any impact on civil rights politics. Rather, various actors use the
opportunities presented by wartime to make new rhetorical claims and policy demands in the context of war.
4Brian Feinstein and Eric Schickler, “Platforms and Partners: The Civil Rights Realignment Reconsidered,” Studies
in American Political Development 22, 2008. I primarily engage with Feinstein and Schickler in this chapter, but a large
area of scholarship has developed examining partisan change in this time period. See, for example, David Karol, Party
Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Hans Noel,
“The Coalition Merchants: The Ideological Roots of the Civil Rights Realignment,” Journal of Politics 74(1), 2012, 156-173.
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stantiated.5 A growing research agenda examining public opinion on civil rights at this time has
largely focused on the relationship between racial attitudes and economic attitudes, and, as such,
has largely ignored the role of World War II.6 This project suggests the war merits greater atten-
tion, both in terms of its complex, uneven impacts on white attitudes, as well as its impact on
institutions and political elites – although the focus of this chapter is on the former.
Second, this chapter complements quantitative work assessing the individual-level impacts of
military service on black southerners.7 While civil rights historians have long believed service in
the Second World War had transformative impacts on black veterans – and this has been affirmed
with survey analysis by Christopher Parker – there has been much less historical scholarship about
white veterans in this regard, and none that I am aware of has utilized survey data. By combin-
ing analyses of surveys in the war’s immediate aftermath that identified veteran status with the
white sample of the 1961 Negro Political Participation Study survey Parker used to analyze black
veterans, this chapter complements previous scholarship by offering a different vantage point.
The chapter proceeds as follows: I begin with historical background, particularly by situating
the analysis with reference to contemporaneous discussions of the war and civil rights in the 1940s.
I then move to a review of present-day academic literatures that have addressed these themes –
at least tangentially – and show what is missing from these scholarly accounts. I next describe
my expectations, datasets, and methods, then turn to my findings. I conclude with a discussion of
mechanisms and how this research contributes to scholarship on American politics more broadly.
Tables and graphs are placed at the end of chapter due to their size. Responses to a few potential
theoretical and methodological objections are included in the Appendix.
5Klinkner and Smith, The Unsteady March; Kryder, Divided Arsenal; Saldin, War, the American State, and Politics since
1898.
6Eric Schickler, “New Deal Liberalism and Racial Liberalism in the Mass Public, 1937-1968,” Perspectives on Politics
11(1), 2013, 75-98.
7Christopher S. Parker, Fighting for Democracy: Black Veterans and the Struggle Against White Supremacy in the Postwar
South, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Christopher S. Parker, “When Politics Becomes Protest: Black
Veterans and Political Activism in the Postwar South,” Journal of Politics 71, 2009, 113-131.
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Historical Background
Many elites in the 1940s saw a connection between the war effort and domestic racial issues. The
most famous example is Gunnar Myrdal and his mammoth study An American Dilemma: The Negro
Problem and Modern Democracy. As Chapter 1 described, Myrdal proclaimed “[t]here is bound to
be a redefinition of the Negro’s status in America as a result of this War.”8 Myrdal was certainly
not the only academic who noticed the connection between the war and domestic racial issues.
Writing in 1942, E. Franklin Frazier suggested “the liberal press of the South has been disposed to
treat the Negro with greater consideration during the war,” offering as an example the Raleigh,
North Carolina, News and Observer’s decision to start using “Mrs.” in reference to upper-class black
women. He acknowledged, however, that even these more liberal papers maintained a defense of
the southern system of segregation.9 This was also perceived, in more negative terms, by certain
prominent racial conservatives. Dixiecrat intellectual leader Charles Wallace Collins worried the
war “offered the opportunity for the rationalization of the position of the Negro as a citizen of the
United States in a time of war.”10 He did not view this prospect in a positive light.
There was likewise a belief that serving in the war would make white veterans more racially
tolerant:
During the Detroit race riots in 1943 three sailors waded in to a white mob which was
beating unmercifully a slender Negro youth. “He isn’t doing you guys any harm. Let
him alone!” one of the trio shouted as he and his companions rescued the Negro and
fought back the mob.
“What’s it to you?” one of the rioters snarled.
“Plenty,” replied the sailor. “There was a colored guy in our outfit in the Pacific and he
saved the lives of two of my buddies. Besides, you guys are stirring up here at home
8Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 997.
9E. Franklin Frazier, “Ethnic and Minority Groups in Wartime, with Special Reference to the Negro,” The American
Journal of Sociology 48(3), November 1942, 377.
10Cited in Joseph Lowndes, From the New Deal to the New Right: Race and the Southern Origins of Modern Conservatism,
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 22.
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something we are fighting to stop!”11
This suggestive anecdote is drawn from NAACP leader Walter White’s 1945 book A Rising Wind.
Although perhaps apocryphal – White had a tendency to capture dialogue in a manner that seems
awkwardly folksy to contemporary ears – such tales nevertheless reached a wide audience and
were consistent with other accounts at the time suggesting the war had liberalized the previously
racist views of white soldiers fighting for democracy.
White shared other interesting stories as well. In England, White visited the black GI Liberty
Club – despite his taxi driver’s insistence that he must mean the white Rainbow Club. Although
designed for black soldiers, there were some white GIs present as well – “the Georgia accent of
one of them was thick as the mud of the Chattahoochee,” according to White. The white Georgian
told him he preferred the Liberty Club to any of the white clubs because he had become friends
with some black soldiers who would not be welcome at the all-white alternatives. White inquired
about whether these friendships would continue upon his stateside return:
Ruefully, he spread his hands, palms upward, and shrugged his shoulders. “I don’t
know,” he said sadly.12
Another white soldier recounted his experiences at the Stage Door Canteen in New York City
prior to being sent overseas. The first time the soldier went there he found black hosts and service-
men and he left in anger. But because the canteen was the standard gathering place for soldiers
unfamiliar with the city, he went back several times and had a change of heart. “If we can play to-
gether, why can’t we fight together?” he asked White. When informed of proposals to establish an
integrated unit white and black soldiers could volunteer to join, he replied, “I’d like to be the first
to volunteer. Then I wouldn’t feel like a Goddamned hypocrite when people over here ask why,
in fighting a war for democracy, the United States sends over one white and one Negro army.”13




However, not all of White’s interviews were so positive. Many white soldiers expressed signif-
icant prejudice. Racial rumors abounded, generally started when white Americans told European
locals wild tales of supposed black behavior.14 Perhaps a more interesting anecdote, however, is
White’s conversation with General Eisenhower. Referring to a discussion with an unnamed New
York journalist, Eisenhower “almost belligerently” exclaimed to White, “He told me my first duty
was to change the social thinking of the soldiers under my command, especially on racial issues.
I told him he was a damned fool – that my first duty is to win wars and that any changes in social
thinking would be purely incidental. Don’t you think I was right?”15
More academic work also analyzed the war’s relationship with white racial attitudes. In 1943’s
To Stem this Tide: A Survey of Racial Tension Areas in the United States, Charles Johnson and his as-
sociates shared an anecdote from Evansville, Indiana, where a train conductor ordered a group of
white and black soldiers from the same town to separate but a white soldier refused the order and
threatened to “fight[] the entire train crew.”16 In the war’s aftermath, University of North Carolina
sociologist Howard Odum, writing in 1948, described “a relatively large number of young college
students and returning G.I.’s advocating a more liberal practice with reference to race relations”
in the white South.17 These claims fit with what Walter White was telling the War Department. In
an April 1944 memorandum, for instance, Walter White described his tour of the North African
and Middle Eastern Theatres of Operation. “As men approach actual combat and the dangers of
death, the tendency becomes more manifest to ignore or drop off pettiness such as racial preju-
dice. . . When German shells and bombs are raining about them, they do not worry as much about
14Howard W. Odum, Race and Rumors of Race: Challenge to American Crises, (Chapel Hill, The University of North
Carolina Press, 1943).
15White, A Rising Wind, 63.
16Charles S. Johnson and Associates, To Stem this Tide: A Survey of Racial Tension Areas in the United States, (New York:
AMS Press, 1943), 38.
17Odum, “Social Change in the South,” 244.
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the race or creed of the man next to them.”18 However, the most serious academic research into
race relations amongst soldiers was The American Soldier. A mammoth two-volume set – totaling
nearly 1,300 pages of text, much of which is data analysis – this book remains a value resource for
insights into the attitudes of soldiers during World War II, as well as a foundational text in survey
research and modern social psychology. The first volume contains a substantial and insightful
chapter about the attitudes of black soldiers. The second volume concludes with a chapter about
what happens when “the soldier becomes a veteran.”19
Previous Research
Such contemporaneous debates relate directly to various scholarly concerns of present-day politi-
cal scientists. I focus here on two.
War, Race, and American Political Development: Missed Opportunities
Race and American political development scholarship has studied 1940s civil rights politics, the
impact of World War II, and the role of public opinion – but never quite in unison. I briefly review
some of this work here with a focus on what has been left unexamined.
Brian Feinstein and Eric Schickler, for example, offer a compelling critique of Edward Carmines
and James Stimson’s model of the civil rights realignment by pushing the timing of this partisan
shift back to the mid-1940s. They focus on two domestic mechanisms through which the Demo-
cratic Party gradually adopted more racially liberal policies than Republicans: (1) critical con-
stituents in the Democratic coalition, like Jews and CIO members, were more predisposed toward
18Memorandum, Walter White to the War Department; Folder: “Colored Matters (Negroes), Apr-May 1944”; OF 93;
Franklin D. Roosevelt President’s Official Files, 1933-1945; Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY (hereafter
cited as FDR Official Files).
19Samuel A. Stouffer, Edward A. Suchman, Leland C. DeVinney, Shirley A. Star, and Robin M. Williams, Jr., The
American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life, Vol. I, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949); Samuel A. Stouffer,
Arthur A. Lumsdaine, Marion Harper Lumsdaine, Robin M. Williams, Jr., M. Brewster Smith, Irving L. Janis, Shirley A.
Star, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., The American Soldier: Combat and its Aftermath, Vol. II, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1949).
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civil rights liberalism than the business-oriented constituents of the Republican Party; and (2) the
“ideological logic of the New Deal itself,” by which they mean the movement of the party towards
a rights-based focus in conjunction with a willingness to use the federal government to intervene
in society.20 I find the evidence for these claims to be largely persuasive. Entirely neglected in
their treatment, however, is the context of World War II. This is likewise true of related research
examining the relationship between civil rights attitudes and economic attitudes at this time pe-
riod. In an article exploring the connection between New Deal liberalism and racial liberalism, for
example, Schickler does not give the wartime context any major causal role. He again focuses in-
stead on the ideological logic of the New Deal, in particular the groups identified with New Deal
programs.21 This research agenda has been hugely insightful, yet I argue its lack of engagement
with the war leaves open several important questions for scholarly analysis.
Other historical institutionalist scholars have carefully examined the impact of the Second
World War on American racial politics. Philip Klinkner and Rogers Smith’s The Unsteady March,
for example, argue war is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, cause for racial progress in the United
States. Daniel Kryder’s Divided Arsenal demonstrates how wars in American history coincide with
increases in racial crowd violence, and often have the effect of centralizing state power. More re-
cently, Robert Saldin’s War, the American State, and Politics since 1898 offers a more general and
expansive overview of how war has shaped American domestic policy, including the greater in-
clusion of marginalized groups.
These three works all share a focus on political institutions. However, they also make several
striking off-handed comments about the relationship between the war and white attitudes – with-
out any original analysis of public opinion data. Klinkner and Smith claim, for example, that it is
“hard to escape the conclusion” that the “Nazi menace forced at least some white Americans to be-
20Feinstein and Schickler, “Platforms and Partners,” 5-6; Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, Issue Evolution:
Race and the Transformation of American Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
21Schickler, “New Deal Liberalism and Racial Liberalism in the Mass Public, 1937-1968”; see also Eric Schickler and
Devin Caughey, “Public Opinion, Organized Labor, and the Limits of New Deal Liberalism,” Studies in American Political
Development 25, 2011.
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gin to reexamine the racial inequalities in their midst.”22 This is a very clear claim, but not verified
with reference to survey data. Later, they fill in the causal processes. “[T]he ideological demands
of fighting an enemy who espoused racial hierarchies made more white Americans sensitive to
the presence of racial discrimination in America,” they argue. “The vision of blacks marching to
claim their rights contradicted the image of America as the defender of democracy.”23 Klinkner
and Smith do offer some willingness to concede that white opinion in the South did not liberalize,
and perhaps even hardened in its white supremacist resolve.24 But in general, their claim about
a shift in white attitudes is fairly strong. This claim about public opinion affects not only their
assessment of the public, but also normative assessments of other actors like President Roosevelt.
“Roosevelt’s unwillingness to take a stronger stand on racial issues was, in hindsight, regrettable
and costly,” they argue. “True, white Southerners were becoming more restive, but it seems clear
that in the context of the war, nationally public attitudes on race had shifted enough that he could
have been more outspoken for reform.”25 However, this claim is not cited, nor do they refer to
any public opinion data.26
This account has notably been itself cited as evidence for such claims in more recent work.
Saldin, for example, refers to Klinkner and Smith as an authority in asserting an “undeniable
growth of racial liberalism link[ed] to World War II.”27 As such, even while Klinkner and Smith’s
research is not centrally concerned with public opinion, it has had the effect of strengthening the




26To be clear, this critique of their sporadic references to mass attitudes should not be taken in itself to imply a critique
of their theoretical framework, which focuses on elite political institutions and social movements.
27Saldin, War, the American State, and Politics since 1898, 114. Elsewhere, Saldin is somewhat more nuanced than
Klinkner and Smith in his assumptions about public opinion. See pp. 114-15.
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view that World War II liberalized white racial attitudes.28
Individual-Level Impacts of Military Service on Black Veterans
Scholarship on the attitudinal and behavioral impacts of the war on veterans, by contrast, has
used public opinion data. However, it has focused almost entirely on black veterans. Parker,
for example, convincingly argues military service in the Second World War, as well as the Ko-
rean War, had a direct impact on the willingness of black veterans in the South to challenge the
white supremacist status quo. However, this analysis leaves open the question of why the war
might not have also had significant ramifications on white attitudes and political behavior. For
example, Parker argues that “we should expect black Southerners who were exposed to different,
more egalitarian cultures to have begun an aggressive interrogation of white supremacy.”29 Yet he
leaves unanswered the question of why this should not also be true for whites who experienced
these same “more egalitarian cultures.” Partially this discrepancy rests on Parker’s acceptance of
traditional models of military service – based on the more conventional rights-obligation trade-off
or more recent rational choice accounts – as sufficient for explaining white male participation, but
not black male participation since they did possess the same full rights of citizenship.30 However,
this seems to leave under-theorized the reason why exposure to relatively more egalitarian race
relations – such as those white soldiers serving in countries like France certainly saw – did not
have similarly transformative impacts on white attitudes.
Work on white veterans has been more local and specific. Jason Sokol’s history of white south-
ern reactions to civil rights quotes individual white southern men who, as a result of their service
in the Second World War, came to learn “that freedom means more than just freedom for the white
man,” as one phrased it. However, Sokol suggests such attitude changes were small, constituting
28Kryder likewise makes assumptions about the white public, albeit somewhat more negatively than Klinkner and
Smith. Kryder suggests Americans were “less familiar with the aims of the war and their relationship to democratic
ideals than Myrdal believed.” See Kryder, Divided Arsenal, 10.
29Parker, Fighting for Democracy, 95.
30Ibid., 18-19
52
“only a small fraction of white southern servicemen.”31 Although Sokol’s analysis is enlightening
in many respects, it stops short of being generalizable by the standards of political scientists.
Perhaps the best research on white veterans is Jennifer Brooks’s analysis of veterans in postwar
Georgia. While many southern black men returned from World War II determined to tear down
white supremacy, Brooks suggests the impact of military service on returning white veterans was
more heterogeneous. “A small but vocal minority of southern white veterans also defined the
war’s meaning and their own participation in it as a mandate to implement a political freedom
that applied to all Georgians,” she writes. These white veterans joined returning black soldiers in
their efforts. However, this push for racial equality “provoked an immediate backlash from other
white veterans determined to sustain all the power and prerogatives of white supremacy.”32
What’s Missing
This literature review suggests at least two avenues for research, then. First, is the available survey
evidence consistent with the argument that World War II led to an increase in white racial liberal-
ism?33 Second, in the war’s aftermath, were white veterans more racially liberal than their non-
veteran counterparts? The next section builds on these claims theoretically, and sets out testable
expectations to assess the war’s impact on white racial attitudes.
31Jason Sokol, There Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil Rights, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
2006), 19, 20, 25.
32Jennifer E. Brooks, Defining the Peace: World War II Veterans, Race, and the Remaking of Southern Political Tradition,
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 36.
33Some public opinion scholars have offered an assessment of racial attitudes in the 1940s and beyond. Page and
Shapiro, for example, present a graph showcasing shifts in racial attitudes from 1940-1963. Schuman et al. focus
more explicitly on race. However, their analysis largely frames the trends they present in behavioral theories of public
opinion formation. This chapter is more focused on how the exogenous shock of war affected white attitudes, both
in general and for those veterans who served. As such, the goal is to more closely relate shifts in opinion with the
changing historical context, integrating behavioral data in a more historical institutionalist framework. Ultimately,
however, my aims are complementary rather than critical. See Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, and Lawrence D.
Bobo, Racial Attitudes in American: Trends and Interpretations, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); Benjamin
I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences, (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1992; Howard Schuman and Maria Krysan, “A Historical Note on Whites’ Beliefs about
Racial Inequality,” American Sociological Review 64(6), 1999, 847-855.
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Theory and Expectations
Two claims made in this chapter – that the impact of the war on white attitudes cannot be take
for granted, yet we also need to incorporate World War II more centrally into our analysis of civil
rights politics – might seem to be contradictory. If the war has been largely ignored, how can
it also be said that it is widely assumed to have liberalized attitudes? If it turns out not to be
the case that the war vastly liberalized white attitudes, is it really so important to include in our
understanding of civil rights in the 1940s? I argue these two claims can be reconciled, and further
that such a reconciliation will improve scholarly understandings of race and American political
development in important ways.
My claim can be broken down into two parts. First, it is widely and popularly assumed that the
war liberalized white racial attitudes. This has long been the predominant view – it was present
in the 1940s and is widely assumed today in popular accounts of the war’s impact – yet it has
received very little scholarly interrogation. In part, this is due to how little attention World War II
has received in scholarly accounts of white racial attitudes. Perhaps it has been taken for granted
that the war’s impact was clearly a liberalizing one, yet it is striking how little evidence there is
for this position. The few scholarly accounts of race and American politics that do suggest the
war had this impact are not studies of public opinion. Rather, they are studies of institutions and
elites, and the suggested relationship between the war and white attitudes is taken for granted in
passing. For such a widely held assumption, the lack of academic work supporting it is notable.
Second, scholars of political parties and civil rights have increasingly turned their attention to
the 1940s, pushing back against conventional accounts focused on the 1958 congressional elections
and 1964 presidential election. Although I find this research to be largely persuasive, it is again
striking that the Second World War – one of the most dominant experience of daily life for many
Americans in this time period – is largely absent from these accounts. Although this chapter is fo-
cused on public opinion, by providing an empirical baseline for claims about the war’s impact on
white racial attitudes, these findings have implications for this research agenda as well. The war,
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of course, also had profound – albeit, again, uneven – impacts on American political institutions.34
I argue these two claims, when considered together, suggest the merits of a research project
examining white attitudes.35 This discussion leads to two theoretical expectations, which I assess
in the remainder of the chapter. I call the first the racial liberalization hypothesis:
Racial Liberalization Hypothesis: World War II led to liberal shifts in white attitudes
toward race and civil rights.
Hypothesis I is simply an explicitly stated version of the common view. Not everyone be-
lieve this – Kryder’s book suggests it is likely incorrect – but it is intellectually predominant. It
is also entirely plausible. If the racial liberalization hypothesis is correct, the most likely mecha-
nism linking the war to white racial attitudes is the ideological logic of a war against Nazi racism
undermining the intellectual plausibility of Jim Crow. Certainly civil rights activists – advocating
as they did a Double-V campaign for victory at home and abroad – found this logic compelling.36
Accounts suggesting something like the racial liberalization hypothesis can be found in sources
as scattered as constitutional law books. Writing of World War II, Alfred H. Kelly asserts, “[T]he
egalitarian ideology of American war propaganda, which presented the United States as a cham-
pion of democracy engaged in a death struggle with the German racists, created in the minds and
hearts of most white people a new and intense awareness of the shocking contrast between the
34While not the purpose of this specific chapter, I return to the subject of the war’s impact on institutions in Chapters
4-5.
35A quick aside is in order regarding the focus on whites. Ultimately, this chapter chooses to restrict the analysis to
whites for two reasons, one substantive and one methodological. Substantively, the broad question is about whether
racist views can be brought into question by an external shock that undermines the credibility of such views. Focusing
on whites makes sense in this regard. For the veterans analysis, analyzing white veterans complements the analysis of
black veterans offered by Parker. Methodologically, the 1940s survey data under-sampled black respondents generally,
but especially under-sampled southern black respondents. Since three-fourths of all African Americans lived in the
South in the 1940s, this is a substantial methodological limitation for any analysis of black public opinion.
36For a discussion of the Double-V campaign, see: Harvard Sitkoff, “Racial Militancy and Interracial Violence in the
Second World War,” Journal of American History 58(3), 1971, 668-681; Neil A. Wynn, The Afro-American and the Second
World War: Revised Edition, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1993 [1976]); Jonathan Rosenberg, How Far the Promised Land?:
World Affairs and the American Civil Rights Movement from the First World War to Vietnam, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2005).
55
country’s too comfortable image of itself and the cold realities of American racial segregation.”37
This claim is simply presented as background to a discussion of Brown v. Board; it is indicative of
a widespread belief that the racial liberalization hypothesis is accurate in popular understandings
of the war.
However, there is also theoretical grounding for a null or even negative result. As described
in Chapter 1, southern newspaper columnist John Temple Graves wrote in 1942, “[T]hey have
invited their followers to think in terms of a Double V-for-Victory – victory in battle with Hitler
and victory in battle at home. Victory, unhappily, doesn’t work that way.”38 Later in the same
article, while detailing improvements in the conditions of black southerners during the war, he
noted the decline of lynchings, but warned, “Unhappily the number may increase now as a result
of the agitations of the white man against the black and the black against the white.”39 Indeed, it
is possible to imagine southern whites fearing Double-V was being persuasive, and thus doubling
down on their white supremacist resolve.40
The second theoretical expectation is a variation on the racial liberalization hypothesis focused
on distinctions between veterans of the war and those who did not serve directly:
Racial Liberalization Hypothesis for Veterans: World War II liberalized the racial
attitudes of white veterans, relative to their non-veteran counterparts.
Hypothesis II shifts the focus from temporal shifts in the aggregate white public to differences
between otherwise similar veterans and non-veterans. If this variant of the racial liberalization
37Alfred H. Kelly, “The School Desegregation Case,” in Quarrels that Have Shaped the Constitution, ed. John A. Garraty,
(New York: Harper & Row Publishers: 1987 [1962]), 312.
38John Temple Graves, “The Southern Negro and the War Crisis,” Virginia Quarterly Review 18(4), 1942, 501.
39Ibid., 514.
40This possibility was perceived by certain elites as well. For example, on March 14, 1944, Neville Butler of the
London Foreign Office wrote Sir Ronald Campbell, a subordinate of Ambassador Halifax in Washington. “It was felt
here that the way in which our public have received the colored troops has not altogether pleased our Southern friends,
who think it may lead to trouble for them after the war. . . ” Cited in Thomas Hachey, “Walter White and the American
Negro Soldier in World War II: A Diplomatic Dilemma for Britain,” Phylon 39(3), 1978, 248.
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hypothesis is correct, the most plausible mechanism is an interaction between the contact hypoth-
esis and the ideological tensions described above. Whites who served in the military might have
felt more closely connected with the anti-Nazi crusade; they might also have encountered black
soldiers and changed their opinions about at least some aspects of race relations. Their exposure
to the sorts of relatively more egalitarian cultures in places like France and England that Parker
points to as inspiring black resistance might have likewise made white soldiers rethink the norms
of their own country.
Theoretical grounding for a null result here can be found in critiques of the contact hypoth-
esis, as well as arguments that white soldiers were fighting to defend their way of life – white
supremacy and all – rather than something more transformative. Many white veterans simply
wanted to return home and resume life exactly as they had left it. “That often meant supporting
Jim Crow as staunchly as ever,” Sokol writes. “Many believed they had fought to defend, not
overturn, racial customs.”41 Brooks likewise points to the heterogeneous impacts the war had on
white veterans in Georgia:
This destabilizing potential of the war’s impact, however, greatly alarmed many other
southern whites, including veterans, who thought that fighting to defend the Amer-
ican way of life abroad also meant upholding the southern way of segregation and
white rule at home. Such veterans tended to experience the economic, demographic,
and social changes accelerated by the war for the South and Georgia–personified by
black veterans determined to claim the political equality and economic opportunity
that was their due–as a profound disruption of their confidence in the durability of
white supremacy. The war’s subversive potential, reactionary veterans believed, un-
dermined their own political prerogatives as white men, and thereby invoked their
civic and male duty to defend the racial sanctity of the domestic and political sphere.42
The extent to which various contradictory outcomes are entirely plausible suggests the merits
of carefully assessing the evidence for each variant of the racial liberalization hypothesis.
41Sokol, There Goes My Everything, 20, 23.
42Brooks, Defining the Peace, 39.
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Data and Methodology
To assess the first hypothesis, I use public opinion surveys from 1937-1950.43 I discuss the ques-
tion wordings in the relevant sections. To correct for the known biases of the quota sampling
procedure employed at the time, I use the weighting method described in Chapter 2.44 This effec-
tively involves breaking the sample into demographic subgroups and using Census data to weight
each subgroup according to their share of the population.45 This is discussed along with question
wordings throughout. To assess aggregate shifts, I make a series of temporal comparisons using
the weighted numbers. If the racial liberalization hypothesis is correct, then the liberal position
on each issue should increase over time. However, if there is no change – or if there is actually an
increase in the conservative position – then the racial liberalization hypothesis is not supported.
To assess the second hypothesis, I examine public opinion surveys from two distinct time
periods: the mid- to late-1940s, to assess the more immediate impact of the war; and the early
1960s, to assess the longer-term impacts. The first section uses two surveys that were used in
the previous section, but in a slightly different way. I also use an additional survey that asked
about military integration. I then move ahead in time and use the “Negro Political Participation
Study,” a survey of black and white southerners – defined as the former Confederate states –
conducted in 1961. This study merits further introduction. The Negro Political Participation Study
was conducted by principal investigators Donald Matthews and James Prothro at the University of
North Carolina.46 This survey uses the more modern American National Election Studies sample
design. Thus, while it is limited by the lack of a non-southern comparison group, it does not face
43iPoll Databank, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html.
44Adam J. Berinsky, “American Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s: The Analysis of Quota-Controlled Sample
Survey Data,” Public Opinion Quarterly 70(4), 2006, 499-529.
45For more detailed instructions, see Chapter 2.
46This dataset was obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the
University of Michigan. ICPSR Website, “http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/. For a contempo-
raneous analysis of this dataset, see Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics,
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966).
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the limitations of the quota controlled samples used in the previous surveys. This is the same
survey used by Parker, who focused on the black sample. I utilize the white sample to address the
questions stated earlier. I discuss the question wordings in the relevant sections.
Methodologically, I opt to estimate regressions on the male sample only. I argue this makes
clear theoretical sense – while some women served in units like the Women’s Army Corp, the bat-
tles of World War II were fought almost entirely men – although it does have the methodological
shortcoming of lowering the number of observations in the models. I also restrict the sample with
reference to age to focus on those who could have plausibly been veterans. To determine what
age range to use, I look at the age and veteran status cross-tabs. For the models using the 1946
dataset, I analyze only those individuals age 40 and below. For the 1948 datasets, I use age 45 as
the cut off. For the 1961 dataset, I look only at those between 38 and 65 to best assess the World
War II generation. This, too, lowers the number of observations, but it also reduces the possibility
that veteran status is simply capturing age effects.
Education – necessarily controlled for because of sampling concerns in the 1940s datasets47 –
takes on additional importance when studying veterans, especially in the later time period. The
1961 cross-tabs are suggestive. In the white sample used here, 26 percent of respondents had some
college experience; 25 percent had served in the military. But among the 25 percent with military
service, a much larger 39 percent had some college experience, compared to only 21 percent of
non-veterans. This is likely largely due to the effects of the 1944’s Servicemen’s Readjustment
Act – the G.I. Bill – which substantially aided white veterans in attending college.48 For more
47Berinsky suggests using the weighting variables as explanatory variables in regression models. Berinsky, “Ameri-
can Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s.” See Chapter 2.
48Empirical analysis demonstrates differential effects of the G.I. Bill on educational attainment between northern and
southern black veterans, with little effect on collegiate outcomes for black veterans in the South. Sarah Turner and John
Bound, “Closing the Gap or Widening the Divide: The Effects of the G.I. Bill and World War II on the Educational
Outcomes of Black Americans,” The Journal of Economic History 63(1), 2003, 145-177. This was not entirely unexpected
in the immediate aftermath of the G.I. Bill’s passage. Writing for the American Council on Race Relations at the end
of the war, William Caudill predicted that “the white GI will be considered first a veteran, second and incidentally a
white man; the Negro GI will often be considered first a Negro, second and incidentally a veteran.” Quoted in David
H. Onkst, “ ‘First a Negro...Incidentally a Veteran’: Black World War Two Veterans and the G. I. Bill of Rights in the
Deep South, 1944-1948,” Journal of Social History 31(3), 1998, 533. More generally, see the debate between Katznelson
and Suzanne Mettler regarding the G.I. Bil’s impact on race: Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An
Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2005); Suzanne
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experimentally-minded readers, I address concerns about post-treatment bias in the Appendix.
Results: Racial Liberalization Hypothesis in the White Mass Public
This section addresses the first hypothesis, that World War II led to a liberalization of white racial
attitudes in the aggregate. If this is correct, we should see a liberal shift in racial attitudes, both
prejudice and policy. I find that while it is possible to argue there were slight liberal shifts in
racial prejudice, this was simply not the case for policy attitudes. White opposition to federal anti-
lynching legislation actually grew during the war, and there was no change on attitudes toward
the poll tax.
Racial Prejudice, 1943-1946
In 1944, NORC administered “Survey #1944-0225: Attitudes Toward Negroes,” a national survey
of white attitudes described in extensive detail in the previous chapter.49 The sample is 2,521 na-
tional white adults who were interviewed face to face. Six of the questions from this survey were
repeated on a single occasion. While this is not an ideal number of data points from a contempo-
rary perspective, it is a goldmine by the standards of 1940s survey research. This section compares
the aggregate and regional numbers between t1 and t2 to offer some assessment of change over
time. Assessing any potential shift from 1943 to 1944 might be of some inherent interest, but un-
fortunately it does not allow for a during and postwar comparison. However, the 1944 and 1946
comparison does offer this and fortunately most of the questions were repeated at this point. A
good living question (“Do you think Negroes have the same chance as white people to make a
good living in this country?”) was asked in a November 1943 survey titled “Postwar Problems,
Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation, (New York: Oxford University Press,
2007); Ira Katznelson and Suzanne Mettler, “On Race and Policy History: A Dialogue About the G.I. Bill,” Perspectives
on Politics 6(3), 2008, 519-537.
49iPoll Databank, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html.
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Old Age Pension, Public Schools and Free Speech.”50 This survey interview 2,560 national adults
face to face. Later, five of the questions were repeated in a May 1946 survey titled “Minorities;
United Nations.”51 This survey interviewed 2,589 national adults face to face. There was a ques-
tion about fair treatment (“Do you think most Negroes in the United States are being treated fairly
or unfairly?”), jobs (“Do you think Negroes should have as good a chance as white people to get
any kind of job, or do you think white people should have the first chance at any kind of job?”),
blood (As far as you know, is Negro blood the same as white blood, or is it different in some
way?”), intelligence (“In general, do you think Negroes are as intelligent as white people – that is,
can they learn just as well if they are given the same education?”), and having a black nurse (“If
you were sick in a hospital, would it be all right with you if you had a Negro nurse, or wouldn’t
you like it?”). A variant of the intelligence questions was asked by Roper in 1939. Unfortunately,
however, the dataset does not identify region or race of respondents, making it difficult to compare
to the weighted white figures presented in this section. The blood question might seem strange at
first, but it actually relates quite directly to the war effort: the Red Cross at this time segregated
donations – storing black blood separately from white blood – even during total war.52 Weights
were constructed following Berinsky and Schickler’s approach.53
Whites became slightly more likely to say African Americans should have the same chance at
a job, rising from 38 percent to 45 percent. Northern support for equal opportunity increased from
46 percent to 52 percent; southern support increased from 15 percent to 25 percent. Whites also
became slightly more likely to say black blood was the same, with the number increasing from 31
percent to 40 percent. The number saying it was different was effectively constant, moving from
50iPoll Databank, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html.
51iPoll Databank, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html.
52Thomas A. Guglielmo, “ ‘Red Cross, Double Cross’: Race and America’s World War II-Era Blood Donor Service,”
Journal of American History 91(1), 2010, 63-90.
53I calculate a 32-category eduWhites weight for the 1943 dataset. However, I am only able to calculate a 24-category
eduWhites weight for the 1946 dataset, since I am unable to distinguish between whites who attended high school and
whites who actually graduated (these two groups are thus lumped together).
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35 percent to 33 percent. However, don’t know responses dropped from 34 percent to 28 percent.
In the North, whites moved from 34 percent to 42 percent saying it was the same. In the South,
whites moved from only 20 percent saying it was the same to 32 percent saying so. Finally, whites
became more likely – moving from 45 to 54 percent – to say blacks were as intelligent as whites.
However, this shift is almost entirely non-southern. In the South, 30 percent of whites said yes
in 1944 compared to 31 percent in 1946. In the North, however, this number increased from 50
percent in 1944 to 61 percent in 1946.
The percentage of whites who said they thought African Americans had the same chance as
whites to make a good living was roughly constant from 1943 to 1944, increasing from 52 percent
to 54 percent. If all extraneous responses – including don’t knows – are dropped, it does increase
from 53 to 60 percent, but this likely overstates the shift.54 White assessments of whether African
Americans were being treated fairly likewise remained constant from 1944 to 1946, at 63 percent
in both years. The question about having a black nurse actually saw a slight decrease in support,
from 50 percent of whites saying they would be okay with this in 1944 to 46 percent in 1946. This
seems primarily driven by northern whites, where support dropped from 56 percent to 51 percent,
while moving only from 32 percent to 30 percent in the South.
Overall, then, changes over time are mixed. There is some evidence of slight racial liberaliza-
tion, but this is counterbalanced a bit by a few null results and especially by the potential conser-
vative shift on the nurse question. Regionally, it seems shifts were often roughly similar across
region, although this was not true for the question about black intelligence. There are, however,
clear limitations to this analysis. Two data points are less than ideal, especially since there is no
clear before and after. Having a 1938 comparison case would be preferable. Fortunately, the two
policy issues that follow are better in this regard, and allow for a more rigorous assessment of
over-time change.
54This could reasonably be seen as not a particularly valid measure of racial prejudice. Indeed, if the FEPC had even
a slight impact, African Americans did have somewhat better job prospects during the war, although certainly not real
equal opportunity in any meaningful sense.
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Policy I: Federal Anti-Lynching Legislation, 1937-1950
I next turn to two policy areas with more available data points: anti-lynching legislation and abol-
ishment of the poll tax. I start with an assessment of changing white attitudes on federal interven-
tion in state lynching cases. Lynching was raised as a national political issue by black civil rights
organizations like the NAACP. Black legal figures like William Hastie and Thurgood Marshall
kept pressing the issue during World War II, arguing that “[t]he recent outbreaks of mob violence
again emphasize the fact that only Federal action will free us from lynchings and the threat of
lynching.”55 Federal anti-lynching legislation was often proposed, but never successfully passed
in the Senate. Such legislation was a challenge to Roosevelt’s congressional New Deal alliance.
Roosevelt and his congressional supporters “tailored New Deal legislation to southern prefer-
ences,” according to Katznelson et al., trading maintenance of southern society’s status quo for
southern support for New Deal economic legislation. This meant that not even “the most heinous
aspects of regional repression, such as lynching, [could be] be brought under the rule of law.”56
Yet for many politicians outside the South, black migration meant “black political power was be-
coming an unavoidable reality.”57 Anti-lynching legislation soon became more than the sum of its
parts, effectively serving as a symbol for racial conservatives of the meddling of northern liberals
in the white South’s affairs.
To assess the more general state of white public opinion on lynching, I use Gallup questions
about federal intervention in state lynching cases, which were asked before and after – although,
interestingly, not during – the war. While Schickler discards the don’t know responses to create
dichotomous response categories in his analysis of the prewar lynching questions, I leave the
don’t know responses in to allow for a valid third category of uncertainty. As will be discussed
55William H. Hastie and Thurgood Marshall, “Negro Discrimination and the Need for Federal Action,” Law Guild
Review, 1942, 21.
56Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger, and Daniel Kryder, “Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 1933-1950,”
Political Science Quarterly 108(2), 1993, 297.
57George C. Rable, “The South and the Politics of anti-lynching Legislation, 1920-1940,” Journal of Southern History 51,
1958, 209.
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momentarily, this helps to assess prewar and postwar shifts in the opposition category.
A word of caution is in order regarding question wordings. While the analysis presented here
is consistent with evidence regarding the poll tax (which provides a useful robustness check, as
there is no substantial variation in question wording there), Gallup’s questions about lynching
are indicative of some of the weaknesses of early survey research. The questions can basically be
divided into three groups. The first three questions, all from 1937, asked quite simply whether
Congress should pass a law making lynching a federal crime. The next three questions, asked
from 1937 to 1940, asked whether the Federal Government should have the authority to fine and
imprison local authorities who do not protect against a lynch mob, which is a much more specific
and severe description. In the postwar period, from 1947 to 1950, Gallup returns to a more general
question, asking, with only very slight variations, something along the lines of, “At present, state
governments deal with most crimes committed in their own state. In the case of a lynching do
you think the Federal Government should have the right to step in and deal with the crime – or
do you think this should be left entirely to the state government?”
I argue the first (1937) and third (1947-1950) groups of questions are roughly equivalent. They
both ask, generally, whether the federal government should have authority over lynchings rather
than state officials. As such, comparing the 1937 numbers to the 1947-1950 numbers provides
a relatively (by the standards of the era) safe assessment of the racial liberalization hypothesis.
However, it is quite possible the second (1937-1940) group of questions might reflect question
wording effects. I include them in my results with this cautionary note attached. However, if
anything the inclusion of the 1937-1940 questions downplays the amount of change. The increase
in opposition to anti-lynching legislation from 1937 to 1947-1950 would look larger if the 1937-1940
questions are ignored because of question wording concerns (I also include supplementary graphs
excluding the survey items that used the more punitive question wording to demonstrate this). I
divide opinion in each survey into support, opposition, and don’t know. I use the best possible
survey weight to correct for the biases of the sampling procedure.58
58For the postwar questions, this means calculating the eduWhites weight. However, the prewar surveys are more
limited. Making the best of the available information, I use profWhites weights for the January 1937, November 1937,
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Figure 3.1 plots trends in support.59 For the first three time points in 1937, national white
support for federal intervention ranges from 59 to 62 percent (the numbers are 59 to 67 percent in
the North, compared to 38 to 53 percent in the South). For the next three, when phrasing about
punishing local officials is introduced from November 1937 to January 1940, support ranges from
42 to 60 percent (46 to 60 percent in the North, compared to 29 to 58 percent in the South), with the
highest figure coinciding with the most minimalist version of this style of question. Postwar, from
February 1948 until January 1950 national white support for federal intervention ranges from 38
to 43 percent (42 to 47 percent in the North, compared to 23 to 27 percent in the South).60
Precise causal inference is impossible to draw from such data. Yet a few general statements
seem consistent with the evidence. The war certainly did not lead to increases in support for
federal intervention in state lynching cases. If anything, there seems to have been an increase in
racially conservative opposition. Figure 3.3 plots the percentage of whites that opposed federal in-
tervention from 1937 until 1950.61 Before the war, opposition never rose above 43 percent overall,
40 percent in the North, and 56 percent in the South, while don’t know response were sometimes
as high as 17-20 percent.62 By January 1950, however, opposition to federal intervention was up
to 52 percent overall, including 45 percent in the North and 71 percent in the South. This seems to
have been primarily the result of white indecision evolving into a hardened states’ rights position,
and January 1940 datasets; I use phoneBlack weights for the August 1937, October/November 1937, and December 1937
datasets. Weights for the prewar questions were previously computed by Schickler. I calculate the postwar weights
myself. Differences in weights are necessitated by differences in available information in surveys from different time
periods. However, it is unlikely this has a sizable effect, substantively. While the weighted figures are technically more
accurate than unweighted ones, the substantive difference between them is generally small.
59Figure 3.2 excludes the data points from surveys with the additional punitive language.
60There is one outlier. In June 1947, 67 percent chose the federal intervention position. The question wording differed
slightly. While the later questions ask whether the federal government should be given certain authority or if it should
be left entirely to the state government, the June 1947 question asks whether the federal government should be able
to step in “if the State Government doesn’t deal with it justly.” This concluding qualifier (“justly”) probably made the
question seem less all-encompassing.
61Figure 3.4 excludes the data points from surveys with the additional punitive language..
62And these prewar heights of opposition coincide with the more extreme question wording, which was dropped in
the postwar period.
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although there appears to have been a slight drop-off in active support for federal intervention as
well.
Policy II: Abolishment of the Poll Tax, 1940-1949
The second civil rights policy issue that was especially salient prewar was the poll tax. To assess
shifts in white attitudes on the poll tax, I use Gallup questions about whether the tax should be
abolished. This question was asked once in 1940, then four more times in the late 1940s. Like
the lynching questions, however, it was never asked during the war itself. The question wording,
fortunately, was very similar over time. “Some Southern states require every voter to pay a poll
tax amounting to about a dollar a year before they can vote,” the question began. The respon-
dent is then asked whether they think “these poll taxes” should be “abolished” or “done away
with” (the specific phrase at the end is the only part that varies over time). The prewar survey
allowed respondents to distinguish between what they labeled “YES!” and “Yes” (also “NO!” and
“No”), which is how they articulated preference intensity. However, the postwar surveyed sim-
ply offered “Yes” and “No” responses, so I collapse the 1940 survey into simple “YES!”/“Yes” and
“NO!”/“No” to allow for comparison. All surveys also allowed the respondents to declare “no
opinion,” which I again choose to keep in my analysis. The 1940 survey weights were constructed
by Berinsky and Schickler, and I use their code to reproduce it (altering, however, their decision to
drop respondents who offered no opinion on the poll tax question). For the six postwar questions,
I again construct my own “eduWhites” weights based on their method.
Figure 3.3 plots white support for abolishing the poll tax. There is very almost zero change in
attitudes toward the poll tax between 1940 and 1949. In December 1940 – a year before the United
States entered the second World War – national white attitudes stood at 61 percent wanting to
overturn poll taxes, 27 percent wanting to keep them, and 12 percent not offering an opinion. In
the South, 51 percent of whites supported getting rid of poll taxes, with 40 percent wanting to
keep them and 9 percent not expressing an opinion. Jumping forward to the postwar questions,
national white support ranged from 63 to 66 percent, and among white southerners it ranged
from 48 to 53 percent. Although there was not an increase in the racially conservative position,
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as there was in lynching, the poll tax evidence likewise does not support the racial liberalization
hypothesis. The war simply had no effect.
Summary: Hypothesis I
This section demonstrates that, for the most part, white attitudes were not broadly liberalized on
race and civil rights as a result of World War II. There is some evidence of a decrease in certain (al-
though not all) measures of white racial prejudice. However, this is counterbalanced by evidence
that, if anything, white opposition to federal anti-lynching legislation actually grew, particularly
in the South. Although the slight shifts in prejudice should not be discounted, this section of-
fers a clear rebuke to scholarship that has simply assumed the war had a liberalizing impact on
white racial attitudes without analyzing the relevant data. This perspective – especially in its more
declarative forms – is simply not supported by the available survey evidence. Several issues can-
not be fully resolved, including sheer data limitations and possible variation in survey response
during the decade. While acknowledging such limitations – which I further address in the Ap-
pendix – I argue the best account of the war’s impact on white racial attitudes must be consistent
with the evidence that does exist.
Results: Racial Liberalization Hypothesis for White Veterans
This section addresses the second hypothesis, that white veterans of World War II were more
likely to be racially liberal in the war’s aftermath than their non-veteran counterparts. Using
two datasets from the earlier analysis of aggregate white racial attitudes, as well as an additional
dataset asking about military integration, I demonstrate white veterans were not less racially prej-
udiced in the war’s immediate aftermath. They were not distinguishable on general prejudice
measures, and they were likewise not more willing to support an integrated military. They were,
however, more likely to support federal anti-lynching legislation. Shifting focus to 1961 – and
bringing in the white southern sample of the Negro Political Participation Study – I demonstrate
white veterans in the South were not distinguishable on attitudes toward segregation, the sit-ins
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movement, and so on. However, they were more supportive of black voting rights than non-
veterans.
Postwar: Late 1940s
This 1946 survey used earlier contains a wide range of questions about race and civil rights. For
dependent variables, I use five of the anti-black prejudice questions from the last section (whether
African Americans are being treated fairly, whether they should have the same chance at a job,
whether black blood is biologically the same as white blood, whether blacks are as innately intel-
ligent as whites, and whether the respondent would tolerate having a black nurse). Each variable
is dichotomized so that discriminatory positions are 1 and more egalitarian positions are 0.
Results of a series of logistic regressions estimating the effect of veteran status, controlling for
region and age, are presented in Table 3.1. World War II veterans were perhaps less likely to say
white people should get the first chance at a job, but the marginal effect of 9 percentage points
is only significant at the .10 level. This might be reasonable since N=477, but that’s a post-hoc
analysis at best. Otherwise, there is no distinction between veterans and non-veterans on an array
of issues.
I also examine attitudes toward an integrated military. In 1948, Gallup used a split form to ask
slight variations on a question about military integration. Those receiving Form K of the survey
were asked, “Would you favor or oppose having Negro and white troops throughout the U.S.
Armed Services live and work together – or should they be separated as they are now?” Those
receiving Form T were asked, “It has been suggested that white and colored men serve together
throughout the U.S. Armed Services – that is, live and work in the same units. Do you think this
is a good idea or a poor idea?” These variables are dichotomized so that 1 = opposition and 0 =
support for integration.
I use logistic regression to estimate the relationship between opinion on military integration
and World War II veteran status, controlling for region, education, and age. Results are presented
in Table 3.2. There is no statistical relationship between being a veteran and attitudes toward
military integration. White veterans were not more supportive of serving side-by-side with black
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soldiers in 1948, nor were they more opposed. The war seems to have had no effect. Question
wording, likewise, seems not to have altered expressed opinion, at least for veterans.
Finally, some of the postwar lynching questions were part of surveys that asked about whether
respondents served in World War II. Here, I examine a 1948 question asking respondents, “At
present, state governments deal with most crimes committed in their own states. In the case of a
lynching, do you think the United States (Federal) Government should have the right to step in
and deal with the crime – or do you think this should be left entirely to the state government?”
This survey provides the strongest positive evidence supporting the hypothesis that white vet-
erans were liberalized on race. I estimate the relationship between opinion on federal intervention
in state lynching cases and World War II veteran status, controlling for age, region, farm residency
(which weakly captures rural effects), and car ownership (which weakly captures class effects). I
estimate a logistic regression using a dichotomous version of the dependent variable (assessing
preferences for leaving lynching cases to states vs. allowing the federal government to intervene),
as well as OLS and ordered probit regressions using as three-category version (allowing “don’t
know” to serve as a middle category).63
Results are presented in Table 3.3. Calculating marginal effects, white veterans are 10 percent
less likely to take the states’ rights position, relative to the federal intervention choice, in the logit
model. They are about 8 percent less likely to take the states’ rights positive, relative to a don’t
know comparison group, in the ordered probit model; in the same model, veterans are 9 percent
more likely to prefer the federal intervention approach rather than stating no preference.64 This
seems to be an entirely non-southern effect. If the model is estimated using only southern respon-
dents, the veteran variable is not significant. However, if it is estimated using only non-southern
respondents, the effect of military service is slightly larger than in the full model.65
63Treating “don’t know” as a middle category is debatable, of course. However, it does not change the results.
64The OLS model captures a similar result.
65These results are included in the Appendix.
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The Civil Rights Era: Early 1960s
While the immediate impact of service on racial attitudes is interesting, another prospect is the
long-term impact of military service on later racial attitudes, especially in the era when civil rights
politics were most primed. This later analysis also allows me to relate this project more directly to
Parker’s work on the attitudinal and behavioral impact of black veterans’ military service. Relying
on the white sample of the 1961 Negro Political Participation Survey, I use the following questions
as dependent variables: the respondent’s assessment of how many white people in the South favor
racial segregation; whether the respondent themselves favors “integration, strict segregation, or
something in between”; their agreement with the statement, “[c]olored people ought to be allowed
to vote”; assessment of the sit-in movement (“that is, some of the young colored people going into
stores, and sitting down at lunch counters, and refusing to leave until they are served”); their
agreement with the statement, “Demonstrations to protest integration of schools are a good idea,
even if a few people have to get hurt”; whether they have ever “ever known a colored person well
enough that you would talk to him as a friend”; and whether they agree that “colored people are
all alike.”
I estimate regression models where opinion is a function of veteran status, as well as age and
educational attainment. The sample is restricted to southern whites by default. As previously
noted, I also restrict it to those individuals age 38 to 65. For dependent variables with multiple,
ordered response categories, I estimate ordered probit models. For the dichotomous question
about friendship – as well as an alternate coding of the sit-ins variable – I use logistic regression.
To aid in interpretation, I calculate changes in probabilities for theoretically relevant shifts, as well
as the average change, for the veteran variable in the ordered probit models. I also calculate the
marginal effect of moving from 0 to 1 on the veteran variable (i.e., moving from not being a veteran
to being a veteran) for the logistic regression models.
Results are presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. The strongest support for the racial liberalization
hypothesis is found in the model assessing attitudes on black voting rights. However, it is largely
in preference intensity, rather than sheer differences of opinion. Southern whites with military
backgrounds were 21 percent more likely than those without military backgrounds to offer strong
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support, relative to the weaker support option. However, the other categorical shifts are much
smaller. The overall average change associated with military service was 11 percentage points,
which is highly skewed due to the 21 percentage point difference between strong and weak sup-
port. For this issue, at least, there is clear support for the racial liberalization hypothesis.
White veterans were also 19 percent more likely than non-veterans to say they had a black
friend. This is the second piece of evidence supporting the racial liberalization hypothesis. Al-
though the “black friend” trope is a cliche one, it lends some support to the idea that white veter-
ans’ relative moderation, at least on some issues, was partly fueled by contact.
However, there is no difference whatsoever between veterans and non-veterans on assess-
ments of the black sit-in protests or general attitudes toward segregation. This is a clear rebuke
of the racial liberalization hypothesis. Segregation was at the core of the southern racial status
quo, and military service seems to have had no moderating effect on how southern white men
felt about the issue. Similarly, the sit-in movement was a critical aspect of the 1960s civil rights
movement, and military service likewise seems to have had no impact on white assessments of it.
Finally, it is possible there is variation between the Peripheral and Deep South states.66 Unfor-
tunately, it is difficult to definitely assess such a distinction, since the number of observations in
the Deep South is quite small by the conventions of survey research.67
Summary: Hypothesis II
This section provides some evidence that white veterans’ military service corresponded with more
moderate racial attitudes on a few issues, but not others. White veterans overall were less likely to
oppose federal intervention in state lynching cases in 1948, and white veterans in the South offered
stronger support for black voting rights in 1961. However, they did not evince less racial prejudice
66The Peripheral South can be defined as Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia, while the
Deep South can be defined as Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. This definition is used
by many standard texts in southern politics, including V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation, (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 2006 [1949]); Earl Black and Merle Black, Politics and Society in the South, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1987).
67The N of 142 for the black voting model, for instance, can be broken down into 107 Peripheral South respondents
and 35 Deep South respondents. The sample is restricted due to the focus on men in the appropriate age range.
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than non-veterans in the war’s immediate aftermath, and by 1961 southern white veterans were
not distinguishable from white southerners as a whole on questions of segregation. This amends
the analysis of the previous section insomuch as the war cannot be said to have had zero impact
on white civil rights policy attitudes. However, the limited effects on the racial attitudes of white
veterans merits critical examination. Where racial moderation occurred, it occurred on policies
addressing the most extreme of white supremacist violence (lynching) and the clearest example of
democratic exclusion (black prohibition from exercising the franchise). However, this moderation
did not extend to broader claims about racial integration. The white veterans analyzed in the
1960s were just as supportive of Jim Crow segregation as southern whites who did not serve, and
they were not any more sympathetic to the sit-in movement.
Discussion
There are two key empirical take-aways from this chapter. First, while there is some evidence of
slight decreases in white racial prejudice during the war, this is not the case for policy. White sup-
port for anti-lynching legislation actually decreased, and the war had no effect on white attitudes
toward abolishing the poll tax. The racial liberalization hypothesis, at least in its strongest forms,
is not supported by the available survey evidence.
Second, the story is more mixed for white veterans. Veterans are not distinguishable on a wide
range of measures of racial prejudice, including willingness to serve alongside black soldiers.
However, they are actually more racially liberal on two policy issues: They were more likely to
support federal anti-lynching legislation in 1948, and southern white veterans offered stronger
support for black voting rights in 1961.
What mechanisms might account for these empirical findings? The growth in white southern
opposition to federal anti-lynching legislation, particularly insomuch as it came from indecision
shifting into such opposition, might well be a response to fears the Double-V rhetoric of civil
rights organizations was successful. This was something the White House sensed as well. For
example, in a November 25, 1942, memo to the President from Jonathan Daniels about the FEPC
investigation of the Capital Transit Company, Daniels wrote that the move is helping to “create
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Southern fears that the government may be moving to end Jim Crow laws in transportation in
the South under the guise of the war effort.”68 Growing white southern opposition to federal
anti-lynching legislation might be similarly motivated.
For veterans, I argue there is a coherent underlying logic that links together opposition to the
most extremes of white supremacist violence and the most blatant form of democratic exclusion,
yet allows for a maintenance of the racial status quo in most other ways. The interaction between
contact (which is supported by southern white veterans being more likely to say they had black
friends than non-veterans) and the ideological logic of the war did not lead to a wholesale reval-
uation of white supremacy. However, it did lead to a discomfort with the most extreme outcomes
associated with it, like mob violence and disenfranchisement.
In many ways, this is similar to the story of President Truman’s evolving civil rights positions.
Privately, Truman was born into a very culturally southern part of Missouri, and he casually used
racial slurs throughout his life. However, Truman’s service in the First World War was a critical
moment in his life, and he developed a particular concern with the treatment of soldiers. When
he saw evidence of black veterans returning home only to be beaten by police – particularly the
blinding of Sergeant Isaac Woodard in South Carolina by an officer’s billy club – he was personally
affected in a way Roosevelt never would have been.69 Such emotional reactions did not lead him to
support desegregation and the civil rights movement more broadly. Indeed, later in life he would
come to view the 1960s movement as unruly and possibly Communist in nature.70 However, it
did at least press him at the margins to say soldiers deserved better than mob violence. It is quite
possible that at least some white veterans of the Second World War had a similar understanding.71
68Memo, Jonathan Daniels to Franklin Roosevelt, November 25, 1942; Folder: “Colored Matters (Negroes) [in Box
5]”; OF 93; FDR Official Files. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
69David McCullough, Truman, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); see also Klinkner and Smith, The Unsteady March.
70McCullough, Truman, 971-72
71Insomuch as this reasoning focuses on a limited set of rights earned through service, this can be seen as a republican
argument. See Chapter 5 for a lengthier articulation of my analysis of Truman.
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Conclusion
Claims about World War II’s impact on white racial attitudes are widespread, yet they are sys-
tematically made without reference to public opinion data that might allow for an examination of
such claims. This chapter provides an empirical baseline for future claims to draw from. First, I
demonstrate that while there is some evidence of shifts in racial prejudice, the war did not liber-
alize the civil rights policy attitudes of whites. This is especially true for anti-lynching legislation,
where opposition actually seems to have grown. Second, the more specific case of veterans is
somewhat more complex. White veterans were not distinguishable on a range of civil rights at-
titudes, but they were more likely to support federal anti-lynching legislation in 1948, and offer
stronger support for black voting rights by 1961.
These findings have clear implications for scholarship on race and American political develop-
ment. In particular, these results highlight the important, yet complex, role of the Second World
War for research agendas that have placed the beginning of major shifts in twentieth century
American politics in the mid-1940s.72 These findings likewise suggest the merits of engaging more
directly with public opinion surveys to assess the war’s impact on racial politics.73 The results re-
lated to white veterans also complement research by Parker on the impact of the war on black
veterans.74 Military service did have an effect on the racial attitudes of white soldiers. However,
it was more limited than many liberals in the 1940s had hoped. More broadly, this chapter affirms
the value of studying war’s impact on domestic politics generally, and war’s impact on the rights
claims of marginalized groups particularly.75 Future research in American politics could benefit
from thinking more about war’s impact on domestic politics.
72Feinstein and Schickler, “Platforms and Partners.”
73Klinkner and Smith, The Unsteady March; Kryder, Divided Arsenal; Saldin, War, the American State, and Politics since
1898.
74Parker, Fighting for Democracy; Parker, “When Politics Becomes Protest.”
75Mayhew, “Wars and American Politics.”
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Finally, the urge to consider World War II as a central factor in race and 20th century American
political development might seem at odds with a finding that claims of the war’s impact on white
attitudes are overblown. However, this chapter’s analytical goal has been to reconcile these two
claims. While the impact of the war on white racial attitudes was uneven at best, the war had
myriad impacts on American racial politics. Parker’s work has demonstrated how important
wartime service was in motivating black activism in the South. Similarly, Brooks’s analysis of
veterans in Georgia has shown how the war had heterogenous impacts on white veterans’ political
participation in that state, partly in response to rising black activism. More generally, the finding
that the war seems to have heightened southern resistance to anti-lynching legislation – while at
odds with the racial liberalization hypothesis – is consistent with a story where the war created
new fears for those dedicated to the maintenance of white supremacy.
At the level of national political institutions, the war likewise had several impacts. The most
obvious is President Roosevelt’s executive order establishing a Fair Employment Practices Com-
mission to examine discrimination in the defense industry, which was issued almost entirely in
response to a threatened March on Washington by A. Philip Randolph and others.76 Violence
against black veterans postwar seems to have likewise inspired Truman to form the President’s
Committee on Civil Rights and the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Oppor-
tunity in the Armed Services.77 More generally, viewing civil rights developments in the 1940s
through the ideological lens of the war effort helps elucidate the constrained nature of the changes
– a subject I pick up in the following two chapters.
Understanding the impact of war on white racial attitudes is a part of this broader story. this
chapter illustrates how the complicated mix of continuity (e.g., attitudes toward the poll tax),
liberalization (e.g., white veterans’ opposition to lynching), and rightward shifts (e.g., aggregate
southern white attitudes toward federal anti-lynching legislation) complicates popular assump-
76Louis Coleridge Kesselman, The Social Politics of FEPC: A Study in Reform Pressure Movements, (Chapel Hill: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 1948); Herbert Garfinkel, When Negroes March: The March on Washington Movement in
the Organizational Politics for FEPC, (New York: Atheneum, 1973); Anthony S. Chen, The FIfth Freedom: Jobs, Politics, and
Civil Rights in the United States, 1941-1972, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
77McCullough, Truman; Klinkner and Smith, The Unsteady March.
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tions about the war’s impact. In conjunction with the careful analysis of the war’s impact on
political institutions to come, these findings can help clarify the complicated role played by the
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Table 3.1: Anti-Black Prejudice, 1946
Treated Job Blood Blood Intell- Black
Fairly Diff DK igent Nurse
Veteran -0.25 -0.36 0.15 -0.24 0.08 0.06
(0.26) (0.22) (0.25) (0.26) (0.23) (0.22)
Grammar 1.13∗∗ 0.35 1.11∗∗∗ 0.25 -0.60∗ 0.22
(0.39) (0.24) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25)
Some College -1.01∗∗∗ -0.93∗∗∗ -0.24 -0.60 0.33 -0.60∗
(0.26) (0.27) (0.29) (0.34) (0.26) (0.25)
Northeast -0.79∗∗ -0.48∗ -0.16 -0.13 -0.21 -0.93∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.24) (0.28) (0.29) (0.25) (0.24)
South 0.19 1.06∗∗∗ 0.64∗ -0.04 1.61∗∗∗ 0.59∗
(0.35) (0.27) (0.29) (0.31) (0.28) (0.27)
West -0.84∗ -0.31 -0.14 0.67 0.04 -0.42
(0.37) (0.32) (0.40) (0.34) (0.32) (0.31)
Age -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.06∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 1.88∗ 0.18 -1.33 -3.23∗∗∗ -1.98∗∗ 0.38
(0.77) (0.64) (0.70) (0.78) (0.67) (0.64)
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.092 0.063 0.055 0.101 0.067
Log likelihood -223.35 -299.78 -234.22 -245.35 -287.84 -304.90
N 428 477 381 490 468 474
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Treated Fairly: “Do you think most Negroes in the United States are being treated
fairly or unfairly?” 1 = unfairly, 0 = fairly
Job: “Do you think Negroes should have as good a chance as white people to get any
kind of job, or do you think white people should have the first chance at any kind of job?”
1= white people first, 0 = same chance
Blood Diff: “As far as you know, is Negro blood the same as white blood, or is it different
in some way?” 1= different, 0 = same
Blood DK: Same question wording as above. 1 = don’t know, 0 = different or same
Intelligent: “In general, do you think Negroes are as intelligent as white people – that is,
can they learn just as well if they are given the same education?” 1 = no, 0 = yes
Black Nurse: “If you were sick in a hospital, would it be all right with you if you had a
Negro nurse, or wouldn’t you like it?” 1 = wouldn’t like it, 0 = all right
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Table 3.2: Integrating the Military, 1948











HS Grad -0.50 0.30
(0.38) (0.37)




Pseudo R2 0.08 0.09
Log. likelihood -191.61 -198.09
N 346 340
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Live and Work: “Would you favor or oppose having
Negro and white troops throughout the U.S. Armed Services
live and work together – or should they be separated as they
are now?” 1 = oppose, 0 = favor
Serve: “It has been suggested that white and colored men
serve together throughout the U.S. Armed Services – that is,
live and work in the same units. Do you think this is a good
idea or a poor idea?” 1 = poor idea, 0 = good idea
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Table 3.3: Lynching, 1948
Logit OLS Ordered
Probit
Veteran -0.39∗ -0.17∗ -0.22∗
(0.18) (0.08) (0.10)
Age 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Northeast -0.65∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.08) (0.11)
South 0.47 0.20 0.25
(0.26) (0.11) (0.14)
West -0.34 -0.14 -0.18
(0.25) (0.11) (0.14)
Farm 0.09 0.04 0.05
(0.24) (0.10) (0.13)









Pseudo R2 0.038 0.025
Log likelihood -462.66 -718.50
N 702 781 781
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
For logit, 1 = left to states, 0 = federal intervention.
For OLS and ordered probit, 0 = federal intervention,
1 = don’t know, 2 = left to states.
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Pseudo R2 .05 .05
Log likelihood -64.59 -89.55
N 137 144
Note: Southern sample
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.5: Negro Political Participation Study White Sample, Ordered Probit Models, 1961
Segregation Segregation Black Sit-ins Anti- All
1 2 Voting Integration Alike
Veteran 0.06 -0.13 -0.69∗∗ -0.18 0.28 0.19
(0.22) (0.23) (0.26) (0.21) (0.26) (0.25)
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Grammar -0.03 0.50 0.24 0.12 -0.39 -0.11
(0.31) (0.34) (0.36) (0.31) (0.36) (0.35)
HS Grad -0.33 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.08 -0.08
(0.33) (0.34) (0.37) (0.32) (0.38) (0.36)
College -0.82∗ -0.61 -0.65 -0.38 1.03 1.07∗
(0.36) (0.37) (0.48) (0.35) (0.55) (0.52)
Cut 1 -2.08∗∗ -1.63∗ 0.32 -2.70∗∗∗ -1.12 -1.49
(0.77) (0.78) (0.81) (0.76) (0.86) (0.84)
Cut 2 -1.49∗ -0.51 1.04 -2.00∗∗ -0.78 -1.27
(0.76) (0.77) (0.81) (0.73) (0.86) (0.84)
Cut 3 0.01 1.22 -1.48∗ -0.42 -0.82
(0.75) (0.81) (0.72) (0.86) (0.84)
Cut 4 0.09
(0.71)
Pseudo R2 .03 .07 .07 .02 .07 .05
Log likelihood -147.05 -112.07 -112.94 -158.84 -117.77 -123.52
N 137 141 142 137 138 143
Note: Southern sample. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Chapter 4
The Roosevelt Administration and Civil
Rights During the Second World War
“It is transparently clear that we shall need to employ to their fullest all our resources,
material and moral, in our struggle to maintain democracy in the world.
We can do so only if we marshal all of our forces in a democratic fashion and eliminate
internal inconsistencies which bring into question the reality of the objectives for with
your country is fighting.”
—Proposed reply for the President to make to a letter concerning military discrimina-
tion, January 5, 19431
“[A]nswer the letter yourself and tone it down.”
—President Roosevelt’s response2
The presidential administration of Franklin Roosevelt – perhaps the most economically lib-
eral one in American political history – has frequently been charged with neglecting racial in-
equality. Scholars have demonstrated how the administration compromised with southern white
supremacists to pass economically liberal New Deal legislation that often excluded African Amer-
icans from their benefits (a common example being the exclusion of farmworkers and maids from
the Social Security Act). Similarly, wartime measures like the G. I. Bill have been seen by some as
“affirmative action for whites,” in turn leaving black veterans behind. This chapter places this de-
1Letter Draft, Mark Ethridge, Undated; Folder: “Colored Matters (Negroes) Jan-Feb 1942”; OF 93; Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt President’s Official Files, 1933-1945; Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY (hereafter cited as FDR Official
Files).
2Letter, Franklin Roosevelt to Marvin McIntyre, January 13, 1942; Folder: “Colored Matters (Negroes) Jan-Feb 1942”;
OF 93; FDR Official Files.
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bate about the Roosevelt administration and the politics of civil rights in the context of the Second
World War. It asks how the war shaped and constrained the administration’s racial agenda; how
various actors in the executive branch understood – and, in some cases, did not understand – the
rhetorical strategy employed by civil rights organizations linking the war effort to their domestic
agenda; and, overall, how the international struggle against Nazism shaped the politics of civil
rights in the latter half of Roosevelt’s presidency. In doing so, it sheds new light on debates about
the administration’s relative inaction on civil rights, as well as the relationship between war and
policymaking more generally.
Members the Roosevelt administration can be divided into three camps: those unaffected by
the war (the President himself, whose relative detachment from racial concerns remained largely
unchanged; Secretary Harold Ickes, whose racial liberalism made him a common target of appeals
by civil rights groups, but who deferred to his position as a Cabinet member to deflect requests
for action); those made more aware of racial inequality by it (Secretary Henry Stimson, initially
perhaps the most racially conservative member of the administration, who was finally affected by
images of black citizens beaten by whites in the Detroit race riot); and those made more cynical
and conservative in their attitudes toward race by it (Secretary Frances Perkins, who largely ig-
nored race during her tenure in the administration, preferring to focus on issues of class, but who
became increasingly vocal in her criticisms of civil rights actors in the 1950s). This typology helps
distinguish the groups of individuals within the administration who helped establish what the
Roosevelt administration’s record on race would come to be.
I argue wartime activism compelled the Roosevelt administration to act earlier, but that the war
also constrained what civil rights activists were able to achieve. The war pushed the very specific
issues of defense industry discrimination and military segregation onto the racial agenda, at the
expense of the 1930s anti-lynching and anti-poll tax campaigns. This had a dual effect: It more
firmly integrated class and economics into the civil rights agenda, but the war-specific nature of
those claims simultaneously inhibited broader critiques of more systematic discrimination across
all economic sectors (particularly discrimination by private businesses). In the absence of the
Second World War, it is possible even the limited civil rights progress made under the purview of
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the Roosevelt administration would not have occurred. Yet the war also shaped the contours of
what seemed possible. The war simultaneously made progress on certain issues more likely and
other issues less likely, which is helpful in elucidating why the 1940s civil rights agenda progressed
as it did.
Previous Research
Much research on civil rights politics in this time period is about the congressional “conservative
coalition” and Roosevelt’s general acquiescence to it. Writing in 1949, Richard Hofstadter de-
clared that southerners in Congress “are exercising a concurrent veto,” with the result being that
the Democratic Party “thus finds itself in the anomalous position of being a party of ‘liberalism,’
whose achievements are subject to veto by a reactionary fashion.”3 V. O. Key’s Southern Politics,
also published in 1949, offered an initial empirical assessment of roll call data that would come
to inspire future scholarship on Congress. In particular, scholars came to be interested in what
Key called the “peculiar combination or cumulation of circumstances” that would lead southern
Democrats into a coalition with Republicans against northern Democrats. One factor Key high-
lighted was “the compounding of regional interest plus agrarian antipathy toward labor.”4 Ira
Katznelson and colleagues have described how the intertwining of race and labor eventually cre-
ated a cross-partisan alliance between racist southern Democrats and economically conservative
Republicans, and the general role of southern Democratic congressmen in “limiting liberalism”
during the New Deal and Fair Deal.5
This affected several policy areas. One of the primary policy examples given is the “race-laden
3Richard Hofstadter, “From Calhoun to the Dixiecrats,” Social Research 16, 1949, 150.
4V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation, (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2006 [1949]), 359. For a
further clarification of Key’s analysis, see John Robert Moore, “The Conservative Coalition in the United States Senate,
1942-1945,” The Journal of Southern History 33(3), 1967, 368-376.
5Sean Farhang and Ira Katznelson, “The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal,”
Studies in American Political Development 19, 2005, 1-30. See also Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger, and Daniel Kryder, “Limit-
ing Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 1933-1950,” Political Science Quarterly108( 2), 1993, 283-306.
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eligibility requirements” of the 1935 Social Security Act, particularly the exclusion of farmworkers
and maids – the main employment opportunities available to black southerners at this time.6 The
soldier voting debate likewise engaged such issues. As Key describes it, “The Republicans did not
want the soldiers to vote Democratic. The southern Democrats did not want colored soldiers to
vote.”7 Another policy, more related to the war, is the 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, which
Katznelson describes as “[w]ritten under southern auspices” by racially conservative members of
Congress and “deliberately designed to accommodate Jim Crow.”8 Despite pressure, the White
House was hesitant to intervene in such congressional debates at risk of harming the coalition
with southern Democrats.
Despite the compelling evidence of the Roosevelt administration’s failings on civil rights, not
all accounts are so negative. Perhaps the most prominent revisionist account of the Roosevelt
administration on race is provided by Kevin McMahon. He argues the Roosevelt administration
set the groundwork for the civil rights movement to come in a number of ways: what he calls
“reconstructive legislation, appointments to the federal courts, and Justice Department efforts to
extend federal protection of civil rights.”9 For my purposes here, the third pillar – Justice De-
partment efforts to protect civil rights through the Civil Rights Section – is most relevant. McMa-
hon’s strongest contribution is highlighting the importance of this relatively little known group.
However, when McMahon tries to link President Roosevelt himself as directly as possible to the
6Robert C. Lieberman, Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State, (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1998), 7.
7Key, Southern Politics, 358-59
8Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century Amer-
ica, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2005), 114. This critical assessment of the G. I. Bill is challenged, however, by
Mettler, who argues its implementation was more racially equitable than Katznelson believes. Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers
to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). For further
analysis of this debate, see Ira Katznelson and Suzanne Mettler, “On Race and Policy History: A Dialogue About the
G.I. Bill,” Perspectives on Politics 6(3), 2008, 519-537.
9Kevin J. McMahon, Reconsidering Roosevelt on Race: How the Presidency Paved the Road to Brown, (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2004), 20.
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creation of the Civil Rights Section, the argument becomes less compelling.10
This debate about the Roosevelt administration and race correlates temporally with the Second
World War, but generally does not take the war itself as an independent variable of particular note.
Similarly, the policy focus is generally not on those civil rights policies related to defense industry
discrimination or military segregation. There are two prominent exceptions: Philip Klinkner and
Rogers Smith’s The Unsteady March and Daniel Kryder’s Divided Arsenal. The former argues war
has been a necessary factor in achieving greater racial equality, while the latter argues war tends to
correspond to increases in racial crowd violence. I briefly describe what each text claims about the
Second World War in particular, with a focus on unresolved tensions between the two arguments
this dissertation hopes to examine.
“Given that the New Deal was largely ineffective in forcing the nation to confront Jim Crow,”
Klinkner and Smith argue, “it is hard to escape the conclusion that it was instead the emergence
of fascism and Nazism in the 1930s that most set the stage of real transformations.” Regarding the
struggle for fair employment, they write that the achievement of an executive order to fight de-
fense industry discrimination was possible because their three-part theory of war and civil rights
progress was met: (1) “the ideological demands of fighting an enemy who espoused racial hierar-
chies made more white Americans sensitive to the presence of racial discrimination in America”
and “[t]he vision of blacks marching to claim their rights contradicted the image of America as the
defender of democracy”; (2) “though America had not yet entered the war, the nation’s defense
buildup was of crucial importance since Hitler seemed unstoppable” and “[m]arches and protests
threatened to disrupt this buildup”; and (3) “most importantly, blacks actively took advantage of
the first two factors to press a still-reluctant government for greater equality.”11
Kryder’s account of the Second World War, by contrast, focuses on the increase in racial crowd
violence. He argues the executive branch’s primary goal was in maintaining order, which some-
times led to racially progressive outcomes and sometimes led to discriminatory ones. His overall
10Ibid., 49.
11Philip A. Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 137, 160.
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account is negative: Although some short-term advances might have occurred, in the long run
World War II was not a broad liberalizing force for American race relations.12 Klinkner, inter-
estingly, reviewed Kryder’s book when it was released. In the review, he applauded Kryder for
being “aware of the importance of war to state development.” However, he criticized what he
saw as Kryder’s attempt to “extrapolate from the case studies to make a larger statement about
the effect of World War II on American race relations.” Klinkner sees Kryder’s argument – which
he describes as, “the war had little lasting positive influence and, if anything, actually constrained
the movement toward civil rights” – as an unfair analysis, “using the civil rights advances of the
1960s as his benchmark of reassessing the achievements of the 1940s, which clearly do not measure
up.”13
These books make disparate claims in two ways. First, they make divergent claims about the
war and white racial attitudes – as described in previous chapters, Klinkner and Smith assume the
war must have led a meaningful number of white Americans to reconsider their racial attitudes,
while Kryder explicitly states many Americans were unaware of the relationship between the war
and civil rights articulated by Myrdal – yet neither book contains any analysis of public opinion
survey data. The preceding two chapters deal with this oversight. Second, the books differ in
their analysis of how the war affected actions by the state. This chapter, as well as the one that
follows it, considers these divergent perspectives on state action by focusing on the executive
branch, trying to offer a middle-ground between the two perspectives in doing so. By offering an
alternative perspective on the executive branch – and integrating the study of state institutions
with the study of public opinion – this dissertation as a whole offers a more complete analysis of
the relationship between the war and civil rights.
12Daniel Kryder, Divided Arsenal: Race and the American State during World War II, (New York: Cambrideg University
Press, 2000).
13Philip A. Klinkner, Review of Divided Arsenal: Race and the American State during World War II, American Political
Science Review 95(3), 2001, 735.
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Method and Approach
This chapter assesses the hypothesis that World War II led the Roosevelt administration to act
earlier and differently on civil rights policies than it would have otherwise. The first part of the
hypothesis is temporal: In the absence of war, would the administration have felt similarly com-
pelled to act on the civil rights issues that it did? The second part is substantive: In the absence
of war, would the administration have acted on different policies than it did? I am also interested
in whether the war led individuals in the administration to change their own beliefs about black
civil rights. Such opinion changes could serve as a mechanism through which the shifts noted in
the hypothesis might occur.
To assess this, I examine the rhetoric and behavior of the Roosevelt administration, which
is defined broadly to include the President, various department secretaries, and presidential as-
sistants both formal and informal. My analysis is divided into three sections. The first section
analyzes rhetoric and the wartime policy agenda. I begin by demonstrating that important mem-
bers of the Roosevelt White House were indeed familiar with the relationship between the war
and domestic race relations posited by the rhetoric of civil rights activists. I show how they, in
varied ways, engaged with such rhetoric. I then move to an overview of the internal White House
debate over whether the war marked the end of a New Deal social policy focus or a continuation
of it. I finally take up one very useful perspective on how administration actors perceived the
war and civil rights: their responses to black journalists who directly interrogated them on the
relationship between the war and civil rights. The second section considers policy case studies
related to lynching, military segregation, job discrimination, and the Detroit race riot. The first is-
sue represents part of the 1930s civil rights agenda; the middle two represent the 1940s civil rights
agenda compelled by the war; and the final case represents an issue forced on the administration
by events outside of their control. Finally, the third section considers the ideological trajectory
of select Roosevelt administration actors once they left office (when they were more likely to talk
openly about controversial issues like civil rights).
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Rhetoric, Civil Rights, and the Wartime Policy Agenda
Scholarship on the 1940s civil rights movement has described how the Double-V campaign – vic-
tory at home and abroad – was the rallying cry of activists during World War II.14 Much less well
understood, however, is the degree to which the White House was aware of, and sometimes en-
gaged with, these rhetorical claims. This section considers this first by looking at how the White
House discussed the wartime campaign for civil rights internally, then second by relating this to
more general struggles inside the White House over whether to maintain a New Deal social pol-
icy focus or turn almost entirely to international affairs. This section concludes by looking at how
black journalists pressured the White House to comment on the relationship between the war and
civil rights, examining both the silences and, occasionally, responses.
The Wartime Racial Agenda
The Double-V rhetoric was frequently used by civil rights leaders during the war. In mailers
sent out to its membership list, the March on Washington Movement declared their motto to be,
“WINNING DEMOCRACY FOR THE NEGRO IS WINNING THE WAR FOR DEMOCRACY.”15
Such rhetoric was meant to be persuasive, when combined with pressure. There is evidence that
civil rights activists were concerned about how the administration would perceive their campaign.
For example, Eugene Kinckle Jones of the National Urban League wrote a letter to presidential
advisor Samuel Rosenman’s wife on February 10, 1943, laying out his concerns and asking for
Rosenman’s opinion. “The Negro stands at the spearhead of forces for social progress, because
interracial discord can work such terrific damage to the war effort, both at home and abroad,”
he wrote. “Inevitably, and quite properly, Negro spokesmen have not hesitated to point out the
need for cleaning up the racial situation on our home front as we go to war to defend democracy
14See, for example, Harvard Sitkoff, “Racial Militancy and Interracial Violence in the Second World War,” Journal of
American History 58(3), 1971, 661-681; Jonathan Rosenberg, How Far the Promised Land?:World Affairs and the American
Civil Rights Movement from the First World War to Vietnam, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
15Letter, Negro March-on-Washington Committee, May 15, 1942; Folder: “March on Washington Movement, Cir-
culars, 1941-47”; Box 26; A. Philip Randolph Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.
(hereafter cited as Randolph Papers).
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abroad.” But Jones was concerned about the pragmatic aspects. Regarding Mr. Rosenman, he
wrote, “I believe that is opinion is valuable because he can look at the situation of my organization
from his vantage point as an adviser to the President and a man who is thoroughly familiar with
the machinery of government.”16
There is evidence the administration was familiar with such rhetoric. For example, in an Oc-
tober 1, 1942, letter from Lawrence Cramer, executive secretary of FEPC, to Marvin McIntyre, one
of Roosevelt’s secretaries, the campaign was discussed quite bluntly:
The argument is frequently advanced that we are fighting Hitler and all of his doc-
trines, including the doctrine of race superiority, and that there should be a clear and
forceful statement by the President pointing out that the doctrine of race superiority is
what our enemies are fighting for, not what we are fighting for.
Frequently letter-writers seize upon a statement by the President, or by a high adminis-
trative officer of the government directed against the German or Vichy-French govern-
ment for inhumanities against Jews, religious organizations or minority groups, and
argues that if these matters are of concern to our government, inhumanities or differ-
entiation in legal or economic rights of citizens of or residents in this country should be
given similar notice by the President or by high administrative officers. Where there
is a demand for action by the Federal government in an area where it does not have
jurisdiction, it is possible to point out that the matter is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Federal government. Where, however, the demand is merely for a statement by the
President similar to those made in the case of persecuted church officials in Norway,
Poles and Jews in Germany or France, and others, it is more difficult, for me, to an-
swer.17
Prominent members of the Cabinet were likewise familiar with it. Later that year, on December
15, Attorney General Francis Biddle sent Grace Tully, another one of the President’s secretaries, a
note. “I thought the President might like to see the enclosed November issue of ‘Survey Graphic’
edited by Professor Alain Locke and devoted to the Negro problem, particularly Negroes in war,”
16Letter, Eugene Kinckle Jones to Mrs. Rosenman, February 8, 1943; Folder: “Colored Matters (Negroes), Jan-April
1943”; OF 93; FDR Official Files. The archival record also contains a memo to Rosenman from McIntyre and a McIntyre
memo to the Attorney General mentioning the letter, further indicating that at least some prominent officials in the
executive branch were familiar with it.
17Letter, Lawrence Cramer to Marvin McIntyre, October 1, 1942; Folder: “Colored Matters (Negroes) [in Box 5]”; OF
93; FDR Official Files.
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Biddle wrote. “It has had wide circulation and has been very favorably commented on.”18 Secre-
tary of the Interior Harold Ickes was even more clearly in touch with such sentiments. He likely
exchanged letters with civil rights leaders more often than any other White House figure, other
than perhaps Eleanor Roosevelt.
There is also some indication administration officials understood growing white southern
fears that civil rights organizations were using the wartime context as an accelerant for their de-
mands. For example, in a November 25, 1942, memo to the President from administrative assis-
tant Jonathan Daniels about the FEPC investigation of the Capital Transit Company, Daniels wrote
that the move is helping to “create Southern fears that the government may be moving to end Jim
Crow laws in transportation in the South under the guise of the war effort. It may also lift Negro
hopes only to drop them again.”19 The administration did not want to be seen as a civil rights
ally by racial conservatives. On February 22, 1944, Daniels sent a memorandum to presidential
correspondence secretary William Hassett about a statement of “negro war aims” submitted to the
White House by the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association. “I suggest we duck it,” Daniels
declared.20
Even the most racially liberal members of the administration often weren’t willing to take a
public stand. On February 10, 1944, Marshall Field, Edwin Embree, and Charles Johnson wrote
a letter to Ickes inviting him to attend a meeting of the Southern Regional Council in Chicago.
“The war has forced to the front the question of race and color,” the letter began. “This is not a
new problem, but its mounting acuteness, as a factor in world civilization, demands that fresh
attention be given to what is happening and is likely to happen in America.”21 On February 17,
18Letter, Francis Biddle to Grace Tully, December 15, 1942; Folder: “Colored Matters (Negroes) [in Box 5]”; OF 93;
FDR Official Files.
19Memo, Jonathan Daniels to Franklin Roosevelt, November 25, 1942; Folder: “Colored Matters (Negroes) [in Box
5]”; OF 93; FDR Official Files.
20Memorandum, Jonathan Daniels to William Hassett, February 22, 1944; Folder: “Colored Matters (Negroes), Jan-
March 1944”; OF 93; FDR Official Files.
21Letter, Marshall Field, Edwin Embree, and Charles Johnson to Harold Ickes, February 10, 1944; Folder: “Negroes,
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Ickes responded in a letter addressed to Embree. “What you and your co-signers say in your letter
of February 10, is, unfortunately, accurate, and I would love to attend the proposed conference,”
Ickes wrote. “Unfortunately, I cannot do so.” Ickes then proceeded to describe his vacation plans
with his wife. “All things considered, and despite my very real interest in the discussion that
you are planning, I do not feel that, in justice to myself or in fairness to Mrs. Ickes, I can again
disappoint her.”22
Internal Struggles Over the New Deal and Win-the-War
The debate over wartime civil rights relates to a broader debate that was happening inside the
White House. During a December 28, 1943, press conference, President Roosevelt declared that,
effectively, “Dr. New Deal” had been replaced by “Dr. Win-the-War.”23 This turn of phrase came
to symbolize the White House’s transition from a focus on New Deal domestic policies to one
almost entirely dedicated to the military aspects of the Second World War. At the most general
level, the debate about what to do – if anything – about civil rights politics during the Second
World War can be seen as a subset of this broader question about social vs. foreign policy in the
1940s. This subsection analyzes this internal executive branch debate as a precursor to an analysis
of how the White House responded to attempts by black journalists to get the President and his
staff to address the wartime claims of civil rights activists.
There was concern that New Dealers were losing prominence in the administration well before
the United States entered the war. Half a year before Pearl Harbor, on on April 23, 1941, Rex
Tugwell wrote Ickes concerning the relationship between the New Deal and the war. Tugwell
had previously served as part of Roosevelt’s “Brain Trust,” articulating policy ideas for the New
1933-1945”; Box 213; Harold L. Ickes Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington D.C. (hereafter
cited as Ickes Papers).
22Letter, Harold Ickes to Edwin Embree, February 17, 1944; Folder: “Negroes, 1933-1945”; Box 213; Ickes Papers.
23Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Excerpts from the Press Conference,” December 28, 1943, Online by Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16358.
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Deal economic program.24 But as the administration shifted in an internationalist direction, he
found his interests less supported. “What is our program? Not to defeat Hitler and humiliate
the German people,” Tugwell argued. “But rather to defeat him and exalt them with our own
ideals.” He concluded by stating, “This war will never be won by force. It can only be won as a
by-product of carrying the New Deal to the world in word and deed.”25 Ickes responded on April
24, writing, “The suggestion in your letter of April 23 is an admirable one. The thing that puzzles
and distresses me the most these days is that we seem to have a leader who won’t lead. The next
time you are in Washington, I would like to talk to you about the whole situation. I am more than
willing to give all that I have but can anyone make a dent except the President, unless, perchance,
someone in direct opposition to the President?”26
The most prominent advocate of maintaining a New Deal social agenda in wartime was Eleanor
Roosevelt. The First Lady was the clearest voice in the President’s ear advocating for a continued
focus on domestic inequalities during wartime, and her role as an intermediary between civil
rights activists and unsympathetic White House figures will play a prominent role later in the
chapter. Some other administration officials also seemed to prefer the maintenance of a domestic
focus during the war. On November 8, 1944, Biddle sent a letter to Roosevelt congratulating him
on winning the election. “I do not think that the great issues of the war can be separated from the
domestic issues,” he wrote. “International cooperation necessarily involves a tolerant and liberal
outlook. . . ”27
In the end, however, this position lost out. The president’s focus was almost exclusively on
the international arena. The Department of War came to capture more and more of Roosevelt’s
24For a discussion of these advisors, see Elliot A. Rosen, “Roosevelt and the Brains Trust: An Historiographical
Overview,” Political Science Quarterly 87(4), 1972, 531-557. For an articulation of Tugwell’s perspective on governance,
see Rexford G. Tugwell, “Design for Government,” Political Science Quarterly 48(3), 1933, 321-332.
25Letter, Rex Tugwell to Harold Ickes, April 23, 1941; Folder: “Apr.-June, 1941”; Box 373; Ickes Papers.
26Letter, Harold Ickes to Rex Tugwell, April 24, 1941; Folder: “Apr.-June, 1941”; Box 373; Ickes Papers.
27Letter, Francis Biddle to Franklin Roosevelt, November 8; Folder: “Roosevelt, Franklin D.”; Box 2; Francis Biddle
Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY (hereafter cited as Biddle Papers).
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attention, and – as will be seen in the sections to come – they were staunchly opposed to calls
for the military to help alleviate racial inequities. Even Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins agreed.
Regarding the President’s shift from emphasizing the New Deal to “win-the-war,” she later said,
“Well, that was a proper thing to say. What he meant by it was let us temporarily suspend these
various humanitarian movements that we have been breathing into the law of this land, and bend
all our energies on winning the War. When the War’s over, we’ll see what we can do then.”28
The Baltimore Afro-American and the White House
The most direct avenue to explore the degree to which executive branch figures did – and did
not – relate the war effort to domestic racial issues comes from examining their replies to black
journalists, who frequently encouraged them to make statements on precisely this connection. In
particular, Michael Carter, a reporter at the Baltimore Afro-American, made a concerted effort to get
prominent public officials to address the relationship between American participation in the war
and the demands of civil rights activists. Indeed, the list of questions he sent such figures is nearly
identical to the ones a contemporary researcher might come up with were they given access to a
time machine and a survey firm. Carter’s interviews provide a unique – and largely forgotten –
window into how national political figures articulated the relationship between the war effort and
race relations at home.
His requests were often denied. For instance, he tried twice to secure an interview with Pres-
ident Roosevelt. The first inquiry came on August 31, 1942. Carter justified the request using
fairly nationalist rhetoric. “The basic ideas behind these interviews is to interpret, through a chan-
nel which Negroes respect and use, the war and our relationship to it,” he wrote. “The interviews
combat the dangerous Axis serving and perhaps Axis inspired propaganda that is trickling into ur-
ban Negro communities. Armed with your answers to the enclosed questions the Negro would be
encouraged to even greater efforts toward total victory.” He also mentioned how he was directly
28Reminiscences of Frances Perkins (1961), Interview 8, Session 1, p. 527, in the Oral History Research Office Collec-
tion of the Columbia University Libraries (hereafter cited as Perkins Oral History).
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helped by the Federal Writers’ Project.29 The second request came in the aftermath of the Detroit
race riots on June 25, 1943. He acknowledged his previous request was declined. But, Carter de-
clared, “[n]ow, something else, something terrible has happened. Those riots have sapped Negro
morale, changed Negro attitudes towards the war, America, democracy and race relations. If it
were possible for you, as it is for me, to over hear conversations in pool parlors, beer gardens,
beauty parlors, YMCA’s barracks etc. you should really understand the nature of the body blow
to Negro morale.” He used this set-up to frame his request. “I beg you to grant me an inter-
view – a statement – a talk with a White House representative, anything to antidote the poison,
to assure the Negro that this is still his war and that his most murderous enemies are in Berlin,”
Carter wrote. “Such an interview would be equal to gunpowder. It would rebuild confidence in
the Negro.”30 Stephen Early replied to Carter on June 29 to say the President still could not break
the policy of not granting exclusive interviews, but suggested he talk to Francis Haas, who had
recently been appointed chairman of the Committee on Fair Employment Practice.31
Carter also unsuccessfully requested an interview with one of Roosevelt’s secretaries, Mar-
vin McIntyre. “I would like your advice as to what I ought tho do about this,” McIntyre wrote
William Hassett. “Naturally, I want to turn it down but I don’t want to hurt any feelings.” McIn-
tyre politely declined Carter’s request a few days later. “Were it not for the fact that I have very
consistently refrained from press interviews and from any writing, I would be glad to cooperate
with you,” he wrote. “As you know, my work as Secretary is entirely divorced from the pub-
lic relations, and I have always felt that I should refrain from public expression of my personal
views.”32
29Letter, Michael Carter to Franklin Roosevelt, August 31, 1942; Folder: “Colored Matters (Negroes) July-Aug 1942”;
OF 93; FDR Official Files.
30Letter, Michael Carter to Franklin Roosevelt, June 25, 1943; Folder:“Colored Matters (Negroes), May-June 1943”;
OF 93; FDR Official Files.
31Letter, Stephen Early to Michael Carter, June 29, 1943; Folder: “Colored Matters (Negroes), May-June 1943”; OF 93;
FDR Official Files.
32Memorandum, Marvin McIntyre to Wiliam Hassett, January 20, 1943; Folder: “Colored Matters (Negroes), Jan-
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However, Carter had better luck with Ickes. “May I arrange an interview with you on the
Negro and the war?,” Carter asked. “The Negro people are avidly interested in anything you
have to say about or to them. Therefore an interview with you would be of particular interest in
this morale building series. We are motivated by a desire to increase the Negroes’ interest in an
knowledge of the war. Anything you have to say on this would be important.” He submitted a
list of questions, although indicated a preference for an in-person discussion.33 “I regret that my
schedule is so heavy that I am unable to find time for an interview on the subject of the Negro
and the war,” Ickes responded. “I shall, however, try to answer your questions by this letter.”
In response to the question, “Should the Negro continue his drive for ethnic freedom during the
course of the war, or should such activity be postponed until a victorious peace?,” Ickes wrote,
“In my personal opinion, yes – provided that it does not seriously interfere with the prosecution
of the war, which must come first.” Similarly, when asked, “Can the war be considered won if at
its conclusion the status of the Negro, in American life, remains unchanged?,” Ickes responded,
“This is a question of definition. We must not confuse the winning of the war, which is a military
problem, with the winning of democratic rights. We can win the war on the battlefield and still
have to go on fighting to protect or preserve certain rights.” Notably, one question asked by Carter
was, “The last war was punctuated by a series of race riots. To date there have been none, or at
least, but few. To what do you attribute the happy change? Need Negroes fear a repetition of
riots against them?” Ickes responded, “I believe that the absence of race riots in this war is largely
the result of President Roosevelt’s consistent policy of attacking discrimination against Negroes,
particularly in plants that do war work.”34 Two months later, a race riot erupted in Detroit. In
his Afro-American write-up of the interview, Carter noted that Ickes “hedges a little” on military
segregation. “In war time questions concerning army policy should be decided purely on the basis
of what would produce least friction and most military success,” Ickes said. “This is for the War
April 1943”; OF 93; FDR Official Files.
33Letter, Michael Carter to Harold Ickes, March 30, 1943; Folder: “Negroes, 1933-1945”; Box 213; Ickes Papers.
34Letter, Harold Ickes to Michael Carter, April 13, 1943; Folder: “Negroes, 1933-1945”; Box 213; Ickes Papers.
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Department and the general staff to decide.” “That’s buck passing,” Carter wrote, “but if it came
to a vote I suspect I know where he would stand.”35
A few days earlier, on March 27, 1943, Ickes received a letter from John H. Johnson, managing
editor of the Negro Digest, asking him to write an article addressing the question, “Have you ever
thought about what you would do if you were a Negro?” Ickes responded on April 15, 1943:
I regret very much that lack of time makes it impossible for me to contribute an article
on the subject, “If I Were a Negro,” to your magazine. I have always felt that discrim-
ination on the basis of race, color, or religion, is a disgrace to any country where it
exists. The treatment of the Negro in this country is nothing for any American to be
proud of, but I am happy to say that the situation is definitely improving. The road to
equality of opportunity is still long and hard, and “If I Were a Negro” I would not stop
until I had reached the goal.36
Carter also secured a response from Eleanor Roosevelt, although it was less positive than he
would have liked. Carter led the article with her response to the question, “Should the colored
man take advantage of the present crisis to further his own ends?” The First Lady responded, “No
one who realizes why this war is being fought and no one who knows that the loss of freedom
means, should take advantage of this crisis in history to further his own ends unless in furthering
them he does so with the interest of the whole country in mind. . . Surely nothing will be gained
by colored people’s efforts to advance themselves at the expense of the total war effort, unless we
all work together for the one end; peace and a chance to build a better world.” To be clear, she did
criticize racially discriminatory policies – but did not articulate the war as a means of overcoming
them.37 It is possible she felt uncomfortable stating her private beliefs in a public setting insomuch
as they clashed with the administration’s focus on winning the peace internationally.
Carter also interviewed Vice President Henry Wallace, who made a number of generally racially
liberal comments. However, Wallace was not entirely optimistic about the future. As Carter wrote
35Michael Carter, “ ‘I Have Done Everything to Abolish Discrimination,’ ” Afro-American, June 5, 1943, ProQuest
Historical Newspapers.
36Letter, Harold Ickes to John H. Johnson, April 15, 1943; Folder: “Negroes, 1933-1945”; Box 213; Ickes Papers.




The interview ended on a depressing tone. I told the Vice President that there was
a democratic awareness in America. White people I thought, were becoming more
conscious of the fact that we were denied normal American privileges and that we
deserved better treatment. The Vice President had no such optimism. He said:
“I only hope you are right. I wish there were a greater spirit of fair play and a greater
knowledge of the real spirit of this war. The need for fraternity and unity is still
great.”38
Carter also interviewed two figures in the War Department. The first was Paul McNutt. He
mostly talked about the necessity of using black workers, although the article’s conclusion quotes
McNutt as saying, “Democracy must not only be won. Democracy must be re-won. It must be
defended every day in the year. And by striving for it we shall approach it. This is our battle.”39
Truman Gibson, in his position as civilian aide to the Secretary of War, also provided comments to
Carter. Many of the points were banal and factual. He also offered a defense of the Army, stating,
“We must not stop hitting at jim crow. I think the army is as much opposed to injustice as anyone
else. I know what they are doing against brutality.”40 As will be described in the next chapter,
however Gibson was less restrained in criticizing the military in internal documents than he was
in this public statement.
While Carter was less successful with President Roosevelt, he did secure an interview with
Wendell Willkie. The 1940 Republican presidential candidate was much more willing to link the
war against the Axis to the fight against racial discrimination at home. “Yes siree,” he said, “I do
not think that the colored man should stop his honest struggles for democracy because of the war.
I see absolutely no inconsistency in the two aims. That is part and parcel of what we are fighting
38Michael Carter, “No Freedom Here: Colore Colored People, says V-President Wallace ‘We Haven’t Solved Problem
Anywhere’, ” Afro-American, October 23, 1943, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
39Michael Carter, “U.S. Not Using Enough Colored War Workers, Warns Paul V. McNutt,” Afro-American, December
12, 1942, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
40Michael Carter, “An Interview with: Truman K. Gibson Civilian Aide to Secretary of War,” Afro-American, July 17,
1943, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
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for on a national scale. There is no contradiction of purpose in that.”41 Carter also secured a 1942
interview with Thomas Dewey, who would be the Republican presidential candidate in 1944 and
1948. Dewey described how he felt discrimination was interfering with the war effort. “A large
portion of our population is being thwarted in its patriotism and deprived of its right to take full
part in the national effort,” he said. “This is not only ugly and hateful; it is downright stupid. It is
not simply a blunder; it is a crime.” Carter also wrote that Dewey “displays a considerable knowl-
edge of the colored race’s history.” This tied into nationalist rhetoric. “He knew, for instance,
that Garveyism was a backbone of the back-to-Africa movement and that these movements were
utilized–to a degree–by the Jap agents,” Carter wrote. “I’ve been struck by the similarity between
Marcus Garvey and Mussolini,” Dewey commented. “The philosophy of one is identical with that
of the other.”42
Carter’s efforts elucidate several aspects of how prominent executive branch figures did and
did not engage with the wartime civil rights rhetoric. The declined requests directed at the Presi-
dent and his secretaries hint at Roosevelt’s general frustration with civil rights activists during the
war. The War Department responses indicate a sense that some engagement was necessary, but
they did not want to say too much. The responses by Ickes and Eleanor Roosevelt show how even
sympathetic figures were hesitant to go on the record against the administration’s line. Wallace’s
open cynicism is an interesting exception. Finally, the more adamant support offered by Willkie
and Dewey is indicative of the broader electoral pressures facing the White House in responding
to black demands.
Policy Case Studies
This section considers a series of policy case studies: the the anti-lynching campaign at the close of
the 1930s, the struggle against military discrimination, Executive Order 8802 and defense industry
41Michael Carter, “America Will Lose the Peace Unless It Gives Equal Duties and Opportunity to Everyone,” Afro-
American, August 15, 1942, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
42Michael Carter, “Race Hate Choking All of Nation–Dewey,” Afro-American, October 24, 1942, ProQuest Historical
Newspapers.
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employment discrimination, and the White House’s response to the Detroit race riot. Of particu-
lar note is how the 1940s civil rights policy agenda came to be largely dominated by war-specific
measures: the successful attempt at pressuring Roosevelt to draft an executive order combatting
defense industry discrimination (rather than industry more broadly), and the unsuccessful (at
least during Roosevelt’s tenure) push to desegregate the military, rather than tear down segrega-
tion in society more broadly.
Anti-Lynching Legislation and the Beginnings of Internationalist Rhetoric
Anti-lynching legislation was perhaps the most prominent civil rights policy issue of the 1930s,
comparable only to the anti-poll tax campaign.43 It began to lose steam in the 1940s, partly as the
result of legislative roadblocks in the Senate and partly because other issues came to dominate
the racial agenda during the war. However, the debate about lynching in the lead-up to the war
contains interesting hints of the rhetoric to come.
In 1936, Senator Edward Costigan cosponsored an anti-lynching bill and told his fellow Sen-
ators bluntly that the bill gave the country “a choice between Hitler and Mussolini on the one
side, and Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, Henry Grady, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Delano
Roosevelt on the other.”44 Like all such bills, however, it never became law. On February 5, 1938,
Carl Murphy of the Afro-American newspapers wrote to presidential secretary Marvin McIntyre.
“Our people feel keenly the fact that the President has made no public statement on the anti-
lynching bill since it has been in Congress,” he said. “They feel that such a public word will bring
encouragement to advocates of the measure and dismay to those who are opposed to it.” He ac-
knowledged the coalitional issues related to southern Democrats. However, he compared Senate
rhetoric to the totalitarian regimes of Europe. “It is not doing us as a party any good to have
the Congressional Record and the public press filled, day after day, with anti-Negro propaganda
matching in bigotry and prejudice anything published in Germany, Russia or Italy against Jews,
43For a discussion of anti-lynching legislation advocacy in the 1930s, see Robert L. Zangrando, “The NAACP and a
Federal anti-lynching Bill, 1934-1940,” Journal of Negro History 50(2), 1965, 106-117.
44Klinkner and Smith, The Unsteady March, 138-139.
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Catholics and aliens,” he wrote.45
Lynching did not completely exit the agenda during the war. On December 11, 1942, Biddle
stayed after a Cabinet meeting to talk with Roosevelt. “I suggested to the President that he direct
me, to which he agreed, to call a group of the outstanding people interested in the Negro situation
to work out with them a more competent handling of the whole problem. I reported to the Pres-
ident our investigation of and authorization of a grand jury proceeding in the recent Mississippi
case of Howard Walsh, a negro who was lynched as a result of the jailer leaving unlocked the door
of his cell so that the mob entered and dragged him out. The President was pleased with the way
we handled it.”46 The issue, though, certainly declined in prominence as the war pushed other
issues onto the agenda like military segregation and defense industry discrimination, and the
congressional anti-lynching campaign started to falter. However, the rhetorical trajectory of the
decade began to emerge in the late 1930s anti-lynching campaign; its pinnacle would be reached
in the 1940s as the issues on the agenda themselves became more explicitly linked to the war.
Race and Troop Policy Debates Before U.S. Entry
One issue that emerged as a result of the war was the debate over the segregated military. Troop
policy debates emerged well before U.S. entry into World War II. This was partially the result of
the black experience serving in the First World War, which activists like W. E. B. Du Bois thought –
incorrectly, it turned out – would lead to major civil rights advances. This led to major concerns as
the lead up to the Second World War unfolded. For example, on March 9, 1939, Roy Wilkins wrote
the President enclosing an article in The Crisis titled “Old Jim Crow in Uniform,” as well as a copy
of a letter to Secretary of War Harry Woodring. The editorial was about military discrimination
during World War I. McIntyre acknowledged receipt of the editorial on March 13, but there is no
45Letter, Carl Murphy to Marvin McIntyre, February 5, 1938; Folder: “Lynching 1938-1944”; OF 93a; FDR Official
Files.
46Meeting Notes, Francis Biddle, December 11, 1942; Folder: “Cabinet meetings, July-Dec. 1942”; Box 1; Biddle
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indication the White House took it particularly seriously.47
In personal correspondence prior to U.S. entry, Ickes took a positive stance in favor of greater
black integration in the military. On May 27, 1940, Paul H. Douglas – then of the Chicago City
Council – wrote Ickes. “I have noticed from the track meets and boxing contests that the colored
people have generally a high degree of physical and nervous coordination, which must mean
that there are a large number of very capable potential pilots in their ranks,” Douglas wrote. “The
country will benefit from their services.” On May 31, 1940, Ickes responded, writing, “Personally, I
see no reason why competent Negroes should not be trained to be pilots, and if they are competent
they ought to be given their chance.”48 Eleanor Roosevelt also became concerned about anti-black
discrimination in the military. In 1940, she accepted an invitation from A. Philip Randolph to
speak at the Convention of Sleeping Car Porters, which according to Goodwin, “set into motion
a chain of events that would carry her into the center of a convulsive battle for racial equality in
the armed forces.”49 She would play an even more important role after the United States formally
entered the war.
Perhaps the most prominent event related to race and troop policy prior to U.S. involvement
came on September 27, 1940, when civil rights leaders met in the White House. Civil rights ac-
tivists had pressed White House secretaries for the meeting, but only succeeded when they sub-
mitted the request through the more sympathetic First Lady. The eventual meeting consisted of
Randolph, NAACP Secretary Walter White, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, Assistant Secretary
of War Robert Patterson, and the President. In his diary, Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote
that he sent Patterson “because I really had so much else to do.” Patterson apparently told him it
was “an amusing affair – the President’s gymnastics as to politics. I saw the same thing happen
47Letter, Roy Wilkins to Franklin Roosevelt, March 9, 1939; Folder: “Lynching 1938-1944”; Box OF 93a; FDR Official
Files.
48Letter, Paul H. Douglas to Harold Ickes, May 27, 1940; Folder: “Negroes, 1933-1945”; Box 213; Ickes Papers; Letter,
Harold Ickes to Paul H. Douglas, May 31, 1940; Folder: “Negroes, 1933-1945”; Box 213; Ickes Papers.
49Doris Kearns Goodwin, No Ordinary Time: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II, (New
York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1994), 161.
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23 years ago when Woodrow Wilson yielded to the same sort of demand and appointed colored
officers to several of the Divisions that went over to France, and the poor fellows made perfect
fools of themselves.” His overall assessment of black capacities was blunt. “Leadership is not
embedded in the Negro race yet,” he wrote, “and to try to make commissioned officers to lead the
men into battle is only to work disaster to both.”50
Randolph and White pressed the administration for meaningful policies to address civil rights.
The President was jovial, if noncommittal and, at times, slightly demeaning (in response to Ran-
dolph’s inquiry about the rank of black members of the Navy, Roosevelt said, “There’s no reason
why we shouldn’t have a colored band on some of these ships, because they’re darn good at it”).51
However, most accounts suggest Randolph and White left thinking some progress had been made.
On October 8, 1940, Patterson sent a memo to President Roosevelt about black participation in
national defense. He included a statement of War Department policies, which had been informally
approved by the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff. The policies included black soldiers serving in
black units with black officers; some training of black soldiers as pilots, mechanics, and technical
specialists; and an explicit statement that the policy of the War Department was against attempts
to “intermingle colored and white enlisted personnel” in the same units. Stephen Early returned
the memo on October 9 with the President’s penciled in approval; a statement of the policy was
released to the press on that same day.52
The press release infuriated civil rights activists, who felt it implied they agreed with segrega-
tion policies. The NAACP sent out its own press release with the headline, “White House charged
with trickery in announcing Jim Crow policy of Army.” White wrote a letter to Ickes, attaching the
release and stating, “I want you to see the enclosed story on an issue of very great importance not
only to the Negro but to many white people who are fair-minded and who believe in practicing
50Ibid., 169.
51William Doyle, Inside the Oval Office: The White House Tapes from FDR to Clinton, (New York: Kodansha International,
1999), 15.
52Memo, Robert Patterson to Franklin Roosevelt, October 8, 1940, Box OF 93b, Folder “Segregation, 1933-45,” Official
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democracy as well as talking about it.” Ickes forwarded the letter to the President, although it is
unclear if Roosevelt read it himself.53
On October 21, David Niles wrote to Early regarding a proposed statement responding to
the controversy. “I think this statement is restrained, makes no commitment, and may do the
trick,” Niles wrote.54 On October 25, 1940, the President sent letters to White, Randolph, and
Arnold Hill. “I regret that there has been so much misinterpretation of the Statement of War
Department Policy issued from the White House on October ninth,” the letter began. “I regret
that your own position, as well as the attitude of both the White House and the War Department,
has been misunderstood.” He went on to promise better use of black troops. He also wrote that
William Hastie – a prominent black legal figure – had been appointed as Civilian Aide to the
Secretary of War.55 The letter was received favorably by the civil rights leaders.56
None of this necessarily led to meaningful shifts in the military, particularly the War Depart-
ment. On November 13, 1940, Stimson sent Roosevelt a statement of War Department “policy
in regard to Negroes.” The last point stated in part, “The policy of the War Department is not
to intermingle colored and white enlisted personnel in the same regimental organizations. This
policy has proven satisfactory over a long period of years and to make changes would produce
situations destructive to morale and detrimental to the preparations for national defense.” Stim-
son concluded forcefully, reiterating the main point. “ It is the opinion of the War Department that
no experiments hold be tried with the organizational set-up of these units at this critical time.”57
53Letter, Walter White to Harold Ickes; Folder: “Colored Matters (Negroes) Oct-Dec 1940”; OF 93; FDR Official Files.
54Letter, David Niles to Stephen Early, October 21, 1940; Folder: “Colored Matters (Negroes) Oct-Dec 1940”; OF 93;
FDR Official Files.
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In February 1941, Truman Gibson – a black lawyer in Chicago – was brought into the Executive
branch as an assistant to Hastie. His initial experiences left him slightly skeptical of his role.
On February 7, Gibson wrote his wife. “Today, the Youth Congress has been picketing the War
Department, with the pickets marching around chanting, ‘Down with Jim Crow’. I had to go out
and see these fifty or so kids, mostly Negroes. While I was out, about a half dozen army officers
called up in high dudgeon saying the picketers were not informed etc. One, on the General Staff
left word for me to hold myself in readiness–for what I don’t know. Maybe he wanted me to rush
out and stop them with my bare hands.”58
Activists attempted to pressure the White House for further results. On March 13, White wrote
President Roosevelt to suggest a conference on racial exclusion in national defense. His request
was declined.59 In September, the President did order an examination of federal civil service
discrimination. However, the response from agencies largely consisted of platitudes and there is
little evidence it had much effect.
Race and Troop Policy During U.S. Participation
The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred on December 7, 1941, and the United States formally declared
war the following day. The participation of African American troops in international combat
formalized the structure of the debate. Activists were able to visit military bases and hear about
discriminatory treatment firsthand. On the other hand, the War Department became even more
frustrated with activist pressures as they focused exclusively on the military aspects of the conflict.
The situation for the wartime civil rights activists was compelled and constrained in complex
ways.
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Stimson’s resistance to giving black soldiers equal responsibilities as white ones – highlighted
earlier by his response to the September 1940 White House meeting with civil rights activists –
would be a consistent theme during U.S. participation in the war. The War Department combatted
critiques by highlighting poor performances in the First World War and what Stimson called a
black inability “to master efficiently the techniques of modern warfare” – something civil rights
activists took to calling the “Negro is too dumb to fight” policy.60
Eleanor Roosevelt butted heads with Stimson over the issue, and when that happened the
President tended to side with Stimson. In October 1942, for example, the First Lady left for a trip
to England inspecting military camps. Prior to leaving, she had written Stimson after hearing
from various sources about racial tension due to white southern soldiers being “very indignant”
at relations between black American soldiers and white English women. “I think we will have to
do a little educating among our Southern white men and officers,” she wrote. In his diary, Stimson
wrote that he went to see the President prior to the First Lady’s trip, asking him to warn his wife
not to make any public statements about “the differential treatment which Negroes receive in the
United Kingdom from what they receive in the U.S.” Despite the concerns raised in her letter,
Eleanor Roosevelt said nothing about race relations during the trip.61
Walter White maintained the NAACP’s pressure campaign. On October 28, 1942, White wrote
the President, attaching letters he had sent to Stimson and Ovetta Hobby, director of the Women’s
Army Corp, which was particularly dedicated to racial segregation. “I have written Colonel Stim-
son and Mrs. Hobby after I have had opportunity to see at first-hand at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, how
well this experiment is working out,” White explains. “But, unfortunately, in a Northern City, at
Des Moines, in the training of WAACs, there is just the reverse of the situation in the South. The
segregation at Des Moines is, in my opinion, both unnecessary and distinctly hurtful of morale.”
It is, White declared, contrary to “the ideals for which the war is being fought.”62 White kept this
60Goodwin, No Ordinary Time, 566.
61Ibid., 383.
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up in 1944, reporting from his visits to Europe. An April 22 memo to the War Department from
White about North African and Middle Eastern Theatres shows his attempts at advocating his
perspective to the military establishment.63 In November, he tried to convince the President and
Secretary of War to give “special recognition of Army personnel who have taken a decent attitude
on the matter of race and color.”64 They were not amenable.
McNutt and other figures became increasingly concerned with defusing potential problems
related to race relations and the military. For example, on February 17, 1943, McNutt sent a letter
to the Secretaries of War and Navy in his position as chairman of the War Manpower Commission.
He also sent a memo to Tully asking her, “Will you see that the President receives the attached
letter.” The letter opened by declaring, “The problem of induction of Negroes into the Army and
the Navy is acute.” McNutt proceeded to go through the percentage of the population that was
black compared to the percentage of various armed forces branches that were black, and talked
about the use of separate black and white Selective Service calls for enlistment. “The practice
of placing separate calls for white and colored registrants is a position which is not tenable,”
he concluded, “and it is now necessary to begin delivering men in accordance with their order
number without regard to race or color.”65
Other administration figures also took note of the increased pressures brought by U.S. partic-
ipation in the war. For example, on July 23, 1943, in the aftermath of the Detroit race riot, Ickes
wrote John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, regarding issues surrounding segregation and
Native women in Alaska at dances with white soldiers. “We are getting some hot race relations
93; FDR Official Files.
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questions these days, aren’t we?”66 Truman Gibson aided in bringing such pressures. On Novem-
ber 3, 1943, Gibson sent a memo to the Assistant Secretary of War. “There is in fact every present
indication that the treatment of Negroes in the armed forces will constitute the most important
issue in the general effort to capture the Negro vote.” Gibson concluded with a list of suggestions,
including moving black troops out of the South (“. . . little, if anything, can be expected when men
are constantly subjected to the types of practices they run into in many southern communities”).67
On December 29, 1943, John Stengstacke, President of the Negro Newspaper Publishers Asso-
ciation, wrote the President requesting a conference about “the status of the Negro in the United
States Navy.” This exchange is most revealing for the response it generated by military officials.
Sengstacke’s concluding paragraph chided various figures in the Navy Department for responses
that “indicate a wide gap between the thinking of the top men in the Navy and the Negro people.
We also believe they indicate a failure on the part of Navy officials to appreciate the importance
of the issue.” He closed by appealing to the war effort. “No one knows better than you, Mr. Pres-
ident the pernicious effect this situation has on national unity,” he wrote. “No one knows better
than you how it weakens our cause before the entire world.”68
Administration officials sent the letter around for comments; the response from the Chief
of Naval Personnel is especially revealing. He blamed the black press for problems with black
morale, as well as offering substantial concern about what whites will think: Will they be okay
with integration? If not, no integration. “The individual negro finds it difficult to sublimate his
race consciousness and become an integral part of the established Navy program. The Navy will
continue to effect integration only to the extent that the attitude of both negroes and whites indi-
cates that integration is practicable. To do otherwise would ignore the fact that racial prejudices
on the part of both negroes and whites do exist on a national scale.” He wrote in conclusion:
66Letter, Harold Ickes to John McCloy, July 23, 1943; Folder: “1943-1946”; Box 376; Ickes Papers.
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“Until the national attitude has been so conditioned that these prejudices no longer exist on a
national scale–and it is believed that the attitude of the negro press in deliberately developing
race consciousness and undue sensitivity to discrimination on the part of the negro in the Navy
is retarding national progress in this direction–the Navy cannot undertake in time of war a pro-
gram which will be detrimental to its war effort and serve only to further the interests of a racial
minority.”69
Such negative military sentiments toward civil rights activists were fairly common. On De-
cember 30, 1943, Jeanette Welch Brown, Executive Secretary of the National Council of Negro
Women, requested that Mary McLeod Bethune be sent to war fronts to see black soldiers. Presi-
dent Roosevelt asked the First Lady for advice. “A young woman would have to go with her and
a man would have to go on a tour such as was planned by Walter White, but I think it would be
very good,” she replied. The President then asked Jonathan Daniels, who responded by attaching
a draft letter declining the request. “The Army does not want her to go,” Daniels stated quite
concisely.70
By early 1944, some important institutional developments began to take place. The Advisory
Committee on Negro Troop Training was established, with its first meeting taking place on Febru-
ary 29. The meeting was held in McCloy’s office and began with a discussion of black troops,
before turning to blood donor policies. “The Red Cross gets the blood, and the Army uses it. This
is the policy of the Red Cross,” Gibson said. “The Surgeon General made the request to segregate
the blood.” The blood segregation “offends the colored people,” acknowledged one general in
attendance. However, the Committee decided to take no action on the blood donation policy.71
On April 26, the committee met again. McCloy noted that race relations in England seemed to
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be going well, then they moved on to the primary focus of the meeting: a conference with Walter
White, who, as usual, pressed the military to alleviate racial inequities in its midst. “There is too
much pressure on the Army to change conditions in the United States,” an exasperated General
Porter stated at one point.72
In the last months of Roosevelt’s tenure in office, Gibson remained active. On March 12, 1945,
Gibson sent a report on his visit to the 92nd Division black troops to Major General Nelson. Gibson
talked to about 800 officers and grouped some general themes in their remarks in his report.73 On
March 31, Gibson sent a report of his visit to the European Theater of Operations to General Lee.74
The next month, on April 12, Roosevelt died. The push for racial equality in the armed forces
picked up steam in the Truman administration, a subject that is examined in detail in the next
chapter. This chapter, however, turns now to fair employment.
Executive Order 8802 and the March on Washington Movement
The second issue that came to dominate the racial agenda during the war was discrimination in
the defense industry. Concerns about discriminatory employment practices had of course been
raised in the past, but the defense industry provided a more concrete target. Because it could be
directly tied to the anti-fascist rhetoric of the war, it was easier to criticize discrimination there.
And because it was focused on the defense industry, not necessarily all employment, it was an
easier sell than a broader anti-job discrimination agenda targeting private business.
President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 on June 25, 1941, which established the Pres-
ident’s Committee on Fair Employment Practice as a means of combatting racial discrimination
in the defense industry. This action was hardly a profile in presidential courage. It was almost
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entirely a response to a threatened march on Washington organized by A. Philip Randolph in
conjunction with other civil rights leaders.75 This was another clear example where the war con-
strained the civil rights trajectory in the 1940s. FEPC and concerns about defense industry discrim-
ination – and military segregation – rose to the top of the civil rights policy agenda, downgrading
the drive for anti-lynching and anti-poll tax legislation of the 1930s. Yet in bringing economics to
the fore, rights claims were limited to war-specific measures.
Randolph’s March on Washington Movement developed in early 1941. The more active stance
was in no small part a result of the dissatisfaction with the September 1940 meeting at the White
House and its ensuing controversies. The public announcement of the organization’s motives
came on January 15 and in the ensuing months Randolph worked to build support for a massive
march to protest racial discrimination. The White House eventually took note. On May 7, Early
sent a memo to Wayne Coy about a statement by the President regarding national defense em-
ployment segregation. “Confidentially, the President did not want to issue the statement himself
but was agreeable to the idea of exchanging letters with Hillman.”76 By June, Roosevelt was ex-
pressing displeasure at the proposed march. In a June 7 memorandum to Marvin McIntyre, the
President wrote, “Tell [Dr. F. O.] Williston that the President is much upset to hear (yesterday) that
several negro organizations are planning to March on Washington on July first, their goal being
100,000 negoes [sic] and I can imagine nothing that will stir up race hatred and slow up progress
more than a march of that kind and the best contribution Williston can make is to stop that march.”
A June 16, 1941, memo to the President from “G.” said Williston “has been to see [Roosevelt secre-
tary Marvin McIntyre] several times and he told [McIntyre] that your action is having a marvelous
effect and that he has talked with several Negro leaders, who were in favor of the ‘march’, but he
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feels now that there is a good chance that nothing will happen.”77 This, however, turned out to be
too naive.
On June 18, the President held a White House conference with Randolph, White, Stimson,
Knox, and several others. Stimson was not pleased by the meeting. He wrote in his diary that
it was “one of those rather harassing interruptions with the main business with which the Secre-
tary of War ought to be engaged – namely, in preparing the Army for defense.”78 In the meeting,
Randolph promised to bring one hundred thousand people to march on Washington if the Pres-
ident did not issue an executive order abolishing defense industry discrimination. When Roo-
sevelt looked to White, thinking Randolph was bluffing (and he probably was), White nonethe-
less backed up Randolph’s number. The President eventually agreed and the drafting of the order
began.
On June 24, Patterson, on behalf of the War Department, sent a memo to the President regard-
ing the coming executive order. “While we are in sympathy with the policy, we are not in favor of
this step,” he wrote. He gave five reasons for the Department’s objection: first, the order “would
be a dead letter” in the South; second, since some labor unions discriminate against black work-
ers, contractors working under a closed shop with such unions had no choice in the matter; third,
contractors might fear litigation and not make bids on war contracts; fourth, it would be difficult
to administer, as the “[t]he only effective remedy for breach would be cancellation of the contract,”
which he argued would be “most unwise”; and fifth, “prejudices might be aroused, rather than
allayed, by such a measure,” and “[t]he substantial progress toward eliminating prejudice might
suffer a setback.” However, if such an order were administered, Patterson suggested the language
be toned down. “[W]e suggest that the clause be to the effect that the contractor will observe, so far
as practical and consistent with the expeditious performance of the work, the policy of the Gov-
ernment that there be no discrimination because of race, creed, or color,” he said. “Any board set
77Memorandum, Franklin Roosevelt to Marvin McIntyre, June 7, 1941; Folder: “Colored Matters (Negroes) June-July
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up to hear grievances should not have the power to direct cancellation of any defense contract.”79
The executive order was released the next day, and debates ensued about what the order would
mean in practice. Civil rights leaders were initially quite celebratory. However, this later turned
slightly more cynical, as many activists felt the committee would not live up to its potential. On
August 20, Mark Ethridge wrote to Stephen Early. “As you know, the Negroes wanted the execu-
tive order as a sort of second Emancipation Proclamation. They wanted the setup entirely outside
of OPM with La Guardia as chairman and, I suppose, somebody like Winston Churchill would
have satisfied them as executive secretary,” he stated. “I think the agitators have got themselves
into such a position with a threatened march that they wanted to make the abandonment of the
march appear to come as the result of a great victory.”80
Detroit Race Riot
Federal response to wartime race riots provides a final case study. As described in the first chapter,
the Detroit race riot took place from June 20-22, 1943. Thirty-four people died, more than 700 were
injured, and there was over two million dollars worth of property damage.81 The administration
soon realized this was not just a local issue, but rather one that required a federal response. On
June 24, Roosevelt apparently sent a memorandum to Stephen Early asking, “Don’t you think
it is about time for me to issue a statement about racial riots?” 82 On June 27, New York City
Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia wrote a letter to the President. “I think you should see Walter White
at the earliest possible moment,” he wrote. “I beg of you not to permit the federal troops to be
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withdrawn,” he added. “Walter urges this very strongly. It is better to keep them a few weeks
longer than to take them away one day too soon.”83 On July 7, Grace Tully sent the President a
message about a phone call received from the Vice President. “Mr. Wallace says that the Negroes
are waiting for Pres. Roosevelt to act. They think he should give a fireside chat.” 84
Ickes and others in the Department of the Interior took a particular interest in the riots. Ickes
had just a few months earlier told readers of the Afro-American that President Roosevelt’s actions
had played a key role in preventing race riots during the war. Many assistants in the Interior
Department took an interest, but perhaps no one more than Saul K. Padover. On June 29, Padover
wrote Ickes analyzing the riots. “The recent race riots were neither accidental nor unexpected,”
he began. “Race tensions throughout the country are such that it may be said that the race disease
is endemic. Observers in the field are convinced that further outbreaks, with their consequent
destructiveness and lasting bitterness, may be expected anywhere, any time. For the sake of the
country’s morale health, thorough action on a national scale is urgent.” Padover urged more
centralized federal government engagement with the issue. “Several federal agencies deal with
minorities, but none of them has a program and none of them has real responsibilities,” he wrote.
“The Fair Employment Practices Committee is the best of all, but it is confined to job-defense
activities. Others, such as the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (interested in the Mexicans
in the Southwest), are limited in scope and action.” He proposed the President set up an Office
of Race Relations. Notably for the purposes of this project, Padover concluded by clearly relating
race relations to the war effort. “A democratic solution of the race problem in this country will
have favorable repercussions among out Allies and friends,” Padover wrote. “It will also deprive
Axis propaganda of one of its most effective anti-American arguments.”85 Also notable is his
observation that wartime measures like the FEPC were limited to war-specific matters.
83Letter, Fiorello LaGuardia to Franklin Roosevelt, June 27, 1943; Folder: “Detroit Race Riots 1943-45”; OF 93c; FDR
Official Files.
84Memorandum, Grace Tully to Franklin Roosevelt, July 7, 1943; Folder: “Detroit Race Riots 1943-45”; OF 93c; Official
Files.
85Memorandum, Saul Padover to Harold Ickes, June 29, 1943; Folder: “Negroes, 1933-1945”; Box 213; Ickes Papers.
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Also on July 29, William A. Neilson of the NAACP asked Ickes to sign onto a statement about
the riots. The statement, attached to the letter, used wartime rhetoric: “The Detroit riot embodied
all the cruelties which have been practices by Nazi Germany and her partner, the Japanese em-
pire.” On August 3, 1943, Ickes sent an interesting response declining the request. “I am in full
sympathy with the idea underlying your letter to me of July 29 and I subscribe to what you say
in the draft of ‘A Statement,’ ” he wrote, seemingly aligning himself with such rhetoric. However,
he then switched frames. “I would sign this gladly and without reservation as you request if it
were not that I doubt the propriety of my joining in a call ‘upon our President and Governments,
federal, state and local, to use all wisdom, etc.’ I may be overfinical, but it seems to be that a mem-
ber of the Cabinet cannot, with propriety, publicly urge any action upon the President.”86 This
document is indicative of Ickes’ general strategy of agreeing with such sentiments, but using his
office to deflect calls for action.
Stimson, however, was surprisingly affected by the riots. In a June 24 diary entry, Stimson
blamed “the deliberate effort that has been going on on the part of certain radical leaders of the
colored race to use the war for obtaining the ends which they were seeking, and these ends are
very difficult because they include race equality to be social as well as economic and military and
they are trying to demand that there will be this complete intermixing in the military.” But by July
5, he had changed his mind, in part by photos in Life magazine showing blacks beaten by whites.
According to his diary, he told General Somervell he had arrived at “the conclusion that we have
go to do something. . . or there will be real trouble in the tense situation that exists among the two
races throughout the country.”87 Stimson was still far from a racial liberal, but there was finally a
crack in his armor.
86Letter, William A. Neilson to Harold Ickes, July 29, 1943; Folder: “Negroes, 1933-1945”; Box 213; Ickes Papers.
Letter, Harold Ickes to William A. Neilson, August 3, 1943; Folder: “Negroes, 1933-1945”; Box 213; Ickes Papers.
87Goodwin, No Ordinary Time, 446.
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Ideological Trajectories Post-Roosevelt Administration
President Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945. The next chapter picks up the analysis of the issues
raised in this chapter in the context of the Truman administration. Some figures find their way
into that chapter. Patterson, for example, became Secretary of War under Truman, and Gibson re-
mained a prominent figure advocating for civil rights inside the administration. Many, however,
did not stay on, at least not for long. Frances Perkins, for instance, stepped down from the Cab-
inet on June 30, 1945, and Harold Ickes resigned on February 15, 1946. However, the ideological
trajectories of these prominent Roosevelt administration figures did not necessarily stop with the
president’s death.
Perhaps the most extreme example is Perkins. Perkins said little about civil rights in the 1940s.
In her book The Roosevelt I Knew, published in 1946, African Americans are effectively invisible.
She does at one point describe the exclusion of farm and domestic workers from social security
legislation as “a blow,” although she does not reference race directly.88 The archival collection
of her papers is likewise lacking in references to civil rights. On October 13, 1944, she delivered
an address to the National Council of Negro Women’s Post-War Institute and Workshop titled
“Women Workers – Today and Tomorrow.” However, the speech made no explicit reference to
race or civil rights, focusing instead on female workers more generally. Her main points were
to argue against the Equal Rights Amendment and use survey data to encourage the notion that
women wanted to return to housework after the war was over.89 Speaking to an audience of black
women is as far as the papers go in enlightening contemporary analysts to her perceptions of race
and civil rights. However, one source does allow for a more detailed analysis of Perkins and civil
rights, both generally and pertaining to the World War II period more specifically: her lengthy
oral history interview at Columbia University.
88Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, (New York: The Viking Press: 1946), 298.
89Speech, Frances Perkins to National Council of Negro Women’s Post-War Institute and Workshop, October 13, 1944;
Folder: “[Washington]; 10 t.p., 9 t.p. (carbon): Address, ‘Women workers –today and tomorrow,’ To National Council
of Negro Women’s Post-War Institute and Workshop”; Frances Perkins Papers, Columbia University, Rare Books &
Manuscript Library, New York, NY.
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Along with her commitment to a military-centric focus during the war, Perkins seemed to see
racism as “deeply ingrained,” perhaps not malleable by war. Reflecting on a strike by white work-
ers in Baltimore refusing to work with African Americans, she said, “Finally we did just exactly
what the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People recommends against do-
ing, which was that we showed the employer how to a make a kind of segregation in the factory,
particularly with regards to toilets. You were running there so deeply into prejudice that you had
to do something. You were dealing with something so deeply ingrained in people, a fear, that you
couldn’t stop right then to cope with it.”90
These two characteristics – her commitment to military victory and her belief that racism was
something impermeable by government interference – make it difficult to expect the wartime civil
rights rhetoric to have an effect on her, and indeed this is the case. She viewed the wartime
FEPC – perhaps the most prominent, although certainly limited, policy victory by civil rights
advocates during Roosevelt’s tenure – as a “nuisance” and a presidential order that “[d]idn’t have
any standing.”91
Perkins was cynical about progress on segregation. Just after the Brown case, she said it would
take twenty or thirty years for desegregation to be achieved. She also, unprompted, brought up
the Brown case itself. “Well, I wouldn’t like to tell you what I think of the Supreme Court decision
on the matter,“ she said. When asked if she disagreed, she replied, “Why, I think it was terrible. It
was a purely political decision, and I think it should never have been made. I do indeed. I don’t
know how they got it. I mean, Earl Warren is a very diplomatic fellow, and he talked them into it.
But there’s more to be said on it than they did.” When the interviewer replied that it seemed to
him “that the thing is so darned long overdue,” Perkins was adamant. “Oh my dear fellow, now
look here,” she said. “No – it’s not overdue. It’s just begun to loom up as due – as nearly due.
No, wait! Nobody ever heard that segregation was wrong until about five years ago,” Perkins
insisted. “I never heard such a thing. I never heard of such a thing. Certainly we should be nice
90Reminiscences of Frances Perkins (1961), Interview 8, Session 1, p.149, Perkins Oral History.
91Reminiscences of Frances Perkins (1961), Interview 8, Session 1, p. 909, Perkins Oral History.
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to the Negroes. Certainly we should treat them right.”92
“Oh gee whiz,” responded the interviewer, “all during the war, with my training –” Perkins
cut him off there, and shifted emphasis from the war to NAACP leader Walter White. “Well, you
were in the war and the training,” she said. “It began to come up then. But after Walter White
began to agitate, it began to be raised. See, he was a smart agitator.” The interviewer pressed her
on the point. “Gosh, he’s been agitating for twenty years,” he said. “No, not for twenty years,”
Perkins said. “He didn’t have a chance to. He didn’t do any agitating until well into the Roosevelt
administration. It was well into the Roosevelt administration before the word ‘segregation’ was
mentioned. Yes, it was.” Perkins maintained her focus on White, while the interviewer raised
the war more generally. “But I remember during the war it was a boiling point,” he said. “Well,
during the war, you see, it was being raised,” Perkins acknowledged. “The Northerners were
coming South and finding something that was pretty hideous?,” the interviewer asked. “Well,
Walter White was agitating,” Perkins reiterated, “and he was putting his finger on the places
where it mattered – the recruiting, the – ” The interviewer interjected. “So help me,” he said,“ I
had never heard of Walter White. All I saw was two drinking fountains side by side, and I got the
word.” Perkins acknowledged that she “always used to feel queerly” in segregated facilities like
waiting rooms for trains. When the interviewer brought up the issue of “get[ting] in the back of
the bus,” Perkins said, “Yes, but they got on the bus after all. The bus hauled them where they
wanted to go.”93
She offered a surprising level of deference to white southern autonomy. The interviewer asked
quite bluntly at one point, “Do you mean to tell me in all your life you’ve never considered the
proposition that there was something perhaps a little awry about this system of separate schools,
sitting in the back of the bus, separate drinking fountains–?” That was in the South; it was a “way
of life in the South,“ Perkins insisted. When asked if she “accepted it,” she said, “No, I didn’t
accept it. I didn’t live in the South.“ The interviewer pushed a bit further. “But you went there,”
92Reminiscences of Frances Perkins (1961), Interview 8, Session 1, p. 336, Perkins Oral History.
93Reminiscences of Frances Perkins (1961), Interview 8, Session 1, p. 336-338, Perkins Oral History.
123
he said. “You went there in the campaign of 1948. You saw these things.” Perkins replied: “Yes,
and they didn’t vote, and we knew they didn’t vote. I went there. When Eugene Talmadge told
me that in the State of Georgia, we had a hundred percent Anglo-Saxon population, I did say,
‘Well, what were those strange black things I saw walking around the streets? If they weren’t
population, what were they?’ I mean, that startled me a little it. But, the way I regarded it, and
the laws of the South are quite separate in their thinking, and it’s the way we’ve gotten along, and
I always regarded it was not my function to tell the South what to do. It was my function to do
what I thought was right, where I lived, and not try to solve the problems that they had.”94
Overall, Perkins seemed to not understand the importance of race, feeling more comfortable
with issues of class and labor economics. The war certainly seemed to have no impact on this.
Ickes took a more positive stance than Perkins in his later years. On June 28, 1946, Malcolm
Ross, Chairman of the President’s Committee on Fair Employment Practice, sent Ickes a summary
of the Final Report of FEPC to the President “represent[ing] the Committee’s conclusions on five
years of a difficult but rewarding experience.” On July 1, Ickes wrote back, thanking him for the
letter. “You certainly have had rough sledding and I want to express my conviction that you have
done a fine and worthwhile job in sticking it out to the bitter end.”95 Ickes, in contrast to Perkins,
spoke favorably about the FEPC order.
However, his deference to the presidency seemed to persist even after leaving the executive
branch. On August 2, 1946, Vincent Sheean and George Marshall of the Civil Rights Congress
wrote Ickes a letter asking him to sign a petition to President Truman urging the federal govern-
ment to investigate a police raid in Columbia, Tennessee. Ickes was away until September 1. He
responded September 19, writing, “I have very strong feelings on the subject matter with which
your letter deals. I have spoken vigorously in the past about lynchings and Negro persecutions,
and I shall again in the future. However, I do not feel like joining in the proposed petition to
94Reminiscences of Frances Perkins (1961), Interview 8, Session 1, p. 342, Perkins Oral History.
95Letter, Harold Ickes to Malcolm Ross, July 1, 1946; Folder: “Negroes, 1946-1951”; Box 75; Ickes Papers.
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President Truman.”96
He also expressed concern about alienating the white South. On April 7, 1947, Oliver Harring-
ton, Director of Public Relations at the NAACP, wrote to Ickes asking him to help them with their
membership drive through one of his columns. On May 10, Ickes responded to Harrington. He
began by apologizing for delay, then stated, “I am glad to hear that the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People is now campaigning for a million members. I have long been
a member of your organization. I believe in its objectives and I like its spunk. But whether I will be
able to write a column or two about the organization is another question. I would not want to run
the risk of establishing a precedent so that all of the organizations in whose principles I believe
and whose work I support would feel that they, too, were entitled to a column.”97 However, an
earlier memo suggested a different concern. He used the line about liking the NAACP’s “spunk,”
but then said, “However, I wonder whether I ought to write a column about it. There must be a
lot of opposition to it in the south and I have a number of subscribers among the southern news-
papers.”98
Ickes, then, provides a clear contrast with Perkins. However, despite efforts by civil rights
activists who viewed him as an ally in their causes, Ickes did not take a proactive stance in pushing
the racial agenda forward, either during or after his service in the executive branch.
Conclusion
The historical narratives presented in this chapter provide evidence with which to assess the hy-
pothesis set out at the beginning of the chapter: that the Second World War led the Roosevelt
administration address civil rights earlier and differently than it would have otherwise. In terms
of the temporal component of the hypothesis, there is clear evidence that the war was a critical
96Letter, Harold Ickes to Vincent Sheean and George Marshall, September 19, 1946; Folder: “Negroes, 1946-1951”;
Box 75; Ickes Papers.
97Letter, Harold Ickes to Oliver Harrington, May 19, 1947; Folder: “Negroes, 1946-1951”; Box 75; Ickes Papers.
98Memorandum, Harold Ickes to Dr. Clark; Folder: Negroes, 1946-1951”; Box 75; Ickes Papers.
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factor in pushing the administration to do anything at all on civil rights. The clearest supporting
example is the emergence of FEPC driven by the March on Washington Movement. There is little
evidence to suggest President Roosevelt would have used an executive order to lessen job dis-
crimination of any sort in the absence of this wartime activism. Regarding the substantive aspect
of the hypothesis, the war constrained the civil rights agenda by focusing it on issues related to
defense industry discrimination – and military segregation – rather than job discrimination and
segregation more broadly.
Civil rights activists at times found themselves constrained rhetorically by the wartime con-
text. On the one hand, the Double-V campaign allowed them to link their agenda to the goals
of the war, which was undoubtedly helpful in some areas. However, activists felt compelled to
tone down more radical claims. Some even felt the need to preempt criticism from moderates. For
example, on June 8, 1942, A. Philip Randolph wrote Mary McLeod Bethune. “May I also say that
the meetings which we are holding are not in any way intended to undermine the war. I want to
see the war won by the United Nations and the wiping out of Hitler, Hirohito, and Mussolini. But
I think it is proper for Negroes to insist upon their democratic rights of being permitted to play
their part int he Army, Navy, Air and Marine Corps, defense industries, and the government as
equals with the White people in this country. This will help rather than weaken America in the
prosecution of the war.”99
This chapter demonstrates the theoretical utility of reconsidering the Roosevelt administra-
tion’s record on civil rights in light of the Second World War. It is not a revisionist account. The
Roosevelt administration did relatively little to advance black civil rights. However, putting aside
the normative shortcomings of this fact, this chapter focuses on the few changes that did occur and
the empirical underpinnings of these shifts. Prior research on the racial agenda of the Roosevelt
years largely misses the simultaneously compelling and constraining aspects of World War II in
this realm, as well as the link between the various racial policies of the wartime period.
The best theoretical assessment of the Second World War’s impact on civil rights in the Roo-
99Letter, A. Philip Randolph to Mary McLeod Bethune, June 8, 1942; Folder: “March on Washington Movement,
Correspondence, A-B 1942”; Box 26; Randolph Papers.
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sevelt administration assesses both the compelling aspects of the war (pressures for something
to happen rather than nothing), as well as the constraining aspects (narrowing the realm of the
agenda to war-specific issues). In a sense, this period was a precursor to the form of “Cold War
civil rights” that would emerge in the 1950s. As Mary Dudziak demonstrates, the Cold War would
“simultaneously constrain and enhance civil rights reform,” as well as “frame and thereby limit
the nation’s civil rights commitment.”100 This tendency has clear roots in the Second World War,
and this earlier period also has similarly restrictive aspects complementing the more liberating
ones.
100Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2000), 11, 13.
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Chapter 5
The Truman Administration, Military
Service, and Postwar Civil Rights
In the midst of debates about President Truman’s proposed civil rights package, Mary Jane Tru-
man – the President’s sister – told a North Carolina reporter, “Harry is no more for nigger equality
than any of us.” Around the same time, Truman replied to a letter from a concerned southern
Democrat. Acknowledging that he understood the concerns of the white South, he nonetheless
proceeded to defend his civil rights stance. He used the role of military service as a particularly
powerful justification. “But my very stomach turned over when I learned that Negro soldiers, just
back from overseas, were being dumped out of army trucks in Mississippi and beaten,” he wrote.
“Whatever my inclinations as a native of Missouri might have been, as President I know this is
bad.” Then, in a moralistic tone common in his rhetoric, Truman concluded, “I shall fight to end
evils like this.”1
Like many white Missourians of his time, Truman possessed more than his fair share of racial
prejudice. Although the state itself was technically midwestern, his hometown of Independence
was, according to his most prominent biographer, “pervadingly southern – Antebellum Old South,
unreconstructed.”2 Later, during his presidency, when his daughter Margaret jokingly asked her
grandmother if she wanted to sleep in Lincoln’s bed, the President’s mother declared with disgust
1David McCullough, Truman, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 588.
2Ibid., 53.
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that given the option she would prefer to sleep on the floor.3 In early courtship letters to Elizabeth
Wallace – the eventual First Lady Bess Truman – Truman casually used a wide range of racial slurs.
In one letter, he declared, “One man was as good as another, so long as he’s honest and decent and
not a nigger or a Chinaman.” Later, in reference to his uncle, Truman wrote, “He sure does hate
Chinks and Japs. So do I. It is race prejudice I guess. But I am strongly of the opinion that negroes
ought to be in Africa, yellow men in Asia, and white men in Europe and America.”4
Such habits of speech would not disappear entirely even by the time he became president. He
still used the word “nigger” privately, “as if that were the way one naturally referred to blacks.”5
When Adam Clayton Powell protested First Lady Bess Truman’s decision to accept an invitation
to tea with the Daughters of the American Revolution, he was referred to as “that damn nigger
preacher” in a Cabinet meeting.6 In the later years of Truman’s life, he was highly critical of the
civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. He strongly disapproved of the use of sit-ins and
marches, which he considered lawlessness. He was even sympathetic to J. Edgar Hoover’s concern
that the movement was filled with communists. Fearful that Truman might say something that
would prove detrimental to the 1960 presidential campaign of John F. Kennedy, Dean Acheson,
his former Secretary of State, actually wrote Truman a letter to set him straight.7
Yet Truman arguably did more to advance black civil rights than any president since Abraham
Lincoln; he certainly did more than his predecessor, Franklin Roosevelt. Truman created the Pres-
ident’s Committee on Civil Rights with Executive Order 9808, which later released the influential







– eventually leading to the desegregation of the U.S. military – through Executive Order 9981.8
When Truman was preparing to leave office in January 1953, Roy Wilkins – who would become
executive secretary of the NAACP just two years later – wrote him a letter. “I want to thank you
and to convey to you my admiration for your efforts in the civil rights field, for your pronounce-
ments and definitions of policy on racial and religious discrimination and segregation,” he wrote.
“Mr. President, no Chief Executive in our history has spoken so plainly on this matter as yourself,
or acted so forthrightly.”9 While the letter’s tone was perhaps partly deference to the executive
office, it is hard to imagine Wilkins writing the same letter to Roosevelt.
I argue these two seemingly contradictory facts – Truman’s deeply prejudiced background and
his support for certain civil rights policies – can be reconciled by the addition of a third factor: Tru-
man’s deeply rooted republican belief in the value of military service and the citizenship rights it
bestows. Truman’s experience in World War I was, by his own account, the defining experience
of his life. This personal experience seems to have shaped his response to accounts of violence
against black veterans of the Second World War brought to his attention by civil rights leaders like
Walter White of the NAACP and A. Philip Randolph of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.
Using Truman’s particular brand of republicanism as a guiding framework for understanding his
decisions on civil rights fits well with the fact that such civil rights advances were largely military-
centric – black soldiers earned certain rights – and not focused on civilians, whose more liberal
claims of universal rights had less appeal for Truman. It also provides a useful vantage point for
statements like the one by Roy Wilkins, who, reflecting on the differences between Truman and
Roosevelt later in life, said, “I feel that Truman was a friend of civil rights and he wanted to do the
fair thing.”10 In the context of the times, “fairness” did not necessarily mean full liberal equality,
8This was accompanied by Executive Order 9980, which desegregated the federal workforce. He issued another
executive order to the Federal Housing Administration demanding it refuse financial assistance to new housing projects
that excluded racial or religious groups. He also ordered African Americans to be welcome at the main events of his
1949 inauguration, something no other president had done before.
9Letter, Roy Wilkins to Harry Truman; Folder: “OF 596: July 1950-53”; Box 1666; Harry S. Truman Papers, White
House Central Files: Official File; Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
10Reminiscences of Roy Wilkins (1960), in the Oral History Research Office Collection of the Columbia University
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but rather a more limited recognition of certain rights derived from service. If military service
endowed black soldiers with the right to serve with white men and not to be beaten or lynched
when they returned home, it did not necessarily follow, for Truman, that they also deserved the
full range of citizenship rights in a liberal polity. Not to be murdered arbitrarily, yes; not to be de-
nied the right to fight with whites in the same uniform, yes; but none of this led Truman to support
the policies advocated that went beyond this limited set of claims. In that sense, this chapter is not
hagiographic.11 What makes the Truman administration such a fascinating case study for schol-
ars of race and American political development is its dual nature. Relative to Roosevelt, Truman
viewed the politics of civil rights as something more than the politics of coalition maintenance,
and his executive order combatting discrimination in the military was almost certainly the most
important civil rights victory of the 1940s. Yet relative to Lyndon Johnson, Truman’s record seems
limited. Civil rights groups appealed to the administration with evidence of violence against black
veterans, and indeed Truman acted to remedy such atrocities. Yet in focusing on these narrower
claims, the broader program of civil rights liberalism – let alone radicalism – could not yet make
it into the agenda. The war, then, compelled Truman to act, yet it also constrained what outcome
was possible, at least in the short term.12
In this chapter, I examine two civil rights victories: the creation of the President’s Commit-
tee on Civil Rights and the eventual desegregation of the armed forces. I show how both were
Libraries.
11There has been a tendency to reinterpret Truman as a steadfast champion of civil rights. See, for example, Michael
R. Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and Political Risks, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Press, 2002). Indeed, this line of work makes some good points. Yet, as I will show, the history is far more complicated.
12None of this should be read to contradict arguments about the role of political expediency in Truman’s support for
certain civil rights policies. Certainly some within Truman’s inner circles saw the black vote as critical for his reelection
hopes. In a confidential report titled the “Politics of 1948,” James Rowe found much value in the theory that “the
northern Negro vote today holds the balance of power in Presidential elections for the simple arithmetical reason that
Negroes not only vote in a block but are geographically concentrated in the pivotal, large and closely contested electoral
states such as New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan.” McCullough, Truman, 590. Scholars pointing to
such factors as an explanation for Truman’s civil rights agenda are not wrong. However, by focusing only on such
conventionally political factors, the full nature and extent of Truman’s specific civil rights agenda is under-explained.
By depicting Truman’s executive orders as part of a linear trend towards the eventual legislative civil rights successes
of the 1960s, scholars ignore the highly constrained nature of Truman’s efforts, and the implications this had for the
political development of American racial politics in the decades to follow.
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motivated by military service and the international context, although World War II slowly gave
way to the Cold War in the latter case. I also examine a similar effort that failed: a move by some
in the executive branch to create a President’s Committee on the Exercise of the Right to Vote.
Along with rescuing this from the archives, it can demonstrate the limits of Truman’s civil rights
liberalism. Finally, I examine Truman’s later years, particularly his rhetoric related to the 1960s
civil rights movement, when legal segregation was finally beginning to unravel in society more
broadly. This analysis shows how the civil rights proposals Truman supported in the 1940s can be
distinguished from the broader civil rights agenda to come. Taken together, these various vantage
points provide a more complete perspective on the Truman administration’s civil rights record.
Ultimately, I argue World War II is critical for understanding the Truman administration’s civil
rights record – but in a heterogeneous way. The actions of the Truman administration cannot be
adequately explained without examining the motivation provided by postwar violence against re-
turning black veterans. Yet to say World War II had a central effect is likewise too misleading. The
broad international context in Truman’s presidency included wartime, the postwar period, and
the early stages of the Cold War – and distinguishing between these temporalities is important.
Yet even in cases where the logic of the Cold War seems more central than World War II, many
issues on the agenda in the latter part of the decade – particular desegregation of the military –
were in fact developed within the context of the Second World War. The toolbox of “Cold War
civil rights” was, in many cases, being built in the lead-up to World War II.
Previous Research
In contrast to the Roosevelt administration’s dominant presence in American political develop-
ment scholarship, the Truman administration is relatively neglected by comparison. Philip Klinkner
and Rogers Smith offer one clear exception. Although framed in a chapter dedicated to the Cold
War, they give place substantial emphasis on the role of postwar violence against black veterans
in motivating Truman’s civil rights actions in the years to come. They first note the similarities
between 1919, the first year after First World War came to an end, and 1946, the first year after the
Second World War came to an end. “Clearly, the outbreak of racial violence after World War II
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suggested a repeat of the Red Summer of 1919, when blacks’ wartime aspirations were met with
bloody rebuffs,” they write. “Yet despite real similarities, 1946 was not 1919.” While giving at
least some “real credit” to Truman as an individual, they point to structural factors in their the-
oretical framework that made “this most recent wave of racial violence less acceptable to many
national leaders and most U.S. citizens.” First, there were the ideological conflicts: “After nearly
four years of hard-fought struggle against fascism and especially after learning of the enormous
evils of the Holocaust, it became harder and harder for Americans to justify their own racial hi-
erarchies,” Klinkner and Smith argue. “Instead of imposing new forms of racial subordination,
the brutal treatment of Isaac Woodard and other African Americans in this era thus worked to
heighten pressures for reform.”13
Second, the war required black manpower. But beyond black manpower, the war effort had
also “depended upon the cooperation of nonwhites around the world.” Here they transition from
World War II to the Cold War:
It, too, demanded ongoing large-scale military mobilization of American manpower,
so that alienating African Americans was more costly than ever before. And in this
war, for the first time, the allegiance of nonwhite nations would be crucial. If America’s
leaders hoped to win the hearts and minds of the world, it could not ignore what dis-
crimination was doing to the hearts and minds of black Americans at home. Because
the United States had never before been such a prominent world power, never before
had U.S. leaders given so much weight to international considerations; and never be-
fore had a war that triggered racial reforms been followed by an international context
generating such strong imperatives to sustain and extend those reforms.14
Finally, there was pressure in the form of the “aggressive activism of black Americans, inspired
by their war experiences, to achieve truly equal rights within an inclusive society, not a segregated
one.” They again distinguish between aftermaths of the First and Second World Wars:
Again, most blacks had come back from World War I with similar demands, but then
the hatred and brutality with which they were met led many instead to embrace the
separatism of Marcus Garvey. This time, many black activists recognized that they
13Philip A. Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 204.
14Ibid., 204-205.
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faced a far more opportune moment, and so their efforts to prod the United States
to live up to its recently professed egalitarian principles were stronger and more per-
sistent than ever before. Furthermore, the war had contributed mightily to the Great
Migration of blacks from the rural South to the urban, industrial North, where black
access to greater education, economic opportunities, and, most importantly, the vot-
ing booth greatly strengthened their political possibilities. Although their request re-
mained daunting, these conditions allowed advocates of civil rights, black and white,
to keep in motion the still-halting strides toward racial equality taken during World
War II, instead of being overwhelmed once again by the forces of reaction.15
Yet when the focus is the Truman, rather than Roosevelt, administration, Ronald Krebs’s work
provides a more critical counterpart to Klinkner and Smith.16 “Though persuasive,” Krebs argues,
“this account leaves a number of questions unanswered.” In particular, Krebs notes that the mo-
ments of civil rights progress under the Truman administration did not occur during total war.
He argues, “[I]n such cases, wartime rhetoric per se mattered less than the postwar rhetorical con-
text.” Further, Klinkner and Smith, he argues, “divide the universe of citizenship discourse into
inclusive (liberal) and exclusive (racist),” whereas Krebs argues, “the fate of African American
claims-making can be understood only if one is sensitive to the differences within the inclusionary
category – that is, between liberalism and republicanism.17 Ultimately, Krebs distinguishes be-
tween black civil rights and his other case study, the Druze in Israel. While the Druze case study
“highlights the possibilities created” by minority military service, “black Americans’ experience
with military service is, for the most part, a more sobering one.”18
Notably, the two chapters about black civil rights in Krebs’s book do not centrally consider
15Ibid., 205.
16In their article about racial orders, Smith and King cite the Klinkner and Smith account, and refer to “Harry Truman,
who had never been a strong racial egalitarian but who concluded for domestic, international, and personal reasons
that it was wiser to ally with antisegregationist northern Democrats than white supremacist southerners.” Desmond S.
King and Rogers M. Smith, “Racial Orders in American Political Development,” American Political Science Review 99(1),
2005, 76.
17Ronald R. Krebs, Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2006), 120. See also Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History, (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1999).
18Krebs, Fighting for Rights, 121.
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World War II. The first of his U.S. chapters considers the black experience of World War I, while
the second skips forward to the Truman administration, which Krebs considers principally in
terms of the Cold War. World War II, for Krebs, is not particularly central. This is reflected in
Krebs’s description of the Double-V campaign. While “often portrayed as indicative of blacks’
conditional loyally,” he argues it instead “channeled mass anger in safe directions.”19 However,
he does place value on the rhetorical context of the postwar period that led into the Cold War era.
“African Americans enjoyed greater influence in part because the way they framed their claims
was compelling in the postwar milieu,” he argues. “Soon after the war, African Americans drew
on a rejuvenated liberal tradition, hammering on the contradiction between racism and human
rights.” Yet in arguing racism at home aided Soviet propaganda abroad, Krebs raises a trade-off.
Since activists were “wary of being painted as Communists, they concentrated their energies on
formal civil and political rights, setting aside the deep political economy of race.” The country, he
argues, “is still coping with the implications of that choice.”20
This comparison of Krebs with Klinkner and Smith suggests at least two theoretical questions.
First, what was the role of the Second World War in the Truman administration’s eventual civil
rights actions? This question raises issues of temporality and periodicity. What analytical value is
gained by cleanly distinguishing between “World War II,” what Krebs calls “the postwar milieu,”
and the “Cold War” era soon to come? Or is such a clean delineation between these three periods
too parsimonious for the complicated reality of the era? Second, was the era of the Truman admin-
istration – however it is periodized with reference to the international context – as pathbreaking as
Klinker and Smith suggest, or is Krebs right to call it a “sobering” one? This chapter uses archival
evidence to assess the first question, but ultimately cannot offer a definitive answer to the second,
although it will be addressed further in the conclusion.
19Ibid., 151. This is similar to Finkle’s account, which Krebs cites. Lee Finkle, “The Conservative Aims of Militant
Rhetoric: Black Protest during World War II,” The Journal of American History 60(3), 1973, 692-713.
20Krebs, Fighting for Rights, 153-54.
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Method and Approach
The goal of this chapter is to assess the impact of the international context on the Truman admin-
istration’s civil rights record (and, within that, to assess how much analytical value can be gained
by distinguishing between the Second World War and the Cold War – two topics that often blur
together in scholarly accounts). In doing so, I emphasize how the context compelled and con-
strained the civil rights agenda of the Truman years, privileging certain rights claims (e.g., black
soldiers deserved better than beatings and lynchings; black soldiers deserved to serve alongside
white soldiers in training and battle), while hindering others (broader claims about universal,
rather than particularistic, citizenship rights more generally).
Truman’s civil rights agenda was one of executive orders and presidential commissions. This
chapter considers four moments: (1) the creation of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights in
response to white violence against black veterans returning from the war; (2) Executive Order 9981
and the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment in the Armed Services; (3) the push for
– and ultimate demise of – a presidential committee on voting rights; and (4) Truman’s cynicism
towards the 1960s civil rights movement in his later years in comparison to his support for a
limited civil rights agenda during his presidency.
Some of this is familiar, particularly the President’s Committee on Civil Rights and the Presi-
dent’s Committee on Equality of Treatment in the Armed Services. However, some of it is much
less well known, especially the ultimately failed effort at creating a Presidents’ Committee on the
Exercise of the Right to Vote. Similarly, many today assume the Committee on the Equality of
Treatment in the Armed Services took military desegregation for granted; this, in fact, was actu-
ally a contentious issue during their hearings. Finally, I argue looking to Truman’s later years is
not just historically interesting for those who happen to be interested in Truman the man. Rather,
it helps elucidate the constrained nature of his support for civil rights during his years in the White
House.
The question of segregation – and, particularly, the distinction between segregation in the U.S.
136
military vs. what many at the time called “social” segregation more broadly – will become key.21
While Truman’s civil right legacy is linked, perhaps above all else, with the desegregation of the
armed services, Truman was not an anti-segregationist. “I wish to make it clear that I am not
appealing for social equality of the Negro,” Truman had told the National Colored Democratic
Association in 1940. “The Negro himself knows better than that, and the highest types of Negro
leaders say quite frankly that they prefer the society of their own people. Negroes want justice,
not social relations.” However, nor was he of similar minds with the most committed of white
supremacists in the U.S. Senate like Theodore Bilbo. In his election announcement earlier that
year, Truman declared, “I believe in the brotherhood of man; not merely the brotherhood of white
men; but the brotherhood of all men before the law.”22 How, then, can this seeming disjunction be
reconciled?
I argue Truman’s own military service plays a key role here – not as an isolated factor, but in
interaction with the rhetorical context of the era Krebs, Klinkner and Smith, and others point to.
Truman believed military service endowed men with certain claims: to be treated with some de-
cency upon their return home from war, rather than with violence; to serve without distinction by
race while wearing a military uniform. Yet not all claims were convincing to him, particularly calls
for an end to segregation in society more generally (his claim in 1940 that “Negroes want justice,
not social relations” is a compelling example of this logic). This relates, in turn, to a distinction
between how Roosevelt and Truman made value judgments. David McCullough distinguishes
between Roosevelt and Truman this way:
Roosevelt loved the subtleties of human relations. He was a master of the circuitous
solution to problems, of the pleasing if ambiguous answer to questions. He was sen-
sitive to nuances in a way Harry Truman never was and never would be. Truman,
with his rural Missouri background, and partly, too, because of the limits of his educa-
21For a discussion of “political” vs. “social” rights in this time period, see this contemporaneous discussion in Public
Opinion Quarterly, which noted,“In general, more respondents favored granting additional rights in the political than
in the social realm.” Claude Dahmer, Jr and Elliott McGinnies, “Shifting Sentiments Toward Civil Rights in a Southern
University,” Public Opinion Quarterly 13(2), 1949, 241.
22William C. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press,
1970), 12.
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tion, was inclined to see things in far simpler terms, as right or wrong, wise or foolish.
He dealt little in abstractions. His answers to questions, even complicated questions,
were nearly always direct and assured, plainly said, and followed often by a conclu-
sive ‘And that’s all there is to it,’ an old Missouri expression, when in truth there may
have been a great more ‘to it.’23
This black-or-white, right-or-wrong sensibility provides a useful analytical lens. It allowed Tru-
man to see violence against black veterans and vow to fight “evils like this,” yet it also left him
influenced by traditions, including the tradition of “social” segregation.
From Roosevelt to Truman
As William Berman describes it, Truman “inherited the unresolved civil rights conflict from the
Roosevelt administration, without at the same time inheriting the good will and affection that
most Negroes felt for his predecessor.”24 In 1944, nomination as vice president “was tantamount
to election” as the new president, given Roosevelt’s poor health.25 The Pittsburgh Courier called
his vice presidential nomination an “appeasement of the South which must rank in cowardice and
shortsightedness with the ineptitude shown by Chamberlain at Munich.” Truman, they argued,
was “a long way from being a Henry Wallace.”26 Alabama Governor Chauncey Sparks had a
somewhat different view on Truman’s vice presidential nomination. “I think the South has won
a substantial victory in searing the defeat of Vice President Wallace,” he said. “I find him safe on
states rights and the right of the state to control qualifications of its electors. In the matter of race
relations Senator Truman told me he is the son of an unreconstructed rebel mother. I think the
23McCullough, Truman, 325.
24Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration, x.
25Robert H. Ferrell, Choosing Truman: The Democratic Convention of 1944, (Columbia: University of Missouri Press,
1994), 1.
26Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration, 19.
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South has won a victory.”27
President Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, at Warm Springs, Georgia – itself segregated.28 In
the year and a half after Roosevelt’s death, now-President Truman’s attention focused on several
pressing issues, including the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the
end of World War II and labor unions’ demands in the postwar period. However, by 1946, civil
rights was starting to find its way back onto the executive branch’s policy agenda.
Black Veterans, White Violence, and Executive Order 9808
In September 1946, someone sent a newspaper clipping to Philleo Nash, a presidential assistant
known to be supportive of civil rights. The story began:
The flat, unemotional voice of Isaac Woodward, Jr., does not change when he says,
“Then the cop gouged out both my eyes with the end of his billy stick.”
Sitting in his parents’ apartment at 1100 Franklin Ave., Bronx, the 27-year-old Negro
veteran was telling how South Carolina, his home state, welcomed him back from the
war.
As if not expecting you to take his word for it, Woodward takes off his dark glasses
to show you his sightless eyes. He says they were made that way by an Aiken, S.C.,
cop last Feb. 13, five hours after Woodward had been handed his honorable discharge
papers, and while he was still in Army uniform.29
27Ibid., 21.
28Consider this passage from Goodwin distinguishing between Franklin Roosevelt and Eleanor Roosevelt’s reactions
to the town: “Eleanor accompanied Franklin on his first visit to Warm Springs, but her reaction to the small Southern
town was as negative as her husband’s was positive. It was later said that Eleanor began asking questions about the
plight of the poor blacks in the town as she rode from the train station the first night; and that once she started asking
questions, she never stopped. ‘We didn’t like her one bit,’ one Southern lady admitted. Between the harsh segregation,
the suffocating poverty, the Spanish moss, which she hated, and the sound of the Southern drawl, which grated on her
ears, Eleanor could not wait to get away.” Goodwin, No Ordinary Time, 116.
29Woodard’s name was often misspelled as “Woodward” by white writers. Clipping; Folder: “Lynching–Woodard
[Woodward], Isaac”; Box 45; Philleo Nash Papers; Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, (hereafter cited
as Nash Papers).
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The case of Sergeant Isaac Woodard is the most poignant example of the role violence against
black veterans played in shaping the Truman administration’s civil rights agenda.30 Although
the case did not reach the attention of individuals in the executive branch until September, the
story began much earlier in the year. On February 12, 1946, Woodard – who had just received his
honorable discharge papers – was traveling on a Greyhound bus from Georgia’s Camp Gordon
to see his family in North Carolina. When the bus stopped just outside Augusta, Woodard went
to use a restroom. The bus driver grew agitated when he perceived Woodard as taking too long,
and at the next stop, on the outskirts of Aiken, South Carolina, the driver called local police and
described Woodard as drunk and disorderly. Police officers – including the Chief of Police – beat
him with nightsticks, arrested him, and left him in jail overnight.31 In the attack, Woodard “suf-
fered bleeding of both eyeballs, and breaking of the cornea in the right eye.”32 He was never able
to see again.
The Woodard case eventually captured the attention of national civil rights organizations, as
well as black newspapers. The Chicago Defender was clear in its condemnation. “Though the Negro
veterans of World War II fought to save this country from Hiterlism and its racial implications,”
the article read, “he has a greater battle yet to fight to win for himself the status of an American
citizen, said Isaac Woodard Jr, veteran of overseas service whose eyes were gouged out in February
by race-hating South Carolina cops.”33 The NAACP made a concerted effort to spread the news
of Woodard’s beating around the country. It wasn’t until the fall, however, that the Woodard case
30For statements suggesting this violence played a role in Truman’s behavior, see John Frederick Martin, Civil Rights
and the Crisis of Liberalism: The Democratic Party 1945-1976, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), 78; Klinkner and Smith,
The Unsteady March, 202-203, 207. “It began with the returning black veterans of World War II,” presidential assistant
Philleo Nash later declared. See Memorandum, Philleo Nash to Clark Clifford; Folder: “Civil Rights [2001 accretion]”;
Box 113, George M. Elsey Papers; Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri (hereafter cited as Elsey Papers).
31This is the rough outline, but as Klinkner and Smith note, “[a]ccounts of the Woodard beating vary.” Klinkner and
Smith, The Unsteady March, 385f1.
32“POLICE CHIEF FREED IN NEGRO BEATING: Federal Court Jury Acquits South Carolina Officer After Blind
Veteran Accuses Him,” New York Times (New York), November 6, 1948, Proquest Historical Newspapers.
33Chicago Defender clipping, Papers of Philleo Nash, White House File, Box 45, “Lynching – Woodard, [Woodward]
Isaac” folder.
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received federal attention. In September 1946, a meeting was held at the White House with the
National Emergency Committee Against Mob Violence – a coalition composed of representatives
from the NAACP, Urban League, Federal Council of Churches, and the American Federation of
Labor.34 When presented with stories of such violence, Truman supposedly said, “My God! I had
no idea that it was as terrible as that! We have to do something. . . ”35
Walter White later described the meeting as a distinction between Roosevelt and Truman.
“Roosevelt issued his famous Executive Order 8802 establishing a Fair Employment Practice Com-
mittee only when he was convinced that a threatened March on Washington was not a bluff,”
White argued. But: “When a small delegation representing labor, church and civic groups pre-
sented to him on September 19th, 1946, the facts regarding the wave of lynchings and other anti-
minority practices which were then sweeping the country, Truman’s face became pale with horror.
His voice trembled with deep emotion as he assured us the steps must be taken immediately to
stop this wave of terrorism before it got out of hand.”36
McCullough argues such stories of violence against black veterans “made an everlasting im-
pression on Truman, moving him in a way no statistics ever would have.”37 On September 20,
Truman sent a memorandum to David Niles, one his advisors, attaching a copy of a letter he sent
34Edith S. Riehm, “Forging the Civil Rights Frontier: How Truman’s Committee Set the Liberal Agenda for Reform
1947-1965” (PhD diss., Georgia State University, 2002), 56.
35McCullough, Truman, 50-51. The quote, though, originates from Walter White’s autobiography, so it is filtered
through White’s perspective. Walter White, A Man Called White: The Autobiography of Walter White, (New York: The
Viking Press, 1948).
36Clipping; Folder: “[1948] 1949-1952”; Box 26; David K. Niles Papers; Harry S. Truman Library, Independence,
Missouri (hereafter cited as Niles Papers).
37McCullough, Truman, 589. Truman seems to have been affected by other incidents of postwar violence as well. In
an interview with Robert Goe, on of Truman’s assistants in composing his memoirs, Truman referred to “that sheriff
in Georgia, who lined up these four Negroes and shot them. Nothing was ever done about it. . . and that’s what set me
back on my heels, and I was raised unreconstructed.” Interview with President Truman; Folder: “Domestic Policy –
Civil Rights”; Box 643; Harry S. Truman Post-Presidential Papers; Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri
(hereafter cited as Truman Post-Presidential Papers). He also seems to have been concerned about anti-Japanese Amer-
ican violence as well. In December 1945, Eleanor Roosevelt forwarded Truman a letter she had received regarding this
subject. “This disgraceful conduct almost makes you believe that a lot of our Americans have a streak of Nazi in them,”
he wrote back.” Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1973), 65.
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to Attorney General Tom Clark. “I am very much in earnest on this thing and I’d like very much
to have you push it with everything you have,” Truman wrote. “I had as callers yesterday some
members of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and they told me
about an incident which happened in South Carolina where a negro Sergeant, who had been dis-
charged from the Army just three hours, was taken off the bus and not only seriously beaten but
his eyes deliberately put out, and that the Mayor of the town had bragged about committing this
outrage,” Truman said. “I have been very much alarmed at the increased racial feeling all over the
country and I am wondering if it wouldn’t be well to appoint a commission to analyze the situ-
ation and have a remedy to present to the next Congress – something similar to the Wickersham
Commission on Prohibition.”38
On October 11, the Attorney General wrote Truman suggesting he issue an executive order
called “Establishing the President’s Committee on Civil Rights.”39 Truman did so on December
5.40 The Committee sent Truman its final report on October, 27, 1949; it was published in Decem-
ber. The report contained several interesting mentions of international affairs. In particular, one
line became famously associated with the report, at least at the time: “The United States is not so
strong, the final triumph of the democratic ideal is not so inevitable that we can ignore what the
38Memorandum, Harry Truman to David Niles, September 20, 1946; Folder: “1945-June, 1947 [2 of 2”; Box 26; Niles
Papers.
39Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration, 53.
40The committee ultimately consisted of 15 members: Sadie T. Alexander (a black lawyer, who was also the first
African American to receive a Ph.D. in the United States), James B. Carey (Secretary-Treasurer of the CIO), John S.
Dickey (President of Dartmouth College), Morris L. Ernst (an anti-communist leader of the American Civil Liberties
Union), Rabbi Roland B. Gittelsohn (the first Jewish chaplain in the Marine Corps), Frank P. Graham (President of
the University of North Carolina [and later Senator from North Carolina]), Reverend Francis J. Haas (bishop of the
Roman Catholic Diocese of Grand Rapids, Michigan, who had previously served on Roosevelt’s Committee on Fair
Employment Practice), Charles Luckman (businessman), Francis P. Matthews (Director of the Department of Finance
in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce [and later Secretary of the Navy]), Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. (the former president’s
son), Reverend Henry Knox Sherrill (an Episcopal clergyman in Massachusetts), Boris Shishkin (an economist with
the American Federation of Labor ), Dorothy Tilly (a southern activist who favored a more gradual pace for reform),
Channing H. Tobias (a black civil rights activist affiliated with the YMCA until 1946, when he became director of the
Phelps-Stokes Fund), and Charles E. Wilson (CEO of General Electric) who served as Chairman. Robert K. Carr (a
government professor at Dartmouth College) was Executive Secretary.
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world thinks of us or our record.”41 Their discussion of why world opinion mattered is also of
note. “The international reason for acting to secure our civil rights now is not to win the approval
of our totalitarian critics,” the report declared. “We would not expect it if our record were spotless;
to them our civil rights record is only a convenient weapon with which to attack us. Certainly we
would like to deprive them of that weapon. But we are more concerned with the good opinion of
the peoples of the world.”42
The President’s Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR) made two policy recommendations related
to black military service. The report was direct in its condemnation of military segregation, calling
for “[t]he enactment by Congress of legislation, followed by appropriate administrative action,
to end immediately all discrimination and segregation based on race, color, creed, or national
origin, in the organization and activities of all branches of the Armed Services.” Their reasoning
was two-fold. First, “[t]he injustice of calling men to fight for freedom while subjecting them
to humiliating discrimination within the fighting forces is at once apparent.” This argument was
more ideological. Second, “by preventing entire groups from making their maximum contribution
to the national defense, we weaken our defense to that extent and impose heavier burdens on the
remainder of the population.” This argument, by contrast, was more practical. On similar practical
grounds, they referred to the postwar structure of the U.S. military. “The Committee believes
that the recent unification of the armed forces provides a timely opportunity for the revision of
present policy and practice,” they argued. “A strong enunciation of future policy should be made
condemning discrimination and segregation within the armed services.43
However, the report did not stop at military segregation. The PCCR also advocated for “[t]he
enactment by Congress of legislation providing that no member of the armed forces shall be sub-
ject to discrimination of any kind by any public authority or place of public accommodation,
41President’s Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights: The Report of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights,





recreation, transportation, or other service or business.” This seems more specifically directed
to incidents like the Woodard case – and, notably, was a proposal only for men who had served
in the war, not African Americans generally. Their reasoning was as follows: “The government of
a nation has an obligation to protect the dignity of the uniform of its armed services. The esteem
of the government itself is impaired when affronts to its armed forces are tolerated. The govern-
ment also has a responsibility for the well-being of those who surrender some of the privileges
of citizenship to serve in the defense establishments.”44 This falls in line with a long association
between military service and republican claims on citizenship rights.45
Whether Truman expected such a forthright statement from the report is unclear. Klinkner and
Smith are more positive towards Truman. “Truman seems to have hoped that the committee’s
work would help make public opinion more receptive to his civil right proposals,” they write.
“Thus he urged its members to come up with a strong report.”46 William Berman is more negative.
“In all probability To Secure These Rights went far beyond anything Truman and his advisors had
in mind when they initially commission an investigation of the problems created by the racial
violence of 1945 and 1946,” he argues.47 However, later in life, Truman reflected on the PCCR:
“I took this action because of the repeated anti-minority incidents immediately after the war in
which homes were invaded, property destroyed, and a number of innocent lives were taken.”48
This executive order, then, was clearly in some sense a response to postwar racial violence directed
44Ibid., 163.
45Historically, this existed as least as early as the high Roman Empire, when the distinction between legionaries
and auxiliaries in the army was partly based on citizenship. Citizenship was required as a condition of joining the
legionaries, while auxiliary soldiers were generally not citizens upon enrollment, but were instead granted citizenship
after 25 years of service. Mark Hassall, “The Army,” in The Cambridge Ancient History, ed. Alan K. Bowman et al.,
Vol. 11, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 336. For a discussion of the military service-citizenship link in
political theory, see Krebs, Fighting for Rights, 189-191.
46Klinkner and Smith, The Unsteady March, 211. Klinkner and Smith draw here on William E. Juhnke, “President
Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights: The Interaction of Politics, Protest, and Presidential Advisory Commission,”
Presidential Studies Quarterly 19, 1989.
47Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration, 70-71.
48Ibid., 57.
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against black veterans in particular.
The reaction in the white South was one of outrage, particularly in the Deep South. Missis-
sippi provides perhaps the strongest example. Acting Governor Oscar Wolfe was particularly
incensed by anti-segregation arguments. “[H]istory shows that where any nation has not prac-
ticed segregation of races, but allowed miscegenation and amalgamation of races, the custom
has always resulted in the destruction of the nation that permitted this crime against nature,” he
told reporters.49 The Mississippi House of Representatives issued a House Concurrent Resolu-
tion “Memorializing the Congress of the United States of the Grave Apprehension and Vigorous
opposition of the people of this state to the recommendations of President Truman’s Committee
on Civil Rights, and urging opposition to Any Congressional enactment of Said Recommenda-
tions.”50 John Stennis – who would win his first Senate term that year after Bilbo’s death – was
more measured, but nonetheless opposed. “Our customs and traditions may be assailed,” he said,
“but we can stand firm in our rights to make our decisions about such matters.”51 Despite this
hostile reaction, however, the PCCR did not ultimately lead to major changes in public policy.
Congress, ultimately, failed to enact their recommended legislation.
“Equality of Treatment and Opportunity,” Military Segregation, and Ex-
ecutive Order 9981
Despite the PCCR’s clear call for an end to segregation in the armed forces, Congress failed to pass
legislation addressing discrimination in the military. As with fair employment, it would take uni-
lateral executive action for any change to occur. This section proceeds in five parts. I first briefly
describe how the military establishment viewed black manpower in the immediate aftermath of
World War II, using a memorandum written by a civilian advisor in the War Department. I second
49Riehm, “Forging the Civil Rights Frontier,” 179.
50Ibid. Presumably “the people of this state” was assumed to mean whites.
51Ibid.
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examine a meeting of the “National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs,” a group organized by
the Secretary of Defense and civil rights organizations to bring African American concerns to the
military hierarchy. The bulk of this section then considers the meetings of the Fahy committee,
which was established by the president’s executive order to study the military’s racial policy by
holding hearings with representatives of various military figures, as well as concerned civilian
groups. This section ends by looking at the varied possible explanations for both why the execu-
tive order was released in the first place, and why it was implemented as it was.
How the Military Understood Black Manpower Postwar
The issue of military segregation was on the agenda from the start of the Truman administration, if
not necessarily in Truman’s mind, at least in the minds of some members of the executive branch.
Not quite four months after Truman became president, an August 8, 1945 memorandum from Tru-
man Gibson – a black lawyer who had been named chief civilian advisor in the War Department
by Roosevelt – provided a summary of the immediate wartime arguments being made against
military integration. “Since the expansion that began in 1940, the Army has been constantly faced
with pressure for a change of its Negro policies,” Gibson wrote. “Prior to 1940 there had been sev-
eral studies into the performance of Negro troops that served as basis for the several statements
and policies governing the employment of Negro personnel in the Army.” The “following basic
premises appear”: (1) “Negroes should be segregated into separate units” because of (a) some
statutes from the late 1860s that have (b) “proven satisfactory over a long period of years” and (c)
“because any other policy would have social repercussions and the Army cannot ‘get ahead of’
the country on this question”; (2) “Negro soldiers are not adaptable to modern combat conditions
because of certain racial characteristics” (as one commanding officer put it, “As fighting troops
the Negro must be rated as second class material; this is due primarily to his inferior intelligence
and lack of mental and moral qualifications”); and (3) “Negro officers have failed because of their
lack of character and the inherent distrust of Negroes for Negro leadership.”52
52Memorandum, Truman Gibson to General Porter; Folder: “McCloy Committee”; Box 14; RG 220: Records of the
President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services; Harry S. Truman Library,
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In summary, Gibson wrote, “The general conclusion that has resulted from these studies has
been that the Army should use Negro troops only in segregated units; that as few Negro organiza-
tions as possible should be established and that these should be noncombatant.” Gibson, however,
argued new studies should be organized that did not rely without question on old assumptions.
In particular, he advocated that an inquiry be made into “the present policy of segregation. This
is the basic problem before the War Department. As indicated above all of the preceding studies
have proceeded on the assumption the segregation is necessary. Experiences during this war in
Army hospitals and Officer Candidate Schools and with the integrated Negro platoons in Europe
certainly raise questions about the continuance of this policy which should be inquired into.” Gib-
son finally chided the Army for its rhetoric. “It has been often stated that the Army is considerably
ahead of the majority of most parts of the country in its handling of Negroes,” he wrote. “Unfor-
tunately, this statement is often used as an excuse for not changing policies. Future policy should
be predicated on an assumption that civilian attitudes will not remain static.”53 In an August 28
memorandum by Davidson Sommers – an Air Corps officer assigned to the War Department –
to Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, he wrote, “Although Truman Gibson’s memorandum
dated 8 August 1945 does not call for any action on your part, it raises the question of how the
Army is to handle its planning with regard to use of Negroes in the post-war period. It is pretty
well recognized that in this field the Army has not found the right answer in terms of the most
efficient use of available manpower.”54
The National Defense Congress on Negro Affairs
Much like in the 1941 case of the threatened march on Washington and the FEPC executive order
that followed, A. Philip Randolph again played an important role. Along with Grant Reynolds,
Independence, Missouri (hereafter cited as Records of the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Oppor-
tunity in the Armed Services).
53Ibid.
54Memorandum, Davidson Sommers to John McCloy; Folder: “McCloy Committee”; Box 14; Records of the Presi-
dent’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.
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Randolph organized a Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training in November
1947. On March 30, 1948, Randolph testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, telling
those in attendance that “Negroes are in no mood to shoulder a gun for democracy abroad so long
as they are denied democracy at home.” He told them he would “advise Negroes to refuse to fight
as slaves for a democracy they cannot possess and cannot enjoy.”55 His comments were not well-
received.56 But as Randolph and the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training
continued its activism, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and the National Urban League’s
Lester Granger decided to form what they called a National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs.
It was designed to allow representatives from civil rights organizations to advise the military
on how to deal with racial problems.57 It provides a useful background note to Truman’s later
executive order and the committee it would create.
The conference held a meeting on April 26, 1948. Kenneth Royall – the last Secretary of War
and by then the first Secretary of the Army – said the following:
We cannot, in particularly this stage, experiment. We cannot use the Army either to
promote or oppose any cause. And I want to say parenthetically that I fully recognize
not only the propriety but the necessity for the Negro race to insist on the abolition of
segregation. I have no lack of sympathy with it personally or from the standpoint of
the Army, but it is a question of timing, and I think we are blind to the facts if we don’t
face it and it’s a question of timing.’58
This led to pushback of what constituted “in the interest of National defense,” as Channing Tobias
– a civil rights activist who had served on the PCCR – put it. Before Royall could answer, Sadie
Alexander – who had also served on the PCCR – interrupted to state that African Americans might
55Cornelius L. Bynum, A. Philip Randolph and the Struggle for Civil Rights, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010),
186-187.
56Some reports indicate that Grant Reynolds (a Randolph ally) and Truman Gibson “almost came to blows” at the
hearing. L. D. Reddick, “The Negro Policy of the American Army since World War II,” The Journal of Negro History 38(2),
1953, 201.
57Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration, 99.
58Transcript, April 26 meeting; Folder: “National Defense Congress on Negro Affairs (1948)”; Box 26; Niles Papers.
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be just as concerned with “the eyes of the world in that we cannot practice right here the kind of
democracy that we demand of other people so we are not asking for protection for ourselves; we
are asking for protection of the American ideal.” Royall described the question as “political,” to
which Alexander took offense – but Royall never really went much further.59
As Royall’s time was coming to a close, Philadelphia civil rights activist Hobson Reynolds
and Howard University President Mordecai Johnson pressed their point. “We are here trying to
make a better non-segregated Army and to do away with segregation within the Army,” Renyolds
said. “Now, for myself, I am not for making or for helping to make a better segregated Army.”
Johnson then stated, “Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question. I don’t care whether it’s
answered now. The Army is undoubtedly aware, of course, that it has deliberately taken a view
on segregation which is lower than the experimental status of the pattern in the nation; that is,
the Army has taken the pattern that exists in Mississippi and North Carolina and imposed it upon
Massachusetts, Illinois, and Pennsylvania. In other words, the Army has taken the position that,
as far as it is concerned, there can be no experimentation in democracy in the Army as is going
on in Massachusetts, Illinois, and Indiana. Is the Army well advised? Has it weighed that matter
seriously?”60 Granger asked him to leave the question with the Secretary, but Royall spoke up.
“No, I would like to answer that. There are obvious ways that it has been given the most careful
sort of consideration. I will be back any time you want me.” With that, Royall left.61
The military establishment, then, despite the efforts of civil rights proponents like Gibson,
was not especially interested in changing its policies. However, this was largely a precursor to
what would come to be known as the Fahy Committee. President Truman issued Executive Order
9981 two months later on July 26, 1948. “It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President
that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services





is often taken to mean the order abolished segregation. However, as the debates at the Fahy
Committee hearings demonstrate, this interpretation of “equality of treatment and opportunity”
was not unanimously shared at the time (some still believed this could be achieved within the
framework of segregation). The second part of the order declared, “There shall be created in the
National Military Establishment an advisory committee to be known as the President’s Committee
on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, which shall be composed of
seven members to be designated by the President.”62
The Fahy Committee Hearings: Segregation and Equality of Treatment?
The February 21 meeting is notable for its discussion among committee members of how to in-
terpret Executive Order 9981’s implications – or not – for segregation. John Sengstacke argued
tearing down segregation was essential. “Those persons who interpret Executive Order 9981 as
not outlawing segregation in the armed forces are the same persons who warn that ultimately the
only solution rests in educating the people over a period of time,” he said. “They explain that
hatreds cannot be ordered or legislated out of existence. It will be wrong for the Committee estab-
lished by the President’s order to approach its task with a pre-disposition toward this idea.”63
Fahy raised other possibilities. “Could you tell me why the word ‘segregation’ is not used in
the Executive Order?” he asked. “If it is true that is the purpose and it is the President’s intent, why
was the word not used? Why is it left to construction and ambiguity.” Speaking to Sengstacke, he
said, “As I understand it, your proposal is that we should instruct the staff that it is the position
of the Committee that the Executive Order requires the elimination of segregation.”
62Those seven members came to be Charles Fahy (a lawyer who had served as Solicitor General until 1945 [and would
later become a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit]), Charles Luckman (a
businessman who had served on the PCCR [although the Fahy Committee’s report indicated Luckman “has not actively
participated in the work of the Committee”]), Lester Granger (of the National Urban League), John H. Sengstacke
(a prominent African American newspaper publisher), William E. Stevenson (President of Oberlin College), Dwight
Palmer (president of the General Cable Corporation), and Alpohonsus J. Donahue (“a prominent Catholic layman,” as
Berman describes him, who died in July 1949, prior to the Fahy Committee’s report). For Donahue description, see
Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration, 123.
63Transcript, February 21 meeting; Folder: “Transcripts of Committee Meetings–Volumes IV-V”; Box 10; Records of
the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.
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“That’s right,” Sengstacke said.
“Now, it may be that you are quite right,” Fahy said. “I am not now saying a word to the
contrary or implying it, but I personally am reluctant to make such a decision at this stage of the
work of the Committee as a matter of ultimate surety. I’d rather get the benefit of further studies
and further testimony in the light of the Executive Order before making a definitive ruling. I think
we need to hear further from people in the Armed Services before we make that interpretation.”
Arnold Palmer suggested not going so far as to assume outlawing segregation was required.
“I feel that if the word ‘segregation’ was substituted for ‘equality of treatment and opportunity for
all persons’ that we wouldn’t accomplish what the President’s intent is because the word ‘segrega-
tion’ would merely mean that you shall no longer separate them – period,” he said. “But ‘equality
of opportunity and without respect to race, color or religion is more vitally important than merely
taking the people and making them up together because there you might reach any kind of an
impasse. So, if I were to choose, I would hold on to what the President has said.”64
For the most part, however, these debates took place in conversation with the military. At
a January 13, 1949 meeting, Major General Dahlquiest declared bluntly, “We have to accept the
Nation as it is.”65 Dahlquist and Granger had an interesting back and forth regarding concerns
for white vs. black morale. When asked, effectively, why black soldiers should be expected to
follow the orders of white generals but not vice versa, Dahlquist stated, “We had a job of winning
a war; and whether or not White troops would have followed them, we are not sure. Our first
job was to whip the Germans.” Granger was not satisfied. “I have never discovered any record
about the Army being concerned about the morale of Negro troops who are forced to serve under
a White officer,” he said. “Their concern seemed to be about the morale of White troops who
might be assigned to Negro officers. There is an inequality. The concern is for the morale of
Whites rather than for the morale of Negroes.” “It is not a question of the concern of the morale
of either,” Dahlquist replied. “It’s a question, in our best judgment, of how we can produce an
64Ibid.
65Transcript, January 13 meeting; Folder: “Transcripts of Committee Meetings–Volumes I-III”; Box 10; Records of the
President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.
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Army that could defeat the enemy” When interrogated further, he suggested there was evidence
white soldiers would refuse black leadership, but black soldiers were willing to tolerate white
leadership.66 Military definitions of race were of course constructed. When Granger pointed to
Puerto Ricans and asked how skin tone might affect military categories, he stumped the Army
representatives.67
At the March 17 meeting, former Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy described the strate-
gic importance of the South – and, therefore, some placation of white southerners – for the De-
partment of War during World War II. For “climatic reasons,” McCloy said most training camps
were placed in the South. When Granger later quipped, “Maybe one answer would be to put a
quota on southern enlistments” – rather than focusing on black soldiers as the problem – McCloy
pointed to the importance of white southern manpower. “Well, southerners make good soldiers,
and when the country is in danger that is where they rush to the colors most rapidly,” he said.
“Enlistments from Texas and around always keep ahead of the rest of the country, and I don’t
know if you put quotas down whether you would get enough people in the Army. Again that is a
statistical problem that I am not qualified to testify about.”68
On March 28, Chief Omar Bradley, Chief of Staff, testified before the Committee. He elucidated
his understanding of what an Army is for. “Here at the beginning I would like to say that I
personally have no prejudice in this matter and my only concern is that nothing be done which
might adversely affect our ability to carry out our mission,” he told the committee. Regarding
the role of the Army, Bradler was unequivocal: “There is only one reason for an Army–National
Security.” “In re-examining Army policies as they affect equality of treatment and opportunity
for all troops,” he said, “I would assume that your committee is not only interested in the welfare
of our Negro minority but that you are primarily concerned with the need for full utilization of
66Ibid.
67Ibid.
68Transcript, March 17 meeting; Folder: “Transcripts of Committee Meetings–Volumes VI-VII”; Box 11; Records of
the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.
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the skills, talents, and competence of all our men in order that the Army might be an efficient and
representative protector of our nation. Consequently I do not believe that we should be charged
with being ultra conservative when we say that any changes in our present system should due
taken only after very careful study of the questions involved and of the possible effects of any
radical changes.”69
Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall, who had spoken to the National Defense Congress on
Negro Affairs the year before, elaborated on what he perceived as the realities the Army faced in
preparing itself for national defense. He went into interesting detail regarding the importance of
white southern manpower. Generally, Royall was similar to Bradley. “At the outset I want to make
it clear that in my opinion the policies which should be applied to the use of all Army personnel,
regardless of race, are those policies which best promote a sound national defense,” Royall said.
“Our basic mission is to win battles and to establish an organization capable of winning battles.”
He then turned to civil rights claims in particular. “Specifically the Army is not an instrument for
social evolution,” he stated. “It is not the Army’s job either to favor or to impede social doctrines,
no matter how progressive they may be – it is not for us to lead or to lag behind the civilian
procession exception to the extent that the national defense is affected.” Regarding the specific
issue of segregation, he said “the criteria must be what produces the greatest and most effective
use of all our manpower including Negro manpower, and what builds up the best morale and
spirit throughout the Army, so that we may place a winning Army on the battlefield. That has
been and will continue to be our aim.70
Royall then turned to white southerners and the tension between their prejudice and their
numbers in the military. First, he noted soldiers are merely ordinary citizens. “We must remember
that soldiers are not mere bodies that can be moved and handled as trucks and guns,” he argued.
“They are individuals who came from civilian life and often return thereto. They are subject to
all the emotions, prejudices, ideals, ambitions and inhibitions that encumber our civil population
69Transcript, March 28 meeting; Folder: “Fahy Committee meetings”; Box 2; Records of the President’s Committee
on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.
70Ibid.
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throughout the country.” Second, he pointed to the realities of space in military service. “Soldiers
live and work closely together. They are not only on the same drill field but also in the same living
and eating quarters. From the standpoint of both morale and of efficiency it is importance in peace
and in war that the barracks and the unit areas be so attractive to them that they will devote not
only their duty time but a reasonable part of their optional time at the post – that they will not be
watching the clock for a chance to get away.” This, he suggested, made segregation unsurprising
(and, presumably, unproblematic). “We must remember that in close personal relationships such
as exist in an Army unit, voluntary segregation is normal in ordinary civilian relations. And this
is true even in those localities where no type of segregation is required by law.” Finally, he turned
to the problem of white southerners in particular. “In this connection we must remember that a
large part of the volunteers in the Army are Southerners – usually a larger proportion than from
any other part of the country. Whether properly or not, it is a well known fact that close per-
sonal association with Negroes is distasteful to a large percentage of Southern whites.” This, he
suggested, might create problems for enlistment. “A total abandonment of – or a substantial and
sudden change in – the Army’s partial segregation policy would in my opinion adversely affect
enlistments and reenlistments not only in the South but in many other parts of the country, prob-
ably making peacetime selective service necessary,” Royall argued. “And a change in our policy
would adversely affect the morale of many Southern soldiers and other soldiers now serving.71
Royall finally mentioned, briefly at least, black soldiers. “On the other side of the question the
point is made that the morale of the Negro soldier is adversely affected by the Army’s partial seg-
regation policies,” Royall said. “Some have inferred that as a result of segregation the Negro is not
treated equitably and justly and does not have the same opportunity for service and advancement
as do white troops. I do not believe that there is any real substance in this inference.”72
Finally, Royall was clear to say segregation did not violate Truman’s order, at least in his inter-




“I’d like to ask whether or not the Army is familiar with the President’s Executive Order in
regard to equality of opportunity?” Sengstacke asked.
“I am sure I read it at the time it was promulgated, but I wouldn’t pose as an authority at this
meeting,” Royall replied. “I would prefer to read it again before I expressed any opinion on it.”
“In other words,” Sengstacke said, “there has been practically no action or follow-up in regard
to it?” When Royall said he wasn’t sure what was meant by that, Sengstacke said, “I look at the
order as an order to the Secretaries to eliminate what I consider to be segregation and discrimina-
tion and give equality of opportunity within the armed services – an order from the President. I
was wondering whether or not any action had been taken.”
“We think we do that, and we did it before the President’s order was issued,” Royall said. “It
says ‘equality of treatment and opportunity.’ As I think I said in my statement, probably before
you came in, I am convinced that we do just exactly that and have done it for some time.”
“Is it your thinking that you can have equality of opportunity within a segregated setup?”
Sengstacke asked directly.
“Yes, I do think so,” Royall said, “and I want to be entirely fair about that. As I said there is no
doubt about the fact that segregation is conducive to discrimination unless it is constantly policed.
I do not think it necessarily denies equality of opportunity. We have made a determined effort in
the Army to see that it does not deny equality of opportunity. I don’t know of any single thing to
which I have given more attention personally.”73
A bit later, when Sendstacke asked, “In other words, you feel that the Army is carrying out the





The Fahy Committee Hearings: Advocacy Groups and the International Context
While the focus was mostly on the military establishment, an April 25 hearing of the Fahy com-
mittee brought in non-government organizations. This is a useful site for seeing how advocacy
groups framed their civil rights claims in 1949, nearly four years after World War II’s formal end,
and as the Soviet Union was increasingly coming to dominate American foreign policy concerns.
The first representative was Meyer Bernstein of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).
The CIO’s first interest in civil rights, Bernstein said, “is in respect to the GI’s who have come from
the labor movement or who will leave the labor movement in the future to join the armed forces.”
However, the second reason was more internationalist in nature. “Our second interest in this mat-
ter is one of the general problem of strengthening the democratic processes here and at the same
time giving encouragement, lending sustenance to democratic forces abroad,” Bernstein said. “I
think that whatever we do here in the United States must be done in part, at least, by keeping
in mind the effect such action will have upon our friends in the rest of the world.” Bernstein de-
scribes talking with “union men” from various European countries, “and one of the first things
these people ask about is how completely do we practice what we preach about equality of treat-
ment, how thoroughly do we implement our democracy.”75
Bernstein also said that if unions and companies could overcome prejudice, the Army certainly
could. “It is true that the first few days you might have some trouble,” he said. “We had trouble.
I remember several strikes we had over the question of colored people using the same washing
facilities the the white men use in plants. But where the union and the company both took a firm
attitude that matter was settled and now there is no question raised. They all use the same. If we
can do that in unions, we can do that in American industry, we can do it in the Army.”76 “I think
the armed forces has reached the status and dignity now where it can ignore local customs,” he
said, “where we can have the same kind of treatment in a movie or swimming pool in Texas that
75Transcript, April 25 meeting; Folder: “Transcripts of Committee Meetings–Volumes XV- XVI”; Box 11; Records of
the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.
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you have in Pennsylvania.”77
The hearing also contained several statements that segregation, itself, is unequal, especially
in statements by Alfred Marrow of the American Jewish Congress and Harold Riegelman of the
American Jewish Committee. “If we ask, and rightly so, that every citizen of the United States be
prepared to sacrifice his life to save American freedom, we cannot in any way justify inequality
of treatment or opportunity in our citizens’ army,” Riegelman said. “Particularly now, with a war
against racism so recently won, it is important for us to root out any vestiges of that doctrine
in our own lives.” Riegelman also complemented Bernstein’s statement about the power of the
army. “The Army is of necessity a highly disciplined organization and one in which the soldier
or sailor makes very few if any decisions on a policy level,” he said. “The armed forces are in a
far better position to introduce and maintain an enlightened policy of racial harmony than any
civilian institution. It has been claimed that the army is not conceived of as ‘an instrument for
social change.’ But here there is danger, not of social change, but of social lag.”78
Executive Order 9981: What Did it Do, Why Did it Do it?
In summary, then, the Fahy committee hearings elucidate several aspects of how elites in the ex-
ecutive branch understood the relationship between military service, segregation in the armed
forces, and “equality of treatment and opportunity.” First, within the committee itself, the exec-
utive order was understood by some as implying an end to segregation. Sengstacke made this
argument quite clearly. Yet not all agreed. Second, within the military establishment, the order
was generally interpreted to instead mean equality in the presence of segregation – separate but
equal, effectively. This is clear from their statements to the committee. Further, like in World
War II, the military establishment was deeply opposed to any policy not primarily motivated by
military efficiency and victory. Third, the advocacy groups’ rhetoric highlights the shifting na-




World War II (“with a war against racism so recently won”), while Bernstein could talk about the
challenge of combatting Communism in Europe while infringing on black civil rights at home.
If it is easy to link the executive order creating the PCCR to postwar violence against returning
black veterans, the case of Executive Order 9981 is more complex, with several plausible explana-
tions for what ultimately caused Truman to act as he did. One possibility is political expediency.
The executive order was announced just twelve days after the close of the 1948 Democratic Na-
tional Convention – where Hubert Humphrey and other liberals affiliated with Americans for
Democratic Action had successfully strengthened the civil rights plank of the party platform to
include, among other things, “the right of equal treatment in the service and defense of our na-
tion” – in an election year when many political observers assumed Truman would have a difficult
time beating the Republican presidential candidate, Thomas Dewey.79 There were also the protest
movements calling directly for military desegregation. Berman argues this was a central factor.
“In all probability, Executive Order 9981 was also designed to reduce the possibility of an im-
mediate confrontation between the administration and A. Philip Randolph,” he writes.80 There
is evidence some executive branch figures supported this interpretation. On September 9, 1948,
White House aide Donald Dawson sent a memorandum to Truman with three bullet points: (1)
“[s]ince your executive order was issued all important opposition to the draft on the basis of the
Army’s race policy has disappeared. Philip Randolph and Grant Reynolds have withdrawn from
their Committee Against Jim Crow, and only a few C.O.’s and other war resisters remain in the
movement.”; (2) “Negro leaders and their white friends have been universal in the praise of the
order and in their support of the proposed committee.”; and (3) “[t]he Committee will have com-
plete minority press support. The Negro press, which had been conducting a vigorous campaign
79For an analysis of the 1948 Convention, see Kari Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South,
1936-1968, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001). For an analysis of the role played by the ADA,
see Steven M. Gillon, Politics and Vision: The ADA and American Liberalism, 1947-1985, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1987). See also Harvard Sitkoff, “Harry Truman and the Election of 1948: The Coming of Age of Civil Rights in
American Politics,” Journal of Southern History 37(4), 1971, 596-616.
80Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration, 117.
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against the Army’s racial policy has now abandoned it.”81
A second possibility is “Cold War civil rights,” with the strategic logic of appealing to the
“third world” hindered by often all-too-accurate claims by the Soviet Union about white supremacy
in America.82 Conceptions of a “world audience” to be swayed – particularly in a “world where
the dark peoples outnumber the white,” as a representative of the American Jewish Committee
told the Fahy committee in 1949 – became more common as a matter of rhetorical strategy.83 There
is likewise evidence this was perceived by elite figures. On July 25, 1950, E. W. Kenworthy wrote
to Fahy. “I do not believe that the prime motivation for adopting policies of equality of treatment
and opportunity in the services should be to make an impression abroad,” he wrote. “The fact
remains, nevertheless, that the country now is engaged in war in the Orient where the whole color
question is an extremely sensitive one. I can not believe that it is wise, when so much is at stake,
for the Army to continue to discriminate against qualified Negro soldiers and to maintain its tra-
ditional policy of segregation.”84 Yet a final possibility is the lingering postwar logic of the Second
World War. As the previous chapter demonstrated, the push for an integrated military began in
the framework of World War II. However, its ultimate achievement came during cold, rather than
total, war.
In the end, the best argument is probably a combination of political expediency with the varied
international contexts. While the former clearly had a major impact on the order being issued, the
order’s actual implementation did not coincide cleanly with any electoral pressures related to
81Ibid.,123.
82Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press: 2000). For a further analysis of the link between the Cold War and the civil rights movement, see also: John
David Skrentny, “The Effect of the Cold War on African-American Civil Rights: American and the World Audience,
1945-1968,” Theory and Society 27(2), 1998, 237-285.
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Truman. It was, to some degree, motivated by the persuasive claims civil rights activists could
make with reference to the international context. But given the push for an integrated military’s
origins in the Roosevelt era, this is about more than just the Cold War.85 Certainly civil rights
advocates were leery of being perceived as communists, and thus had to temper their claims in
this early Cold War period. Yet I argue more than red baiting was at play. By framing the early
efforts an integrated military within the context of the Second World War – when, notably the
Soviet Union was technically an ally – the limits of military republicanism more generally shaped
what arguments civil rights activists could persuasively make.
The Road Not Taken: The President’s Committee on the Exercise of the
Right to Vote
Finally, I turn to one last civil rights push that failed. From February to April of 1951, staff mem-
bers at the Truman White House scrambled to organize one final presidential commission before
the 1952 election season. However, a search for academic articles mentioning the “President’s
Committee on the Exercise of the Right to Vote” reveals no mentions of this effort in historical
scholarship. The purpose of this section is two-fold. First, I want to rescue this effort from the
archives. Second, I argue this failed attempt is, to some degree, indicative of the broader limita-
tions of the Truman White House’s civil rights agenda. Advocating for a careful study of the right
to vote in American clearly pushed at the comfort of southern white supremacy, which was in part
premised on the denial of franchise rights to as many African Americans as possible – an issue that
did not pertain, except in the case of the soldier voting debate, to veterans specifically. The fact
that a structure was being built for this – but it was ultimately killed – is a useful non-outcome to
consider.
Although downgraded in focus due to the wartime issues of defense industry discrimination
and military segregation, the right to vote remained a key area of concern for many civil rights ac-
85There were, of course, calls for military integration before World War II, but here I mean the 1940s movement
specifically.
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tivists. On June 27, 1946, A. Philip Randolph had sent a lengthy telegraph to Truman “[c]oncerning
protecting right t[o ]vote of Negro citizens in Mississippi[. R]eliable reports indicate that a wave of
terrorism threatens to deprive Negro citizens of their constitutional rights to vote in the July 2nd
primary. . . ” Randolph related this directly to wartime service. “I am sure you will agree that if our
great nation can send our armies to Berlin and Tokyo to maintain a democratic political system,”
Randolph wrote, “it is not too much to ask that a part of the Army be sent to Mississippi to restrain
the mad ranting and violent vengeance of Senator Bilbo and Congressman Rankin from intimidat-
ing colored citizens who have done their bit to stop Hitler Tojo and Mussolini in the interest of the
principle of one world democracy and peace.”86
There is an intellectual lineage to the idea within the executive branch itself, dating back at
least to the PCCR report, which called for “[t]he enactment by Congress of a statute protecting the
right of qualified persons to participate in federal primaries and elections against interference by
public officers and private persons”:
This statute would apply only to federal elections. There is no doubt that such a law
can be applied to primaries which are an integral part of the federal electoral process
or which affect or determine the result of a federal election. It can also protect partic-
ipation in federal election campaigns and discussions of matters relating to national
political issues. This statute should authorize the Department of Justice to use both
civil and criminal sanctions. Civil remedies should be used wherever possible to test
the legality of threatened interferences with the suffrage before voting rights have been
lost.87
It is certainly possible the discussion that proceeds was inspired, in part, by this section of
the PCCR report. On February 8, K. W. Hechler, an assistant to President Truman, wrote George
Elsey, another presidential assistant. “I think it is urgent that early action be taken on creating the
David Lloyd Commission,” he began (Lloyd was another presidential assistant, who seemed to
have taken a lead role in the proposed commission ). “Each day that passes gets closer to 1952,
86Telegram, A. Philip Randolph to Harry Truman; Folder: “Correspondence, A-T, 1946”; Box 1; A. Philip Randolph
Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as Randolph Papers). The text is
edited slightly, in places indicated by brackets, for readability.
87“Truman Library – To Secure These Rights, Chapter IV,” http://www.trumanlibrary.org/civilrights/
srights4.htm.
161
and there is a vast amount of work that has to be done if the Commission is to report by December
1951.” He made some suggestions regarding membership of the committee.88
On February 8, Lloyd sent a memorandum to Charles Murphy, who was serving as special
counsel to the president. “As you may remember, the President’s letter to the American Political
Science Association asked for the views of that group as to the desirability of appointing a Pres-
idential Commission to look into the obstacles and impediments preventing the exercise of the
right to vote,” he wrote. “[APSA President Peter] Odegard’s reply indicates that the Association
favors the creation of such a Commission, and outlines the nature of its task.” He also included
additional materials. “I also attach copies of the draft executive order and the draft Presidential
statement which were prepared on this subject some time ago, together with a tentative list of
suggested nominees for the Commission,” Lloyd wrote.89
Elsey’s files contain a list of proposed appointments to the commission – presumably what was
mentioned here. Among them was George Gallup, who had called the 1948 election for Dewey
and remained eternally on Truman’s bad side. “Let’s forgive and forget,” the author of the docu-
ment argued. “He could do constructive work on this one.” James Pollock – a past president of
the American Political Science Association – was recommended as chairman. For the role of exec-
utive director, University of California Professor Joseph P. Harris was labeled as “[p]robably the
best man for the job,” with Wesleyan political scientist Stephen Bailey as a second option. Other
recommendations for the commission included then-current American Political Science Associa-
tion President Peter Odegard, former Secretary of War Robert Patterson, Arthur Vanderbilt, Ralph
Bunche, Henry Ford III, and others – including “[a] prominent woman – suggestion to be made
by Mrs. Edwards.”90
Elsey and others drafted the executive order and even a statement for the President to make
88Memorandum, K. W. Hechler to George Elsey; Folder: “Internal Security – Commission on Exercise of Right to
Vote”; Box 68; Elsey Papers.
89Memorandum, David Lloyd to Charles Murphy; Folder: “Internal Security – Commission on Exercise of Right to
Vote”; Box 68; Elsey Papers.
90Document; Folder: “Internal Security – Commission on Exercise of Right to Vote”; Box 68; Elsey Papers.
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in announcing it (full text provided in the Appendix). The order began by making several obser-
vations: “widespread and intelligent exercise of the right to vote is essential to the continuation of
free institutions in this country and the survival of popular democratic government”; “the num-
ber of qualified voters who participate in legal, state and federal elections appears to be declining
rather than growing in proportion to the social and educational advancement of the population”;
and “this apparent lack of participation presents a serious problem to the operation of govern-
ment, and to the preservation of free institutions.” The order would create “a Committee to be
known as the President’s Committee on the Exercise of the Right to Vote,” which would be autho-
rized to study “the extent of voting throughout the United States”; “the standards and regulations
laid down by law and by the political parties with regard to the exercise of the right to vote”; “the
effect upon voting of larger requirements with respect to the exercise of the franchise and of phys-
ical arrangements with respect thereto”; and “to determine what measures can be taken both by
government and by private groups to increase participation in the electoral process.”91 The order
neglected to mention race explicitly. However, it is apparent that any examination into what steps
the federal government might take to increase voter turnout would inevitably involve a debate
about black voting rights in the South – particularly if such a commission included individuals
like Ralph Bunche.
The proposed statement for the President to make in announcing the order is likewise interest-
ing. “The basis of popular government is the participation of all qualified citizens in free and fair
elections. In no other way can the people maintain control over their government,” the statement
began. “Throughout the world today the right of free men to vote as they please is under attack
from totalitarianism. The value and effectiveness of democratic institutions are being challenged.
The fate of the free nations depends upon the extent to which their citizens exercise the duties
of free citizenship – the most important of which is participation in the process of government
through the ballot.”92 Here, the right to vote is framed in reference to Cold War concerns.
91Executive Order Draft; Folder: “Internal Security – Commission on Exercise of Right to Vote”; Box 68; Elsey Papers.
92Speech Draft; Folder: “Internal Security – Commission on Exercise of Right to Vote”; Box 68; Elsey Papers.
163
Yet, the rhetoric that followed was framed in a safer way that does not directly engage race.
“In this country, the extent to which citizens exercise their right to vote has been declining. The
economic and the social progress which this country has made has resulted in a more literature,
better informed, and better educated body of citizens today than we have ever had in the past.
Yet, while our people are becoming better qualified to take an intelligent part in their own self-
government, the number who actually vote is declining.”93
Then, in a manner perhaps inspired by the political scientists supporting the proposed order,
they turned to numbers:
Forty years ago a higher percentage of qualified voters participated in national than is
the case today.
In national elections only about fifty percent of the eligible voters participate. Since
1940 this percentage has been declining. Our present population is some twenty mil-
lion larger than it was in 1940, but the number of people voting in the last national
Presidential election was actually one million less than in 1940.
In state and local elections the situation is often even worse. Generally speaking, the
more local the issues are in any election, the smaller is the percentage of qualified
voters who participate.
This is a condition which can no longer be ignored or tolerated. It is a matter of deep
concern both to the federal and to the state governments. Declining participation in
popular government means not only a weakening in the authority and effectiveness
of government, but may also betray a decline in the sense of civic responsibility which
every citizen must have if our basic institutions are to survive. 94
“It is important, therefore, to find out the reasons for this state of affairs and to consider the
remedies which may be adopted both by the government on all levels, and by interested groups
of citizens,” the statement declared. “Many of the obstacles to greater participation in govern-
ment may arise from the laws and regulations required with respect to registration and voting,
both in elections and in primaries. The qualifications of electors are, under our Constitutional
system, established by the states, subject to the overridden provisions of the Constitution and its




to state. There is no standard or norm in this field which has the backing of widespread popular
approval. Much can be done through a pooling of the experience of various states in defining the
requirement for registration and voting.”95
While framed in technical language, this probably would have been resisted heavily by white
southern political power. However, the statement gave the more sympathetic example of mobility.
“Today our citizens are more mobile than they have been in the past. The 1950 census shows
great shifts in our population taking place in a very short period of time. The requirements of
defense will intensify the movement of citizens across state lines. We can expect a greater degree
of migration in the future than we have had in the past. Because of residence requirements and
the dissimilarity of electoral laws, this movement of our citizens tends to reduce participation in
elections.” Further, there were military concerns. “In the period ahead, when our defense needs
require the maintenance of substantial armed forces, and considerable civilian personnel overseas,
the problem of absentee voting will take on greater importance.” It also mentioned education:
“Aside from the obstacles which may be created by existing laws and regulations in a period
when much of the population is required to move from state to state, there may be other factors
which reduce public interest in government. There may be a failure in our educational system to
properly instruct our young citizens on the need of popular participation in government.”96
On March 21, Elsey wrote to Rogers Jones, Assistant Director for Legislative References at the
Bureau of the Budget. “I am attaching five copies of the proposed Executive Order establishing
a Commission on the Exercise of the Right to Vote,” he wrote. “I’ll be in touch with you later in
the day regarding the timing of this, as I understand that Key Westers think there is some urgency
about it.”97 On April 2, Elsey wrote Lloyd. “I understand that Fred Lawton is holding the papers
on this subject, awaiting an opportunity to discuss the Commission with Mr. Murphy,” he wrote.
95Ibid.
96Ibid.
97Letter, Gerge Elsey to Roger Jones; Folder: “Internal Security – Commission on Exercise of Right to Vote”; Box 68;
Elsey Papers..
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“Lawton feels, Roger Jones tells me, that there is some risk in proposing another Presidential
Commission to be paid out of emergency funds at this time, inasmuch as the Congress is in a
bearish mood on Presidential Commissions.”98 On April 3, Murphy sent a memo to Lloyd. “I
would like to talk to you about this – particularly since the President has some views about a
commission on crime,” he wrote. “It might be possible to change the terms of reference of the
commission to include a study of the influence of crime and money on local politics and getting
out the vote – and to produce a project that could not successfully be objected to.”99
However, some two weeks later, the effort came to an end. On April 18, Elsey wrote to Demo-
cratic National Committee Chairman William Boyle. “I am attaching a copy of a proposed Ex-
ecutive Order which would establish a Presidential commission on voting,” he wrote. “I believe
you know that this has been under discussion from time to time here at the White House.” Elsey
had two questions. “First, do you think the proposal has merit and should it be issued by the
President? Second, if you believe the President should appoint such a commission, what are your
suggestions as to timing?”100 While there is no reply from Boyle that remains, a memorandum for
the files written by Elsey is likely sufficient. “This proposal died a slow death due to the opposition
of Boyle and others at the Committee,” he wrote.101
There was, from the perspective of the time, some reason to think it was time to push for
voting rights. The 1944 Smith v Allwright U.S. Supreme Court case – along with state-level cases
like Elmore v. Rice in South Carolina – set a clear legal precedent against racial exclusion from
the franchise.102 Yet despite the leverage provided by such judicial decisions, the federal push
98Letter, George Elsey to David Lloyd; Folder: “Internal Security – Commission on Exercise of Right to Vote”; Box 68;
Elsey Papers.
99Memorandum, Charles Murphy to David Lloyd; Folder: “Internal Security – Commission on Exercise of Right to
Vote”; Box 68; Elsey Papers.
100Letter, George Elsey to William Boyle; Folder: “Internal Security – Commission on Exercise of Right to Vote”; Box
68; Elsey Papers.
101Document; Folder: “Internal Security – Commission on Exercise of Right to Vote”; Box 68; Elsey Papers.
102The Smith ruling had declared the whites only Democratic primary unconstitutional, and the state-level Elmore
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to protect black voting rights would wait well over a decade. It is of course important to not
read into the language more than is there. While the language would likely have been resisted
by conservative southern Democrats, the language likewise would have perhaps been viewed as
toothless by civil rights groups, as it did not say anything directly about racial discrimination in
the franchise. The analytical value of considering this failed effort within the executive branch,
I argue, is in pointing especially to how Truman’s primary civil rights accomplishments were
in response to black veterans, or aimed at aiding black soldiers, rather than black citizens more
generally.
Truman’s Civil Rights Rhetoric Post-Presidency
Since Roosevelt died in office, it was not possible for the last chapter to consider his civil rights
positions after leaving the White House. However, when Harry Truman left the White House
on January 20, 1953, it would be nearly twenty years before he passed away. Truman retired
to Independence, Missouri, to work on his memoirs and build a presidential library. He soon
came to speak quite differently about civil rights. An assessment of his later rhetoric is useful for
understanding why his 1940s civil rights liberalism was limited in precisely the way that it was.
In the lead-up to the 1960 presidential election, some national Democrats saw Truman’s out-
spokenness as a potential liability. “If anyone came into my store and tried to stop business I’d
throw him out,” he had told reporters. “The Negro should behave himself and show he’s a good
citizen. Common sense and good will can solve this thing.” When the Detroit branch of the
NAACP sent him a telegram asking about the quote, Truman stood by it. “Your telegram regard-
ing the statement which I made about sit downs in the restaurant is correct,” Truman replied. “I
ruling strengthened this interpretation when southern political elites were trying to find ways around Smith. For a
discussion of the aftermath of Smith v. Allwright, see Robert W. Mickey, “The Beginning of the End for Authoritarian
Rule in America: Smith v. Allwright and the Abolition of the White Primary in the Deep South, 1944-1948,” Studies in
American Political Development 22(2), 2008 143-182. For a discussion of how black civil rights activists in South Carolina
used the Elmore v. Rice case to argue against the state’s official delegation at the 1948 Democratic National Convention,
see Steven White, “Beyond ‘Northern’ Democrats: State Parties, the Democratic National Committee, and Civil Rights,”
Unpublished Manuscript, Columbia University, 2014.
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would do just what I said I would.”103 “Truman strongly disapproved of the methods of the civil
rights movement, the sit-ins and marches,” McCullough writes. “The leaders of the movement, it
seemed to him, were flouting the law, resorting to mob rule, which was not his idea of the right
way to bring about progress. He also appeared to take seriously the view of J. Edgar Hoover that
much of the movement was Communist-inspired.” Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson was
eventually tasked with keeping him under control.104 This is similarly reflected in Truman’s un-
ease with the 1963 March on Washington, where Martin Luther King, Jr., gave his famous “I Have
a Dream Speech.” “I think it’s silly,” Truman said of the march.105
None of these means Truman retreated from his advocacy of certain civil rights programs dur-
ing his presidential tenure. In a 1957 statement he prepared commemorating the tenth anniversary
of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights, he wrote quite straight-forwardly:
The Committee pinpointed the danger points where freedom was lagging:
Segregation in the nation’s capital; racial and religious discrimination in employment,
housing, and education; infringements of the right to vote, to serve in the armed forces,
to enjoy equal justice under the law.
Given the facts, the American people soon moved into action. Civic and religious or-
ganizations, veterans groups, labor unions and business associations, women’s clubs,
youth council – men and women in every walk of life and in every section of our land
joined to close the gap between our ideals and our practices.
Given the facts, the American people will always lead the way.106
Indeed, Truman seemed to remain proud of his civil rights accomplishments as president. Truman
had not changed. Rather, Truman viewed the 1960s civil rights movement as something less legit-
imate than the demands in the context of the Second World War and its aftermath. This, I argue,
can be usefully interpreted in light of the findings about the constrained impact of military service
103Telegram, Harry S. Truman to Edward Turnet and Arthur Johnson; Folder: “Civil Rights”; Box 14; Truman Post-
Presidential Papers.
104McCullough, Truman, 971.
105“Big Civil Rights March Is Still Silly to Truman,” Kansas City Times, August 24, 1963.
106Letter Draft, Harry S. Truman; Folder: “Civil Rights”; Box 14; Truman Post-Presidential Papers.
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on white veterans described in Chapter 3. Truman held a basic sense of decent treatment. Black
men who wore the uniform of the U.S. military, who followed orders from Army generals: they
deserved better than many, like Isaac Woodard, had received at the hands of white mobs upon
their return. Yet what they “deserved,” in Truman’s mind, was limited. Truman’s military repub-
licanism led him to advocate for certain civil rights policy outcomes. Yet as civil rights activists
increasingly came to focus their efforts on bringing an end to all segregation – including private
businesses – Truman’s civil rights liberalism began to reach its limits.
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated how the Truman administration’s record on civil rights can be bet-
ter understood through the lens of military service and the specific range of citizenship claims it
can privilege. Far more so than Roosevelt, Truman seemed genuinely affected when presented
with evidence of white supremacy’s violent extremes – particularly when directed against black
men who had fought in the Second World War – and his 1948 executive order combatting dis-
crimination in the military is almost certainly the most important civil rights accomplishment of
the 1940s. Yet compared to policy outcomes in the Johnson era, Truman’s civil rights agenda was
constrained, focused more on black veterans rather than African Americans more generally. The
ambiguities of military service – and the particular benefits it can be understood by some to be-
stow – offer an analytical lens through which to understand precisely how Truman’s civil rights
legacy unfolded as it did. By limiting their rights claims to those that would be ideologically or
materially related to the Second World War – opposition to segregation in the military, opposi-
tion to job discrimination in the defense industry – civil rights activists in the first half of the 1940s
shaped the rhetorical toolbox they would be able to use in the second half of the decade. Fear of
being labeled communists certainly played a profound role in limiting the rights claims of African
Americans in the late 1940s and early 1950s, yet the historical underpinning of the limited rights
claims made by mainstream civil rights liberals goes back further to the beginning of World War
II.
While I am in accordance with Klinkner and Smith’s emphasis on the central role of postwar
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violence against black veterans in motivating the Truman administration’s actions, their account
ultimately gives too little attention to the constraints and limitations such actions engendered.
More broadly, the Truman administration’s record on civil rights – and, particularly, interpreting
the motivation for it – relates to debates about liberalism, republicanism, ascriptivism, and exclu-
sion. Krebs’s critique of Klinkner and Smith rests, in part, on distinctions within the inclusionary
category (i.e., between liberal inclusion and republican inclusion); Klinkner and Smith, he argues,
focus more on the distinctions between inclusion and ascription. By dividing inclusionary argu-
ments into liberal and republican components, Krebs is able to make a suggestive counterfactual
regarding the difference between African American claim-making post-World War II and Japanese
American claim-making during the same period. Japanese American soldiers shared with African
Americans the experience of segregated units and limited opportunities during World War II.
However, in the postwar period, they lacked the political resources African Americans had built
over preceding decades. Yet their civil rights claims in the later part of the decade and early 1950s
were not met with the sort of red-baiting that black civil rights claims were met with, and were
ultimately more successful. One reason for this, according to Krebs, is that Japanese Americans
“regularly highlighted the valor they had displayed during the war,” while black civil rights ac-
tivists generally did not. Because of this, “[o]pponents of equal rights for African Americans thus
had rhetorical options that the opponents of Japanese Americans did not.”107 I am neutral on
this claim. However, the analysis presented in this chapter does add one wrinkle to his argu-
ment about the implications of it for black civil rights. Rather than republican claims resulting
in broader democratic inclusion, the evidence suggests it is at least possible that focusing more
explicitly on military service as a justification could have instead constrained the agenda further.
Military service can make for powerful claims on civil rights, as the Truman years show. However,
in compelling some outcome rather than none at all, it is analytically important to also assess how
arguments bound up in military service can be constraining as well.108
107Ibid., 167-168.
108The difficulty in assessing the effects of the military desegregation order is discussed further in the Appendix.
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Taken together with the previous chapter, this section has placed the executive branch response
to civil rights in the 1940s more directly in the context of the Second World War. In conjunction
with the argument about white public opinion presented earlier, a more complete picture of the
war’s complex effects on the politics of civil rights can be seen. I now turn to the conclusion, which
links these pieces together and considers their implications.
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Chapter 6
War, Civil Rights, and Twentieth Century
American Political Development
In the last chapter of his 1944 book An American Dilemma, Gunnar Myrdal looked forward to where
American race relations were heading in the context of World War II. “Now America is again in
a life-and-death struggle for liberty and equality, and the American Negro is again watching for
signs of what war and victory will mean in terms of opportunity and rights for him in his native
land,” he wrote. “To the white American, too, the Negro problem has taken on a significance
greater than it has ever had since the Civil War. This War is crucial for the future of the Negro,
and the Negro problem is crucial in the War. There is bound to be a redefinition of the Negro’s
status in America as a result of this War.” Yet Myrdal was astute enough to observe the nature of
this redefinition was not inherent. “The exact nature of this structural change in American society
cannot yet be foreseen,” he wrote. “History is not the result of a predetermined Fate. Nothing is
irredeemable until it is past.”1
World War II indeed altered the racialized limits of American democracy. The war’s effects,
however, were not uniformly liberal or conservative – or, alternately, inclusionary or exclusion-
ary – but rather multidirectional and far from straight-forward. The best assessment of the war’s
impact on civil rights must consider the good alongside the bad. The war against Nazism made
racism more intellectually difficult to sustain, but that did not mean some white soldiers could
1Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, (New York: Harper & Brothers
Publishers, 1944), 997.
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not interpret their battle against European fascism as a war to maintain their way of life, white
supremacy and all. The war corresponded with decreases in some measures of white racial prej-
udice, but it also corresponded with growing white opposition to federal legislation aimed at
combatting the evil of lynching, especially in the South. Wartime activists, fighting for democ-
racy at home and abroad, made it compelling for Roosevelt to issue an executive order combatting
discrimination in the defense industry, but the fight for a broader anti-job discrimination agenda
proved less fruitful for the movement. Truman’s 1948 executive order (which ultimately led to
the desegregation of the military) was an even more substantial civil rights outcome, but it did
not lead Truman to rethink segregation in society more broadly, and its impact on the broader
anti-segregation struggle is contested.
The war, overall, had a profound impact on the politics of civil rights in America, but its effects
were uneven. This dissertation’s purpose has to to offer a more empirically grounded assessment
of precisely these myriad impacts. The preceding chapters have dealt with constitutive parts of
this larger inquiry, asking whether the war led the white mass public to liberalize on race, and
whether the war led the executive branch to address civil rights earlier and differently than it
would have in the war’s absence. By examining both mass public opinion and elite behavior in
the executive branch, a question about the direction of change inherently arises. I therefore begin
this chapter by examining the pathways of constrained wartime policy changes on civil rights.
I also consider several alternative explanations noted in passing in earlier chapters, particularly
migration and political expediency arguments. At a broader level, this dissertation is motivated
by a concern with how “war and other social upheavals” can confound the traditional stabilities
of American politics.2 As such, I then turn to a discussion of how this study of the Second World
War can contribute to scholarly understandings of race and American political development more
generally. I also discuss how the policy developments described above shaped civil rights politics
in their aftermath: how did the wartime FEPC and the Truman-era struggle for military desegre-
gation shape civil rights politics over the long term? I conclude with a summary and discussion
of implications.
2Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (Boston: Addison-Wesley), 47
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The Pathway of World War II’s Constrained Policy Changes
This dissertation has made two complementary arguments. The first argument is that the im-
pact of World War II on white racial attitudes was more limited than many civil rights activists
had hoped, and than many contemporary academics have simply assumed. Looking at the white
mass public in general, while there is some evidence of shifts related to racial prejudice, there is
no evidence the war liberalized the civil rights policy attitudes of whites. If anything, there is
some evidence the war actually led to an increase in white opposition to federal anti-lynching
legislation, a result that is especially clear for white southerners. Attitudes toward the poll tax
simply remained constant. Looking at distinctions between veterans and non-veterans similarly
reveals several cases in which wartime service seems to have had no effect on white racial at-
titudes. White veterans were not less racially prejudiced, nor were they more likely to oppose
segregation. However, there were two intriguing exceptions. White veterans were more likely
to support federal anti-lynching legislation in the immediate postwar period, and southern white
veterans were more supportive of black voting rights in the early 1960s.
The second argument is that the war had simultaneously compelling and constraining impacts
on executive branch responsiveness to civil rights. In compelling some change to occur rather than
no change, the war also constrained the scope of the civil rights agenda to war-specific measures.
For the Roosevelt administration, this meant discrimination in the defense industry. In response
to a threatened march on Washington, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 on June 25, 1941,
which created the President’s Committee on Fair Employment Practices to combat racial discrimi-
nation in the defense industry. However, despite calls for military desegregation originating even
before Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt chose not to act on that issue. The Truman administration, by con-
trast, was more genuinely receptive to civil rights claims, but only of a particular type – of which
military desegregation was an ideal-typical example. In response to violence against returning
black veterans in the immediate postwar period, Truman issued Executive Order 9908 on Decem-
ber 5, 1946, creating the President’s Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR). He later issued Executive
Order 9981 on July 26, 1948, which created the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment
and Opportunity in the Armed Services, and eventually led to the desegregation of the U.S. mil-
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itary. These three executive orders are all important moments in civil rights history. Yet they are
also limited in important ways. The PCCR was ultimately not a change in policy, but rather a rec-
ommendation for congressional action that never occurred. While the other two orders are among
the most important examples of unilateral executive policymaking in twentieth century America,
they were specifically limited to wartime claims: protections against discrimination in the defense
industry, rather than industry more broadly; a gradual end to segregation in the U.S. military,
rather than U.S. society and business more broadly.
Any study of both mass opinion and elite behavior naturally implies a question about the
direction of change. In other words, was this a top-down or bottom-up process? Yet when the
focus is historical, studying the relationship between opinion and policymaking is a somewhat
more difficult enterprise. There is, of course, a large political science literature on the relation-
ship between public opinion and policy outcomes in contemporary American politics. While
acknowledging variation within the research program, the baseline method for assessing the re-
sponsiveness of policy elites to public opinion is to compare Policyt to Opiniont−1. James Stimson
et al. describe their concept of “dynamic representation” this way: If “by knowing about earlier
changes in public sentiment, we can improve the prediction of public policy over what we could
have done from knowing only the history of public policy itself, then opinion causes policy, and
this is dynamic representation.”3 Recently scholarship has contributed several theoretical and
methodological innovations to this research agenda, including the use of multilevel regression
with post-stratification to analyze responsiveness by state legislatures to state opinion4 and the
use of Literary Digest polls in the 1920s and 1930s to study the opinion-policy relationship before
more reliable survey methods emerged in the later 1930s.5
3James A. Stimson et al., “Dynamic Representation,” American Political Science Review 89(3), 1995, 543.
4Jeffrey R. Lax and Justin H. Phillips, “Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and Policy Responsiveness,” Amer-
ican Political Science Review 103(3), 2009, 367-386; Jeffrey R. Lax and Justin H. Phillips, “The Democratic Deficit in the
States,” American Journal of Political Science 56(1), 2012, 148-166.
5David Karol, “Has Polling Enhanced Representation? Unearthing Evidence from the Literary Digest Issue Polls,”
Studies in American Political Development 21, 2007, 16-29.
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One rather severe methodological limitation for this dissertation is the unavailability of stan-
dard measures used by contemporary scholars of responsiveness. There is not sufficient opinion
data on the relevant policy items, especially for Opiniont−1. This is largely consistent with Taeku
Lee’s argument that questions are only asked after they are known by elite audiences. Polls, while
indicative in some sense of mass sentiments, are elite constructions.6 The push against defense
industry discrimination is a perfect example of this. Gallup first asked about FEPC legislation in
1945, four years after Roosevelt’s executive order.7 Unilateral executive action likewise is distinc-
tive from congressional roll call voting, which lends itself more easily to an analysis of responsive-
ness, since members of Congress are associated with districts or states, where the strength and
ideological direction of public pressure can be more easily discerned.8
This suggests a more qualitative approach to responsiveness, which in part might exploit a
unique distinction between Roosevelt and Truman. While Roosevelt is reflective of all later pres-
idents in his approval and use of public opinion polling, Truman stands out as the exceptional
modern president who rejected polling. According to Robert Eisinger and Jeremy Brown, “Of the
ways in which the executive began to grow under Roosevelt, the assimilation of public opinion
polls and the advice that accompanied them as an accepted function of the presidency signaled a
6Taeku Lee, Mobilizing Public Opinion: Black Insurgency and Racial Attitudes in the Civil Rights Era, (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2002). Paul Lazarsfeld made just this point in a 1950 essay. Regarding the significance of pollsters’
work, Lazarsfeld wrote:
But there is at least one more aspect of this quest for significance. This has to do with the choice of specific
topics in even the simplest opinion poll. Even if we do not work for a specific client, do we not have a
tendency to ask questions which will make interesting reading in tomorrow’s newspapers? Don’t we
overlook the fact that, in a way, the pollster writes contemporary history? Might not the 1984 historian
reproach us for not having given enough thought to what he will want to know about 1950?
Paul F. Lazarsfeld, “The Obligations of the 1950 Pollster to the 1984 Historian,” Public Opinion Quarterly 14(4), 1950-51,
617-618.
7See Eric Schickler, “New Deal Liberalism and Racial Liberalism in the Mass Public, 1937-1968,” Perspectives on
Politics 11(1), 2013, 81.
8An analysis of the congressional soldier voting legislation, as well as unsuccessful votes regarding other civil rights
policy items, might offer a better assessment of the opinion-policymaking linkage. However, since with the exception
of soldier voting none of these bills were ever enacted, it would not be a measure of opinion and policymaking, per se,
but rather the relationship between the preferences of districts/states and the vote choice of their representative.
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historic change in the evolution of American politics.”9 Yet, as noted in Chapter 2, Truman placed
pollsters in the same moral realm as the Republican Party. In an undated memo to himself, Tru-
man once wrote “I wonder how far Moses would have gone if he’d taken a poll in Egypt? What
would Jesus Christ have preached if he’d taken a poll in Israel?” For Truman, apparently, the
leadership of great men was more important. “It isn’t polls or public opinion of the moment that
counts,” he wrote to himself. “It’s right and wrong.”10 One possibility is that Truman’s distrust of
survey data made him less attentive to it than Roosevelt, in turn making him willing to go with
gut feeling on civil rights. This would be consistent with relatively greater civil rights outcomes
under Truman, who seemed less constrained by concerns about keeping together the Democratic
coalition of northern liberals and southern white supremacists than Roosevelt. Yet it would also
be consistent with the limits of his agenda, as his gut feeling was that while violence against black
veterans was bad, “social” segregation was not.11
A second possibility regarding public opinion is that the war might have raised the salience of
race, even if shifts are heterogeneous. In other words, absent widespread liberalization on policy
preferences, the war at least raised the importance of civil rights, especially for those already
inclined towards racial liberalism. This was perceived by some at the time as well. On March 31,
1944, Charles S. Johnson read a paper titled “The Present Status of Race Relations in the South”
before the eighth annual meeting of the Southern Sociology Society in Atlanta. “There can be no
doubt that northern liberals, spurred by the racial implications raised by the Second World War,
are taking an increasing interest in the problem of race relations, and in the South as the source of
9Robert M. Eisinger and Jeremy Brown, “Polling as a Means Toward Presidential Autonomy: Emil Hurja, Hadley
Cantril and the Roosevelt Administration,” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 10(3), 1998, 254.
10David McCullough, Truman, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 914-915.
11Brandon Rottinghaus contests the traditional view of the Truman administration as being averse to public opinion
polling. See Brandon Rottinghaus, “Reassessing Public Opinion Polling in the Truman Administration,” Presidential
Studies Quarterly 33(4), 2003, 325-332. However, even if his administration considered survey research at times, it
remains the case that Truman distrusted the polling industry, particularly compared to Roosevelt, who embraced it.
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many of the racial attitudes and established patterns of adjustment,” he said.12 This sort of effect
does not require a mass shift in racial attitudes, but rather a propelling force to those already
inclined to pick the liberal option in a survey. An analysis of media coverage might be able to
better illuminate this.13
Overall, then, the war’s uneven – but still substantial – impacts on civil rights politics were
largely driven by national advocacy organizations like the NAACP, who framed their rights claims
in the context of the ideological logic of a war against Nazism, which prompted a limited but real
response from the executive branch. Yet even if public opinion did not directly drive policy, it re-
mains an important part of this study. It helped set the contours of the possible. Counterfactually,
had World War II in fact profoundly liberalized white attitudes, civil rights politics might have
looked very different. Yet it did not, and this unfortunate reality, too, constrained the scope of the
agenda.14
Alternative Explanations
This dissertation has explored race and civil rights in the 1940s through the analytical lens of
the wartime context. However, there are of course other factors impacting civil rights in this
time period besides the war itself. In particular, there are two related concepts: migration and
new calculations of political expediency a result of it. As described in the first chapter, about 1.6
million civilians migrated out of the South over the course of the war, with African Americans
accounting for about two-thirds of these shifts. By the war’s end the black population of the
South dropped below 70 percent. Not unrelated to migration were political calculations related to
12Charles S. Johnson, “The Present Status of Race Relations in the South,” Social Forces 23(1), 1944, 30.
13See Paul Kellstedt, The Mass Media and the Dynamics of American Racial Attitudes, (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2003). Unfortunately, this book begins just after the period my dissertation covers. However, replicating
Kellstedt’s analysis for this earlier period might be useful for future work.
14The null, occasionally negative findings for the white mass public are useful correctives for conventional wisdom.
The very limited distinctions between white veterans and non-veterans is also a helpful analytical comparison for the
actions, especially, of Truman, whose own military service, I argue, had a profound impact on his civil rights beliefs.
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growing numbers of black voters in northern swing states and what was often called “the balance
of power.”15
The Truman White House was familiar with this line of argument, as evidenced most directly
by the memorandum James Rowe wrote urging Truman to safely ignore the South and instead
pay heed to other constituencies, including black voters. “Unless there are new and real efforts (as
distinguished from mere political gestures which are today thoroughly understood and strongly
resented by sophisticated Negro leaders) the Negro bloc, which, certainly in Illinois and probably
in New York and Ohio, does hold the balance of power, will go Republican,” he wrote to Truman.16
White conservatives in the South likewise perceived this. On February 6, 1949, Louisiana Senator
Allen Ellender debated Hubert Humphrey at a roundtable discussion on Truman’s civil rights
program at the University of Chicago.“Both of our major parties have been doing all in their
power to catch the Negro vote in the North,” Ellender said at one point. “There are eight states in
the North wherein the Negroes are dominant. I will not say ‘dominant,’ but, however they vote, so
goes the election.”17 At a 1952 meeting of the DNC subcommittee on platforms and resolutions,
several speakers tried to use the balance of power argument to strengthen their arguments for
liberalizing the civil rights plank. A statement prepared by Adam Clayton Powell warned of the
prospect that “if the Democratic Party pussyfoots on the civil rights issue, the Negro voter will not
go to the polls at all.”18
15Popularization of the title was aided by Henry Lee Moon, The Balance of Power: The Negro Vote, (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1948).
16The memorandum is available online at “Oral History Interview with James H. Rowe,” Appendix B, http://
www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/rowejhap.htm#appb.
17Transcript of roundtable at the University of Chicago; Folder: “Civil Rights - Pamphlets (Regarding Civil Rights
and Civil Rights Report, [1947] 1948-1949) [1 of 2”; Box 36; Philleo Nash Papers; Harry S. Truman Library, Indepen-
dence, Missouri. At other points in the debate, Ellender was less composed in his rhetoric. When the moderator
suggested that Allender, like Humphrey, was “against white supremacy as a principle,” Ellender’s rhetoric shifted.
“White supremacy? Well, white leadership,” he said. “Now that you bring up the subject, I would say that the Negro
himself cannot make progress unless he has white leadership. If you call that ‘supremacy,’ why suit yourself. But I say
that the Negro race as a whole, if permitted to go back to itself, will invariably go back to barbaric lunacy.” Ibid.
18Transcript; Folder: “Democratic National Convention July 17, 1952 [1 of 3]”; Box 218; Records of the Democratic
National Committee; Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. For further analysis of the implications of this,
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Yet despite this, it remains the case that focusing on the war itself – including, but not limited
to, its interaction with these more easily quantified domestic factors – is insightful. Taken together,
these factors fit fairly cleanly into Robert Lieberman’s theory of political change on race policy. To
account for the “lumpiness” of racial progress, he posits three factors crucial for understanding
processes of coalition formation: (1) the “institutional setting of key policy decisions”; (2) the
“structure of linkages between racial groups and the state”; and (3) the “cultural repertoires on
which political actors draw to understand the status of racial groups in society and to define what
constitutes rational solutions to problems of racial conflict and inequality.”19 The institutional
setting of this project has been the executive branch. The changes caused by migration and new
political calculations can be understood as altering the structure of group-state linkages. World
War II, then, becomes a contextual factor critical in changing the cultural repertoire, albeit in a
more uneven way than often suspected.20 While the group-stage linkages aspect has been studied
in more detail, the importance of the war in altering the cultural repertoire has not been dealt with
as satisfactorily. This dissertation has been an attempt at providing a more empirically grounded
baseline for claims about the war in this regard.
World War II, Civil Rights, and the Study of American Political Devel-
opment
The project was initially inspired by research rethinking the periodization of the mid-century civil
rights “realignment.” Contrary to the standard focus on the 1958-1964 period, researchers are now
see Steven White, “Beyond ‘Northern’ Democrats: State Parties, the Democratic National Committee, and Civil Rights,
1944-1952,” Unpublished Manuscript, Columbia University
19Robert C. Lieberman, Shaping Race Policy: The United States in Comparative Perspective, (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2007), 10. He writes, “None of these factors alone is sufficient to explain patterns of race policy; together,
they point toward a convincing causal explanation of race policy and of the peculiarities of racial incorporation in the
United States.”
20Opportunities presented by wartime were also a factor in out-migration from the South, of course. War also tends
to emphasize the executive branch because the president serves as commander-in-chief of the military. In this way, the
war also shaped the institutional setting.
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looking back to the mid-1940s.21 While my project strayed from this focus almost immediately, it
still has several insights for such studies. I was initially struck by how this research, in focusing on
the role of urban constituents in the Democratic Party and “the ideological logic of the New Deal,”
largely placed the role of World War II on the sidelines, despite the war’s temporal correlation with
the proposed periodization. Yet the war seemed to be far more important than that. These scholars
often suggest as much. In one article, for example, Eric Schickler notes, “While lynching and the
poll tax were the main items on the sparse congressional civil rights agenda in the late 1930s and
early 1940s, discrimination in the U.S. military became more salient with the onset of World War
II.” However, while he analyzes survey questions about these issues in relationship to New Deal
economic attitudes, the actual causal role of the war is not the focus of his research.22
A similar treatment of the war can be found in Robert Mickey’s analysis of Deep South states’
varied “paths out of Dixie” after the 1944 Smith v. Allwright case. “Of course, the transition was
a highly complex period that featured many acute challenges from ‘abroad’ – important ‘exoge-
nous’ shocks such as World War II,” he notes. The war, he later writes, “disrupted agricultural
labor markets and sparked divisive mill strikes, and the national party appeared increasingly un-
reliable on these and other matters.”23 Yet while acknowledging the war’s importance, his article
is likewise not about the war. The war is instead noted in passing before turning to other vari-
ables. This dissertation demonstrates their acknowledgement of the war’s importance is correct,
but goes further in assessing precisely in what ways the war mattered.
This project also, of course, addresses several arguments made by scholars writing on war and
civil rights politics more explicitly like Philip Klinkner and Rogers Smith, Ronald Krebs, Daniel
Kryder, and Robert Saldin. This agenda can be broken down into two types of claims: back-
ground claims about public opinion that, while not the central focus of these texts, strengthen the
21For the traditional 1958-1964 account, see Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, Issue Evolution: Race and the
Transformation of American Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
22Schickler, “New Deal Liberalism and Racial Liberalism in the Mass Public, 1937-1968,” 81.
23Robert W. Mickey, “The Beginning of the End for Authoritarian Rule in America: Smith v. Allwright and the Aboli-
tion of the White Primary in the Deep South, 1944-1948,” Studies in American Political Development 22, 2008, 150, 157.
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tendency for historical institutionalist scholars to make claims about mass attitudes without ref-
erence to survey data; and more central claims about the relationship between social movements
and political institutions. Regarding public opinion, this dissertation’s implications are clear: If
scholars want to make even background claims about how the war affected white racial attitudes,
they should do so with reference to actual public opinion data analysis, rather than inductive plau-
sibility. In fairness, this is not among the primary purposes of these texts. Yet it often finds its way
into background claims, especially Klinkner and Smith’s book. Did the war“force[] at least some
white Americans to begin to reexamine the racial inequalities in their midst”?24 Had “nation-
ally public attitudes on race. . . shifted enough that [Roosevelt] could have been more outspoken
for reform” on civil rights?25 Did “most Americans” see World War II “as a struggle against the
forces of tyranny and prejudice”?26 While this might not be the primary purpose of Klinkner and
Smith’s book, they imply answers to such questions without adequately offering evidence. This
dissertation offers a more empirically rigorous account of such claims.
Regarding policy outcomes and the relationship between social movements and elite political
institutions, this dissertation mediates between the relatively positive perspective of Klinkner and
Smith and the relatively more cynical perspectives of Kryder and, especially, Krebs. In his review
of Kryder’s book, Klinkner argues Kryder is being unfair to the civil rights advances of the 1940s,
“using the civil rights advances of the 1960s as his benchmark for assessing the achievements of
the 1940s, which clearly do not measure up.” Klinkner instead is more impressed that any change
at all took place: “In some respects, the federal government’s response to civil rights in the 1940s
is like the dog that could dance – that he did so poorly is far less significant than the fact that he
did it at all,” he writes.27 Yet, as described in Chapter 5, Krebs offer several compelling critiques of
24Philip A. Klinkner and Rogesr M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America,
(Chicago: University of Chicago press, 2002), 137.
25Ibid., 199.
26Ibid., 207.
27Philip A. Klinkner, Review of Divided Arsenal: Race and the American State, American Political Science Review 95(3),
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the Klinkner and Smith model.28 My account, which takes into account both the compelling and
constraining impacts of the war, is somewhat more mixed. World War II was a critical juncture for
American race relations, but critical junctures need not be unidirectional.
Long-term Implications of Wartime Policy Developments
This dissertation has analyzed the effects of World War II on white racial attitudes and policy out-
comes related to race and civil rights. Yet while it is focused on the wartime period, the legacy of
the era extends throughout the twentieth century. The wartime and immediate postwar struggle
shaped civil rights politics in a number of important ways. The wartime FEPC’s contested place
on the 1940s civil rights agenda, relative to military segregation, highlighted tensions within the
movement, and it played a complex role in the broader economic turn in civil rights advocacy. Tru-
man’s executive order addressing discrimination in the military solidified the connection, forged
in part by the logic of the Double-V campaign, between the foreign policy goals of the executive
branch and the domestic policy goals of civil rights advocates. This deference to executive foreign
policy preferences by the mainstream civil rights movement would eventually lead to tensions in
the Vietnam era, when a younger generation of activists saw things in a much different light than
the NAACP.
Christopher Baylor describes how 1940 marked a turning point in the NAACP’s advocacy.
While the organization had been skeptical of labor unions in the past – in large part due to very
real racial discrimination in many unions – they nonetheless allied themselves with the CIO just
before the war. Baylor contrasts this alliance with the National Urban League, which allied itself
with business, particularly in terms of its donor base. Counterfactually, had the NAACP allied




view as the most important issues on the agenda – would have been even more difficult.29 This, in
turn, had implications for party politics. When the NAACP and CIO advocated for a permanent
FEPC over other goals, including the desegregation of the military, “[w]hatever lingering rela-
tionship remained between African Americans and the Republican Party was strained” because
the GOP considered the FEPC to be “the most unpalatable civil rights proposal on the NAACP’s
agenda.” The FEPC model was similar to that of the National Labor Relations Board, which many
Republicans despised. “One could have hardly invented a better institution for pitting the inter-
ests of business groups against the interests of civil rights groups,” Baylor writes. “Republicans
were as eager as ever to win black votes, but at this point, the most important item on the civil
rights agenda produced great friction with business groups.”30
Anthony Chen’s research makes a compelling case for the long-term implications of this mid-
century struggle for fair employment practices legislation. Chen traces how the successful conser-
vative battle against fair employment practices legislation inadvertently set the groundwork for an
affirmative action program these political actors would find even more objectionable. Viewed this
way, scholars can find “the missing link between the ‘forgotten years’ of the civil rights movement
and the puzzling rise of affirmative action years later.” In making this argument, Chen views the
wartime FEPC’s political legacy in a long time horizon.31 “The most far-reaching consequences
29Christopher A. Baylor, “First to the Party: The Group Origins of the Partisan Transformation on Civil Rights,” Stud-
ies in American Political Development 27(2), 2013, 121. Other civil rights advocates similarly highlighted the importance
of a permanent FEPC. At a 1952 Democratic National Committee proceeding, a statement by Adam Clayton Powell
conveyed his sense of the fair employment’s relative importance in the civil rights agenda. “Now as to FEPC, the num-
ber one directly substantive legislative matter in both House of Congress,” his statement read as he transitioned to the
topic. “I say ‘number one’ quite intentionally, because if I had to make a choice among, say, anti-lynch, anti-poll tax and
FEPC, and mind you, I do not have to make such a choice, and I will not; I will fight for all three and the others as well–
but if I did have to make such a choice, I would pick FEPC.” The FEPC, Powell said, “will rid us of the poll tax and
of lynching: For as you work side by side with a man you get to know him, you realize that he is a human being like
yourself, and you no longer retain the desire or even the ability, to deny him his vote or to hang him from a tree limb.
In short, knowledge pierces the iron curtain of bigotry, which is only ignorance under another name. Yes, gentlemen,
FEPC comes first. After all, what good does it do to a man to be told he may vote, or walk the streets free from violence,
if he cannot work and earn a living and stay alive to exercise those rights?” Transcript, “Thursday Morning session,
July 17, 1952,” Folder: “Democratic National Convention July 17, 1952 [1 of 3]”; Box 218; Records of the Democratic
National Committee Proceedings; Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
30Ibid., 129..
31Anthony S. Chen, The Fifth Freedom: Jobs, Politics, and Civil Rights in the United States, 1941-1972, (Princeton: Prince-
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of the wartime FEPC were not economic but political in nature,” Chen writes. Illustrating E. E.
Schattschneider’s observation that “new policies create new politics” and a more contemporary
political science literature on “policy feedback,” Chen argues the effort to save the wartime FEPC
“served as a catalyst for grass-roots mobilization”’ and “spurred a wider range of liberal interest
groups to collaborate ore closely with each other – in the name of civil rights – than ever before in
the twentieth century.” The wartime experience with FEPC led to “a specific regulatory ideal and
concrete legislative program.”32 Because of this focusing effect, the FEPC’s legacy “profoundly
refigured and transformed the political character of the struggle for civil rights.”33
While the wartime FEPC was ineffective in the South – and its effects in the rest of the country
were contested, both then and now – it represented an important shift from the 1930s civil rights
agenda focused on lynching and the poll tax to a new agenda that highlighted economics and
social welfare policies more explicitly.34 While civil rights activists in the 1930s and 1940s were
often perceived by elites as only being concerned with racial discrimination, per se, Dona Hamilton
and Charles Hamilton note they in fact had “two agendas – civil rights and social welfare,” with
the latter encompassing at least three components:“(1) preferences for a universal social welfare
system that doe snot distinguish between social insurance and public assistance, (2) jobs for all
in the regular labor market, and (3) federal hegemony over social welfare programs.”35 Wartime
ton University Press, 2009), 6.
32Ibid., 33. For Schattschneider quote, see E. E. Schattschendier, Politics, Pressure, and the Tariff, (New York: Prentice-
Hall, 1935), 288. For a discussion of policy feedback, see Paul Pierson, “When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback
and Political Change,” World Politics 45, 1993, 595-628.
33Chen, The Fifth Freedom 40.
34For an econometric analysis suggesting the wartime FEPC was “surprisingly effective” outside of the South, see
William J. Collins, “Race, Roosevelt, and Wartime Production: Fair Employment in World War II Labor Markets,”
American Economic Review 91(1), 2001, 284.
35Dona Cooper Hamilton and Charles V. Hamilton, The Dual Agenda: Race and Social Welfare Policies of Civil Rights
Organizations, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 4. When Walter White wrote Congressman Dow H. Carter
in 1937, Carter sent a succinct reply illustrating what Hamilton and Hamilton describe. “This will acknowledge receipt
of your letter of October 21st,” the letter stated. The Record will disclose that I have always been in favor of anti-
lynching legislation. I am hopeful that a satisfactory bill may be passed at the coming session.” White responded the
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activism had the effect of making the social welfare agenda more salient than before. However,
by focusing so intensely on the defense industry – a rhetorically convenient site in the context of
the war – civil rights actors were inhibited from pursuing a broader anti-discrimination agenda,
at least during the war.
The 1940s, Chen writes, were a “a genuine moment of historical contingency... For better and
for worse, Americans concerned about racial inequality and public policy continue to wrestle
with the unresolved legacies of battles initially fought more than half a century ago.”36 Chen’s
research, then, points to the 1940s as a moment when long-term political developments saw their
roots. This dissertation builds on his analysis by bringing the Second World War more explicitly
into the theoretical and empirical analysis. If the 1940s were a key moment where many of the
key aspects of twentieth century race politics were set into motion, grappling more centrally with
World War II – the dominant experience of the decade – is essential.
Military segregation has received less scholarly attention in political science than the FEPC
movement. This relative lack of theoretical engagement makes it difficult to know what to make
of it. It can be perceived by cynics as a small gesture, a move that transformed an institution
where the president had substantial control, but left segregation in society more generally un-
touched. It can also be perceived as a more crucial, central part of civil rights progress, perhaps
even a transformative moment in American race relations. A. Philip Randolph perceived it in
the latter respect. Baylor suggests Randolph “prioritized the desegregation of the armed forces
over the FEPC,” even being willing to settle for the Republican version of FEPC, which lacked
enforcement power (Randolph had talked with Senator Taft about promoting the desegregation
of the military). The recently-formed NAACP-CIO coalition pressured other civil rights groups
next day: “Thank you for your good letter of October 25. However, my letter to you of October 21 was not about
the anti-lynching bill but regarding the passage of a nondiscriminatory wages and hours bill at the next session of
Congress. I am not surprised that you assumed that my communication had reference to the anti-lynching bill since
that has been the subject of our correspondence for so long a time. But you can see from my letter of the 21st that after
all I can write about other matters.” Cited in Ibid., 3.
36Chen, The Fifth Freedom, 31. For a more general discussion of the 1940s Chen draws from, see Gary Gerstle, “The
Crucial Decade: The 1940s and Beyond,” Journal of American History 92(4), 2006, 1292-1299.
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to allow the NAACP to take over the FEPC fight in light of Randolph’s stance.37 For Randolph,
the two were deeply linked. How could the FEPC “criticize job discrimination in private industry
if the federal government itself were simultaneously discriminating against Negro youth in mil-
itary installations all over the world," he asked.38 While he saw a direct connection between the
FEPC and desegregating the armed services, he disagreed with the NAACP, the CIO and others in
his disproportionate emphasis on the latter. African Americans, he said, were “more emotionally
aroused” about segregation in the army “than by any other single issue,” because all families were
affected “through intense humiliation of their husbands, sons, brothers, and sisters in the armed
forces.”39
The military desegregation debate also had the effect of further strengthening the link, forged
during the Second World War, between the domestic policy aspirations of civil rights activists and
the foreign policy goals of the executive branch. However, by the 1960s, a younger generation of
civil rights activists would complicate the service-rights linkage in the context of a much differ-
ent – and far more domestically controversial – war in Vietnam. In 1969, the historian Richard
Dalfiume published an article about the World War II era military desegregation debate. In the
midst of the Vietnam war, the relationship between U.S. foreign policy and the civil rights move-
ment was starting to look very different. “Today the militant segment of the civil rights movement
deplores the use of colored troops in a war against the colored people of Asia,” he wrote. “The
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee has labeled these soldiers ‘black mercenaries’ fight-
ing an imperialist war. The left-wing Negro protest goes further, also opposing the draft because
low-income Negroes are disproportionately represented among the draftees. This means that a
larger percentage of black Americans are serving throughout the combat units in Viet Nam than
their percentage of the total population.” As Dalfiume knew, this was a substantial change from
37Baylor, First to the Party, 126.




the old – and much derided – quota system, which had kept the number of black soldiers be-
low population levels in general, but especially in combat units. “Ironically,” he wrote, “it was
only a generation ago that the most militant Negroes were fighting to overcome discriminatory
restrictions on their service in the armed forces. Then the cry was ‘the right to fight.’ ”40
While the right to serve in an integrated military was a key demand of the 1940s civil rights
movement, by the mid-1960s, military service would highlight a deep divide between the more
moderate civil right positions of the NAACP and a younger generation of civil rights activists or-
ganized in groups like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Congress
of Racial Equality (CORE), not to mention Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC).41 A younger, more radical generation of civil rights activists often
viewed sending black men to fight people of color in Vietnam as itself part of white supremacy –
rather than a tool to break it down. “Man, I ain’t got no quarrel with them Vietcong,” the boxer
Muhammad Ali famously said in February 1966. “No Vietcong ever called me nigger.”42 This
generational divide had implications for the relationship between the civil rights movement and
the executive branch formed in the World War II era.43
Groups like SNCC and CORE refused to go along with Johnson’s war. On January 6, 1966,
the executive committee of SNCC issued a “blanket denunciation of the war in Vietnam,” which
bluntly labeled the war as “racist and imperialist,” and further stated that their role “was not
to fight in Vietnam, but here in this country for freedoms that are denied here at home.” A
40Richard M. Dalfiume, “Military Segregation and the 1940 Presidential Election,” Phylon 30(1), 1969, 42.
41Daniel Seth Lucks, “The Vietnam War and Its Tragic Impact on the Civil Rights Movement and African Americans”
(PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2009). Malcolm X likewise was clear in his condemnation of the war in
Vietnam. Manning Marable, Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention, (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), 404, 411, 412.
42The exact wording varies somewhat. See Kimberley L. Phillips, War! What is it Good For? Black Freedom Struggles &
the U.S. Military from World War II to Iraq, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 324f98.
43This can be read, in light of my interpretation of Lieberman’s model, as a new uncertainty about the proper insti-
tutional setting, as well as the structure of linkages between these new groups and the state.
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few months later, CORE followed SNCC’s example and denounced the war as well.44 Stokely
Carmichael appeared on CBS’s Face the Nation in June 1966, and said he opposed the draft. “My
own feeling is that there is no reason why black people should be fighting for free elections in
Vietnam for some other people to get free elections when they don’t have it in their own coun-
try,” he told the national TV audience.45 Between 1965 and 1966 – the beginning of the escalating
war – African Americans had risen from 6.5 percent of the dead to nearly 21 percent, a fact that
exacerbated the urgency of what the younger generation was saying.46
The next year, on April 4, 1967, King spoke at Riverside Church in Manhattan, and came out
forthrightly against the war in Vietnam. He offered several reasons for his opposition to the war
that related to the domestic cause of black civil rights. “There is at the outset a very obvious and
almost facile connection between the war in Vietnam and the struggle I, and others, have been
waging in America,” he said. “A few years ago there was a shining moment in that struggle.
It seemed as if there was a real promise of hope for the poor – both black and white – through
the poverty program. There were experiments, hopes, new beginnings. Then came the buildup
in Vietnam, and I watched this program broken and eviscerated. . . ” He then turned to who was
being asked to bear the burden of military service. “We were taking the black young men who had
been crippled by our society and sending them eight thousand miles away to guarantee liberties
in Southeast Asia which they had not found in southwest Georgia and East Harlem,” he said.
“And so we have been repeatedly faced with the cruel irony of watching Negro and white boys
on TV screens as they kill and die together for a nation that has been unable to seat them together
in the same schools. And so we watch them in brutal solidarity burning the huts of a poor village,
but we realize that they would hardly live on the same block in Chicago. I could not be silent in
the face of such cruel manipulation of the poor.” Third, he referred to “the ghettoes of the North.”
44Lucks, “The Vietnam War and Its Tragic Impact on the Civil Rights Movement and African Americans,” 2.
45Ibid., 215.
46James Burk and Evelyn Espinoza, “Race Relations Within the US Military,” Annual Review of Sociology 38, 2012, 411.
However, this dropped back down to 12 percent in 1967, and by the war’s end in 1972 the mean average of all years for
black soldiers was comparable to their population size.
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“As I have walked among the desperate, rejected, and angry young men, I have told them that
Molotov cocktails and rifles would not solve their problems,” King said. “I have tried to offer
them my deepest compassion while maintaining my conviction that social change comes most
meaningfully through nonviolent action. But they ask – and rightly so – what about Vietnam?
They ask if our own nation wasn’t using massive doses of violence to solve its problems, to bring
about the changes it wanted. Their questions hit home, and I knew that I could never again raise
my voice against the violence of the oppressed in the ghettos without having first spoken clearly
to the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today – my own government.”47
Motivated in part by their experience with the Truman administration – whose Cold War poli-
cies they had endorsed, moving away from anti-imperialist sentiments espoused by those like W.
E. B. Du Bois – groups like the NAACP were reluctant to oppose Johnson’s war in Vietnam.48
“Like most Americans, they expected a quick victory and were preoccupied with the ongoing
struggle for Voting Rights,” Daniel Seth Lucks writes. “After all, military adventures had histor-
ically spurred advances in civil rights, and they were also sympathetic to the strides the military
had undertaken in the area of race relations.”49 Whitney Young of the Urban League viewed it
as a matter of practical politics. “If we are not with Lyndon Johnson on Vietnam,” he declared,
47Martin Luther King, Jr., “Beyond Vietnam: A Time to Break Silence” (speech, New York, NY, April 4, 1967), Ameri-
can Rhetoric, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkatimetobreaksilence.htm.
48Patricia Sullivan describes it this way:
Routinely tagged by Southern whites as “subversive,” the NAACP attempted to establish its anti-
communist credentials by distancing itself from groups on the Left active in the fight against racial op-
pression and by establishing procedures to investigate charges of communist infiltration in its branches.
At the end of 1948, the NAACP board ousted the uncompromising W.E.B. Du Bois, a fierce critique of
U.S. foreign policy and government complicity with racial case and injustice, who also clashed with
White’s approach. Pittsburgh Courier columnist and attorney Margaret McKenzie noted the inherent con-
tradictions of a civil rights group engaged in “acts of exclusion political grounds,” while conceding that
circumstances made it “inevitable.” But, she asked, at what cost? In the constrained and unforgiving
political climate of the early cold war years, the NAACP managed to secure its place in Washington as
guardian of a more narrowly focused civil rights agenda. Yet it made no legislative advances until the
late 1950s.
Patricia Sullivan, “Movement Building during the World War II Era: The NAACP’s Legal Insurgency in the South,”
In Fog of War: The Second World War and the Civil Rights Movement, ed. Kevin M. Kruse and Stephen Tuck, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2012), 81.
49Lucks, “The Vietnam War and Its Tragic Impact on the Civil Rights Movement and African Americans,” 350-51.
190
“then he is not going to be with us on civil rights.”50 Just a few days after King’s antiwar speech
at Riverside Church, the NAACP’s Roy Wilkins spoke at Yale University and said, “If I am go-
ing to cry about something, I am going to cry about the murder of Wharlest Jackson in Natchez,
Mississippi, rather than about civilians in Vietnam.”51 Not unlike President Truman’s comments
in his later years, both Johnson and the NAACP “shared a mutual antipathy to those who acted
outside the channels of the political system.”52 Black newspapers, too, were clear in criticizing the
anti-war civil rights left. The Atlanta Daily World called SNCC’s statement “deplorable, misleading
and incorrect,” and further declared, “Negroes must continue to be loyal to America, particularly
when they are on the threshold of receiving full equality before the law.”53
The shift from the World War II era – when civil rights organizations were largely united in
support of the executive branch’s foreign policy goals – was impossible to miss. “As the 1960s
unfolded, it would become unnecessary to equate Jim Crow with European fascism or Soviet to-
talitarianism; instead, some in the reform community would compare America’s misdeeds over-
seas with its domestic malefactions,” Jonathan Rosenberg writes. “The days of fighting ‘to make
the world safe for democracy’ were no more, as were the years of the Double-V campaign. In
the Vietnam era, a segment of the reform community could no longer claim, as reformers had for
decades, that because the United States was spending blood and treasure to uphold the demo-
cratic cause overseas, it was essential to obstruct a genuine democracy at home.”54 The civil rights
politics of the World War II era had linked civil rights activism to the foreign policy goals of the
executive branch in the late 1940s and early 1950s. By the time the Vietnam War came around, it




53Ibid., 3. The Pittsburgh Courier also suggested anti-Vietnam stances would harm the civil rights movement.
54Jonathan Rosenberg, How Far the Promised Land?: World Affairs and the American Civil Rights Movement from the First
World War to Vietnam, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 227.
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on domestic civil rights they so valued. Yet for a new generation of more radical activists – not as
tamed by the imperatives of the Cold War, and without a direct experience with Truman’s execu-
tive orders – supporting civil rights meant also opposing what they viewed as an imperialistic war
against other people of color. Sending black men to fight in that war was the height of injustice
– quite a contrast, indeed, from the “right to fight” advocated so strongly by civil rights activists
in the World War II era, when it was hoped that fighting Hitler abroad might help defeat white
supremacy at home.55
In conjunction, the political legacies of these two executive orders went far beyond their moti-
vation in the wartime and immediate postwar period. The shift from a more limited anti-lynching
and anti-poll tax agenda in the 1930s to an anti-defense industry discrimination and anti-military
segregation agenda in the 1940s was a significant one, pushing the civil rights movement to bet-
ter integrate economics into civil rights advocacy. The mainstream movement’s focus on FEPC
brought an economic focus on jobs onto their agenda. Yet strategic debates over emphasizing a
permanent FEPC or the desegregation of the armed forces created a new gap between the aims of
the NAACP and those allied with Randolph. The success of Randolph and others in pressuring
Truman to issue an executive order combatting discrimination in the armed forces helped bring
the movement’s disparate members together, but an integrated military came to mean something
quite different when black soldiers were serving in more equitable positions during the far more
controversial war in Vietnam. Linking the domestic goals of the movement with the foreign policy
goals of the president turned out to be a much easier compromise in the 1940s than it was later.
All in all, the wartime and immediate postwar civil rights policy agenda had complex, profound,
and in some ways contradictory impacts on the trajectory of race and twentieth century American
political development.
55This discussion has focused on black civil rights. For a discussion of immigrant rights and gay rights claims in the
context of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, see the Appendix for this chapter.
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Conclusion
To conclude, I take a step back. This dissertation has offered what I believe to be the best possible
empirical assessment of the Second World War’s impact on white racial attitudes and the exec-
utive branch response to civil rights. By examining rarely used public opinion surveys from the
quota sampling era, I have demonstrated that the war did not liberalize white attitudes towards
civil rights policy issues, although it did have some effects on measures of racial prejudice. By
taking a fresh look at the available archival evidence, I have demonstrated how wartime pressure
compelled and constrained the executive branch response to civil rights, reshaping the modern
civil rights policy agenda in its aftermath. In sum, this dissertation has several implications for
political scientists interested in American politics.
Methodologically, this dissertation suggests the benefits of better integrating the study of pub-
lic opinion with the historical study of political institutions – two realms that have traditionally
been rather separate in the political science study of American politics.56 To a large degree, this is
a result of the institutional development of the discipline itself. Modern historical institutionalism
developed in part as a critique of behavioralism (exemplified by studies of opinion and voting
behavior). Yet, while understandable from this perspective, this distinction between mass opinion
and political institutions has little intellectual merit. Given the substantial amount of research de-
voted to the Roosevelt administration by scholars of American political development, it is striking
that such relatively little attention has been given to the development of modern political opin-
ion polling, which arrived in Roosevelt’s second term, and the archival record makes quite clear
was used by his office.57 It is striking, too, that work assessing World War II’s impact on race
and civil rights has similarly mostly ignored the development of measures of racial attitudes co-
56For an argument in favor of better integrating them, see Robert Y. Shapiro, “Public Opinion,” in The Oxford Handbook
of American Political Development, Forthcoming.
57For a notable exception, see Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and
the War against Nazi Germany, 1941-1945, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). See also Chapter 2 in James T.
Sparrow, Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government, (New York: Oxford University Press,
2011).
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inciding with the war.58 More explicit analyses of public opinion data, in an American political
development theoretical framework, would be beneficial. The effort by Adam Berinsky and Eric
Schickler to clean up survey data from the 1930s and 1940s is enormously helpful for this, and re-
search by Schickler and colleagues on the developing relationship between civil rights liberalism
and economic liberalism starting in this time period is an excellent start.
Theoretically, this dissertation makes several contributions to scholarship on race and Amer-
ican political development. First, as scholars are pushing the beginning of the lengthy twentieth
century partisan shift on race back to the 1940s, this dissertation demonstrates the merits of con-
sidering the Second World War itself. The war is crucial for explaining the policy agenda’s shift
from the poll tax and lynching to discrimination in the defense industry and segregation in the
armed forces. So far scholarship has, at most, acknowledged the war’s general impact, but it has
not actually integrated it into these theoretical accounts. This dissertation offers a starting point
for theory building in that regard. Second, studies of war and the American state – which have
largely developed intellectually apart from the research agenda on the 20th century civil rights
realignment – should more critically interrogate the World War II case in greater detail. Shorter
treatments often miss several important elements, leading to readings of the Second World War
that are somewhat too simple and potentially misleading for larger theoretical accounts. Portray-
als of war as a necessary condition for civil rights progress tend to miss how the war constrained
what was obtainable, while more negative portrayals often fail to fully grapple with the potential
that, in the war’s absence, it is possible literally nothing on civil rights would have been done.
Such accounts should also be placed in greater scholarly communication with the periodization of
the civil rights realignment.
More broadly, this dissertation complements calls for greater attention to the relationship be-
tween war and domestic politics generally, and in American politics particularly.59 By demon-
58Of course, institutional work often assumes certain attitudinal effects – as argued earlier, these assumptions should
be more grounded in the available survey evidence.
59Ira Katznelson and Martin Shefter, ed., Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American Political Devel-
opment, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); David R. Mayhew, “Wars and American Politics,” Perspectives
on Politics 3(3), 2005, 473-493; Elizabeth Kier and Ronald Krebs, ed., In War’s Wake: International Conflict and the Fate of
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strating how the war’s impact on white racial attitudes was much more complex and nuanced
than typically assumed – and how the war both compelled and constrained the civil rights pol-
icy agenda, particularly in the executive branch, in a manner not quite accurately captured by
either more positive or negative accounts – this dissertation calls for greater attention to the “wars
and other social upheavals” Anthony Downs mentioned as exceptions to the sort of work his An
Economic Theory of Democracy set the groundwork for over a half-century ago.60 This matters not
only for those with historical interests in the World War II era, but indeed scholars of race and
20th century political development more broadly. Finally, this dissertation highlights the impor-
tance of contingency that David Mayhew describes in his article on wars and American politics.
Although perhaps not always easy to model parsimoniously, scholars interested in major shifts
on race and civil rights should take more seriously the upheavals of wartime.61 As this study of
World War II and black civil rights has shown, war’s effects on public opinion can be uneven and
often surprising; its impacts on policy outcomes both compelling and constraining.
Liberal Democracy, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
60Anthony Downs, An Economy Theory of Democracy, 47.
61Mayhew, “Wars and American Politics.”
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This appendix contains graphs for other demographic and political variables in regression mod-
els assessing the “Attitudes Toward Negroes” questions that can be compared to the graph of
southern residence on racial attitudes shown in Figure 2.1. The variables graphed include size of
place (dummy variable for very urban areas), vote choice (dummy variables for Roosevelt vote
choice and Willkie vote choice), gender (dummy variable for female), religion (dummy variables
for Catholic, Jewish, and “Non-church”), education (dummy variables for grammar school and
some college), and age (dummy variables for the 19-24, 25-34, 35-44, 55-64, and 65-plus age co-
horts). These dots represent logistic regression coefficients. Graphs A1-A4 are displayed on pages
221-224.
Chapter 3
This appendix briefly addresses a few potential theoretical and methodological objections to the
analysis presented in Chapter 3. While there are limits inherent to the nature of the questions
asked and the limited data available to assess them, I argue the results presented here are the best
possible assessment, and as such are an improvement of prior assessments grounded largely in
inductive plausibility.
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The Limits of Before-and-After Comparisons
The first hypothesis is assessed by comparing prewar attitudes to postwar attitudes. The “war”
is effectively assessed temporally by the years 1941-1945. However, it is of course the case that
other things also happened during the war years, and so this method is capturing those effects as
well. I argue claims the war liberalized white attitudes should at least stand up to the over-time
trends. If they do not – as in the case of policy attitudes like lynching and the poll tax – the racial
liberalization argument is unsubstantiated. This in itself is of analytical value.
However, a different argument is that the interactive effects might be too big for this to be true.
It is possible, for instance, that the war actually did liberalize civil rights policy attitudes, but some
other, temporally similar event led to an equal or greater conservative shift, such that the overall
trend is zero or even negative. This is ultimately nearly impossible to test, but is provides cause
for care in interpretation.
Question Wording Effects
The assessment of the first hypothesis likewise faces several data hurdles inherent to working with
old surveys. In particular, the lynching questions were not consistent in their wording. Ultimately,
I argue the results presented are still the best possible empirical assessment for a couple of reasons.
First, the question wording issue is a problem of sheer data limitations. Working with survey
datasets from this time period is often more like entering an archive than the standard, well-
organized set-up of contemporary surveys. Second, the findings are consistent with the lack of
liberalization in attitudes toward the poll tax (using equivalent question wordings). If I instead
found that attitudes toward the poll tax liberalized, but lynching did not, it would be tempting to
write the latter off as a question wording issue. However, this is not the case, and the lynching
and poll tax results are consistent with one another.
Quota Sampling and Standard Errors
An unresolved issue, in this project but also in other work, is that standard tests of statistical signif-
icance assume a data generating process that is probabilistic, which quota sampling is not. Thus,
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“the question of generating standard errors for estimates – at both the individual and aggregate
levels – should be the subject of future work,” Bersinky writes (2006: 518). In Chapter 3, I have
noted as “statistically significant” regression coefficients that are significant at the .05 level. This
has become standard in using these older surveys in regression analysis. However, for Figures
3.1-3.5, which plot aggregate estimates of opinion at various points over time, I have decided not
to include confidence intervals. I believe plotting confidence intervals would obscure more than
it would enlighten, as it would graphically imply far greater precision that actually exists math-
ematically. As such, I have tried to be careful in interpreting these analyses, speaking mostly in
terms of what the evidence is – and is not – consistent with.
The Effect of Veteran Status on Lynching Attitudes by Region
In the text of Chapter 3, I describe how the liberalizing effect of military service on attitudes toward
federal antilynching legislation was entirely a non-southern effect. Table B1 displays the results
by region.
Veteran Status and Post-Treatment Bias
The second hypothesis is assessed by regression analysis, where a statistically significant coeffi-
cient for the veteran variable in a multivariate model (controlling for other factors correlated with
racial attitudes) is understood as support for the hypothesis. Educational attainment is part of
the model. This should not be cause for much concern in the late 1940s surveys. However, by
1961, it is possible that for many respondents, educational attainment might actually be partially
a result of the “treatment” of military service due to the effects of the G. I. Bill. In an experimen-
tal framework, including post-treatment variables in a model can introduce bias. Tables B2 and
B3 of this appendix replicate the analysis using a bivariate model specification (i.e., the only ex-
planatory variable is veteran status; there are no controls). The results for the black voting and
friendship dependent variables are robust. For most of the other variables, the veteran coefficient
is still statistically insignificant. However, there is one difference: the veteran coefficient in the
model assessing the white-anti-integration protestors is now statistically significant as well. This
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is largely driven by the fact that only 2 veterans said they “agree quite a bit” with the merits of
the anti-integration protests, even if violence will arise. Since violence was primed by this ques-
tion, this would still be consistent with the findings on lynching: that veterans were more likely to
oppose violence against African Americans, even if they were not willing to support integration.
However, it is important not to use causal language too strongly. Although the draft was semi-
random, reasons the military used to refuse service included illiteracy and poor health, which
might correlate with racial attitudes and would be hard to control for.
Chapter 5
In Chapter 5, I note there are two possible ways of thinking about how to study military desegre-
gation. One potential inquiry – the one taken by this dissertation – would ask how pressure for
the civil rights outcomes in the Truman administration was shaped by the wartime context. The
second possible inquiry would ask how transformative these civil rights outcomes were in the
long-run (i.e., how does military desegregation relate to, and perhaps compare with, the Brown
decision, the Civil Rights Act, and the Voting Rights Act)? Krebs, for example, takes the view that
military desegregation’s longer-term effects are over-stated. Others, however, believe its implica-
tions were substantial.
This dissertation ends with the Truman administration. As such, I ultimately makes no em-
pirical claim about how transformative the 1948 executive order was in the decades to come. It
is possible that military desegregation was a forceful blow to white supremacy with long-lasting
reverberations. This argument would go something like this: The military, as a total institution,
was able to force white soldiers to salute black superiors. The military likewise increased educa-
tion levels among southern black recruits, which in turn might have prompted the sort of engaged
civil rights activism Parker and others describe in the postwar South.
I am neutral on this claim. I argue, rather, that even if this is true, it is still analytically the case
that the war constrained the agenda, even if such a focusing drive ended up being good for the
broader goals of the civil rights movement. My focus is in delineating how the wartime context,
in compelling something to happen, constrained the scope so that military segregation became
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such an appealing focus, rather than something else. It can still be the case that military desegre-
gation was transformative (alternately, it can still be the case that it was not as transformative as
many hoped). Either way, it is important, I think, to more explicitly consider the ways in which
war compels and also constrains, regardless of one’s answer to the larger second question. In
that sense, my project is complementary to, rather than crucial of, disparate assessment’s of the
executive order’s long-term impact.
Texts Referenced in Chapter 5
In Chapter 5, I also described a failed effort in the Truman White House to form the President’s
Committee on the Exercise of the Right to Vote. In my archival research, I found a draft of the
proposed executive order establishing such a committee, as well as a draft of a statement President
Truman might make if such an executive order were signed. I reproduce these documents here for
reference.
Draft of the Proposed Executive Order
Whereas the widespread and intelligent exercise of the right to vote is essential to the
continuation of free institutions in this country and the survival of popular democratic
government; and
Whereas the number of qualified voters who participate in legal, state and federal
elections appears to be declining rather than growing in proportion to the social and
educational advancement of the population; and
Whereas this apparent lack of participation presents a serious problem to the operation
of government, and to the preservation of free institutions;
Now therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States
by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
1. There is hereby created a Committee to be known as the President’s Committee on
the Exercise of the Right to Vote, which shall be composed of the following named
persons who shall serve without compensation.
2. The Committee is authorized on behalf of the President to inquire into:
1. the extent of voting throughout the United States;
2. the standards and regulations laid down by law and by the political parties with
regard to the exercise of the right to vote;
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3. the effect upon voting of larger requirements with respect to the exercise of the
ranches and of physical arrangements with respect thereto; and
4. to determine what measures can be taken both by government and by private
groups to increase participation in the electoral process;
3. The Committee should make a report of its studies to the President in writing, on or
before December 1, 1951, and may make such other reports as it deems appropriate.
4. All executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government are authorized
and directed to cooperate with the Committee in its work, and to furnish the Com-
mittee such information or the services of such persons as the Committee may require
in the performance of its duties. When requested by the Committee to do so, persons
employed in any of the executive departments and agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment shall testify before the Committee and shall make available for the use of the
Committee such documents and other information as the Committee may require.
Draft of Statement for President Truman to Make
STATEMENT ON A COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE
The basis of popular government is the participation of all qualified citizens in free and
fair elections. In no other way can the people maintain control over their government.
Throughout the world today the right of free men to vote as they please is under attack
from totalitarianism. The value and effectiveness of democratic institutions are being
challenged. The fate of the free nations depends upon the extent to which their citizens
exercise the duties of free citizenship – the most important of which is participation in
the process of government through the ballot.
In this country, the extent to which citizens exercise their right to vote has been declin-
ing. The economic and the social progress which this country has made has resulted
in a more literature, better informed, and better educated body of citizens today than
we have ever had in the past. Yet, while our people are becoming better qualified to
take an intelligent part in their own self-government, the number who actually vote is
declining.
Forty years ago a higher percentage of qualified voters participated in national than is
the case today.
In national elections only about fifty percent of the eligible voters participate. Since
1940 this percentage has been declining. Our present population is some twenty mil-
lion larger than it was in 1940, but the number of people voting in the last national
Presidential election was actually one million less than in 1940.
In state and local elections the situation is often even worse. Generally speaking, the
more local the issues are in any election, the smaller is the percentage of qualified
voters who participate.
This is a condition which can no longer be ignored or tolerated. It is a matter of deep
concern both to the federal and to the state governments. Declining participation in
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popular government means not only a weakening in the authority and effectiveness
of government, but may also betray a decline in the sense of civic responsibility which
every citizen must have if our basic institutions are to survive.
It is important, therefore, to find out the reasons for this state of affairs and to consider
the remedies which may be adopted both by the government on all levels, and by
interested groups of citizens.
Many of the obstacles to greater participation in government may arise from the laws
and regulations required with respect to registration and voting, both in elections and
in primaries. The qualifications of electors are, under our Constitutional system, es-
tablished by the states, subject to the overridden provisions of the Constitution and its
amendments. The requirements for the registration and voting of citizens vary widely
from state to state. There is no standard or norm in this field which has the backing of
widespread popular approval. Much can be done through a pooling of the experience
of various states in defining the requirement for registration and voting.
Today our citizens are more mobile than they have been in the past. The 1950 census
shows great shifts in our population taking place in a very short period of time. The
requirements of defense will intensify the movement of citizens across state lines. We
can expect a greater degree of migration in the future than we have had in the past. Be-
cause of residence requirements and the dissimilarity of electoral laws, this movement
of our citizens tends to reduce participation in elections.
In the period ahead, when our defense needs require the maintenance of substantial
armed forces, and considerable civilian personnel overseas, the problem of absentee
voting will take on greater importance.
Aside from the obstacles which may be created by existing laws and regulations in a
period when much of the population is required to move from state to state, there may
be other factors which reduce public interest in government. There may be a failure in
our educational system to properly instruct our young citizens on the need of popular
participation in government.
In order to ascertain the true facts about the exercise of the electoral franchise, I have
today appointed a committee on the Exercise of the Right to Vote, to investigate and
to make recommendations for future action. This is a bipartisan group, composed of
citizens drawn from all walks of lief and from both of our major political parties. I
have asked them to report to me on the subject of their inquiry by December 1, 1951.
I have asked this Committee to look into the following main points:
1. The extent of popular participation in voting throughout the United States in elec-
tions and primaries and in connection with state and local as well as federal offices.
2. To examine the rights and regulations affecting voting which are presently laid
down by the Constitution, federal law, state law, judicial decisions, and the rules and
regulations of political parties.
3. To examine the effect upon voting of specific registration and residence require-
ments, absentee voting requirements, the qualifications established for voters, and pro-
tection of the privacy of the ballot.
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4. To consider the effect upon voting of physical arrangements, such as the number
and accessibility of boring places, voting hours, etc.
5. To examine the various proposals for increasing participating in voting by legal
inducements, or by penalties, or by other means.
Chapter 6
Immigration, Gay Rights, and the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
Today the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been accompanied by claims about military service
and civil rights, but more related to immigrant rights claims then black civil rights. The story
of Marine Lance Cpl. José Gutiérrez is reflective of this. When Gutiérrez was 14 years old, he
left Guatemala for the United States. Gutiérrez, whose parents were both dead, hopped freight
trains through Mexico, only to be only to be detained by U.S. immigration authorities when he
crossed into California. Since the U.S. government does not deport Guatemalan minors who arrive
without family, he was instead made a ward of the Los Angeles Juvenile Court, and placed in a
series of group and foster homes. He received his residency documents when he turned 18, and
he soon joined the Marine Corps. According to the adult daughter of the family that last fostered
Gutiérrez, he “wanted to give the United States what the United States gave to him.” On March
21, 2003, Marine Lance Cpl. Gutiérrez became one of the first U.S. servicemen killed in the war
in Iraq. He was 22 years old. After his death, the U.S. government granted him posthumous
citizenship because of the military service. By March 29, three more American soldiers were killed
who, though the wore the uniform of the U.S. military, were not legally citizens at the time of
their deaths. They were Marine Lance Cpl. Jesús Suárez del Solar, Cpl. José Angel Garibay, and
Army Pfc. Diego Rincón. They, too, were granted posthumous citizenship in the aftermath of their
deaths in battle. See Hector Amaya, “Dying American or the Violence of Citizenship: Latinos in
Iraq,” Latino Studies 5, 2007; “Guatemala native put off college to join Marines,” USA Today.
As their stories demonstrates, the service-rights linkage still exists, and it pertains not only to
the inclusion of African Americans. As debates about undocumented immigrants and a “path
to citizenship” continue in American politics, similar arguments can be found in contemporary
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discourse on undocumented immigrants and citizenship rights. On the eve of the war in Iraq,
there were 37,000 non-citizens on active duty in the U.S. military, with another nearly 12,000 in
the selected reserves and a final 8,000 in the inactive national guard and ready reserves. See Mar-
garet Mikyung Lee and Ruth Ellen Wasem, Expedited Citizenship Through Military Service: Policy and
Issues, CRS Report RL31884 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Ser-
vice, September 30, 2003). While African Americans were actually somewhat under-represented
among the Americans who died in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2003 to 2009, Latinos were actu-
ally over-represented. “Compared with the debates about blacks killed in Vietnam,” Burk and
Espinoza write, “Hispanic deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan have generated little controversy.” See
Burk and Espinoza, “Race Relations Within the US Military,” 411. Of course, the vast majority of
Latino soldiers who died in these conflicts were U.S. citizens.
In November 2007, Democracy Corps asked whether Americans favor or oppose “[p]rovid[ing]
expedited citizenship to legal immigrants who serve in the US (United States) military.” Seventy-
six percent of respondents said they were in favor, including 52 percent who said they “strongly”
favored such a policy. See Democracy Corps Poll, Nov, 2007, iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center
for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.
edu.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html. Given such pub-
lic sentiment, it is perhaps not surprising that the DREAM Act proposal includes serving in the
armed forces as one step towards permanent residency for non-citizens. In December 2010, the
Defense Department released a press release stating the DREAM Act’s passage “would expand
the eligible recruiting pool for the U.S. military.” The press release quoted Clifford Stanley, un-
dersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, as stating, “The department supports those
elements of the DREAM Act that provide children of nonresident immigrants a clear path to
U.S. citizenship through service in the military.” He continued: “Throughout past and current
conflicts, those who are not yet citizens have answered the call to defend their adopted nation.
Allowing DREAM Act-eligible youth the opportunity to serve this nation would continue this
tradition of service, while expanding the market of high-quality patriotic youth, to the advan-
tage of military recruitment and readiness.” See “DREAM Act Would Expand Recruiting Pool,”
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http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=61928. Of course, the language
of the military establishment – “expanding the market of high-quality patriotic youth, to the ad-
vantage of military recruitment” – is a world of difference from the language of activists who view
citizenship rights as human rights. If permanent residency – and, perhaps, citizenship down the
road – is earned through something like military service, this widely supported policy might well
take the place of advocacy for broader citizenship claims based on more universalistic inclusion.
There are, of course, several important distinctions between black civil rights during the Second
World War and the rights claims of immigrant groups in the context of the war in Iraq. In terms of
both scope and public support, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are far more comparable to the
Vietnam War than they are to World War II. The war in Iraq became deeply unpopular with the
American public, more like the progression of the Vietnam war than the Second World War. The
absence of a draft is likewise an important distinction, though of course reasonable arguments
can be made that the “all-volunteer army” is compelled somewhat by circumstance and lack of
alternative opportunities. Further, debates about the rights of non-citizens vs. the citizenship
rights of a marginalized group that, technically at least, possessed legal citizenship are not quite
identical. This, in a sense, means the rights claims made plausible by the logic of the Second
World War are not necessarily the best guide for present-day civil rights strategists. World War II’s
characteristics were in some ways unique – its totality, its clearly racist enemy in Nazi Germany,
and its widespread support after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. In contexts defined by their very
contentiousness and lack of totality, rights claims are much different. However, there is perhaps
at least one lesson. While it may be tempting to frame claims about the rights of citizenship in a
liberal polity in republican terms of military service and valor, the results of this rhetorical choice
are often far from straight-forward in reality. War and democratic inclusion are intricately bound
together, but not necessarily in a clear, linear manner.
Of course, similar claims were also made regarding gay soldiers in the context of debates about
the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy. This issue has generated spirited debate between conservatives
and radicals in the gay rights movement. The conservative writer Andrew Sullivan called for a gay
rights focus on the right to marriage and the right to serve in the military in the 1990s. See Andrew
218
Sullivan, Virtually Normal: An Argument About Homosexuality, (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
Scholars more in the critical theory tradition have offered several critiques of the mainstream gay
rights movement in this spirit. See, for example, Dean Spade, “Under the Cover of Gay Rights,”
N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change 37(1), 2013, 79-100.
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Adjusted R2 0.01 -0.01
N 680 101
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Pseudo R2 0.007 0.033
Log likelihood -67.55 -91.08
N 137 144
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B3: Negro Political Participation Study White Sample, Ordered Probit Models, 1961 (Bivari-
ate)
Segregation Segregation Black Sit-ins Anti- All
1 2 Voting Integration Alike
Veteran -0.06 -0.30 -0.81∗∗∗ -0.19 0.46∗ 0.38
(0.19) (0.21) (0.24) (0.19) (0.23) (0.22)
Cut 1 -1.59∗∗∗ -1.51∗∗∗ 0.28∗ -2.10∗∗∗ -1.04∗∗∗ -1.04∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.18) (0.14) (0.26) (0.16) (0.16)
Cut 2 -1.01∗∗∗ -0.48∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ -1.44∗∗∗ -0.71∗∗∗ -0.83∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15)
Cut 3 0.42∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ -0.93∗∗∗ -0.38∗∗ -0.40∗∗
(0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Cut 4 0.61∗∗∗
(0.14)
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.009 0.050 0.003 0.016 0.012
Log likelihood -151.72 -119.07 -115.71 -160.84 -124.22 -128.25
N 137 141 142 137 138 143
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure A1: Comparing the Effect of Urban Residence, FDR, Willkie, and Female (1944)
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Figure A2: Comparing the Effect of Catholic, Jewish, Non-church, and Grammar School (1944)
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Figure A3: Comparing the Effect of Some College, Age 19-24, Age 25-34, and Age 35-44 (1944)
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Age 55 to 64





















































Figure A4: Comparing the Effect of Age 55-64 and Age 65+ (1944)
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